Max 22, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER 
eoming in reverse renders any position exceed- 
ingly perilous, but tliis steepness of the fall of the 
land toward the -^gean renders the fire of the 
ships one that can only be delivered at very long 
range and one that may consequently be less 
effective. The point will be clear enough from the 
following diagram. 
Supposing the section of the land to be 
roughly what appears in this diagram, with the 
lesser peak D at D and the higher Achibaba peak 
at X, it is clear that, save from quite a long way 
out at sea, or by the aid of aircraft from above, 
one could get no view of the falling of the shells : 
even the slopes of the summit of Achibaba would 
not be visible save from many miles out into the 
JE^ean, while the ships would also have to stand 
well out in order that the trajectory of the fire 
indicated by the dotted lines and arrows should 
surmount the steep slopes which fail down to the 
water on this side. 
The real opportunities afforded to a fleet can, 
of course, only be tested by those wlio have the 
ground under their own eyes, but a study of the 
contours makes such conclusions as those I have 
suggested seem fairly certain. 
One may sum up, therefore, and say that a 
study of the map alone impresses one with the great 
strength of this position and with the very intense 
efforts that will have to be made if it is to be forced 
at all. Once forced, upon the other liand, the 
retirement of the enemy beyond it over lower 
ground will expose them to severe punishment. 
The north-eastern slope of the ridge towards the 
valley which lies between it and the second 
position — the escarpment of the Pasha Dagh sur- 
rounding the Narrows — is a series of long, easy 
stretches of falling land entirely exposed to fire 
from those who may have acquired the summits of 
the Achibaba ridge. Troops falling back from 
that ridge across the Soghan Dere — that is, fall- 
ing back from the position A B on the above 
sketch to the semi-circular position C D on the 
escarpments of the Pasha Dagh and covering the 
Narrows — will, during the first part of their re- 
tirement, be completely exposed to fire following 
them from the ridge they have just abandoned. 
Save in the neighbourhood of the buildings at 
Arpeton (see Diagram D), there would seem to be 
no cover afforded, either by natural features or by 
the contours of the ground, though it may be that 
rocky scars or what not of a sort which the contoui 
map does not show occasionally afford such cover. 
It must not be forgotten either that once th< 
ridge is taken it will be under fire from heavj; 
artillery posted on the Pasha Dagh or its neigh- 
bourhood, as also under fire at long range from the 
permanent works and mobile barriers of heavy 
guns upon the Asiatic coast. 
THE PRESENT GERMAN TEMPER. 
iWhile it is an error to exaggerate the moral 
factor represented by the temper of the enemy at 
any moment, it is well to appreciate what that 
temper is, for it has its effect upon each phase of 
the war, and the reader may be recommended to a 
very excellent summary of that temper which 
appeared in the Times of last Monday. It was 
there pointed out that German confidence in vic- 
tory — meaning, presumably, the confidence of the 
populace, not of those trained to war and able to 
weigh the international situation — was perhaps 
higher now than it had been since the winter. The 
cause of this state of mind is simple enough. It 
has been produced by the great Austro-German 
advance in Galicia, and those of us who are wise 
enough to put ourselves into the shoes of the enemy 
and to imagine how we should feel if we read in 
the course of a fortnight of an advance over some- 
thing like fifty miles and the presence of our 
troops at the very gates of a recently-fallen 
fortress, of great captures of prisoners, and of 
more moderate but appreciable captures of guns 
will understand perhaps why uninstructed 
opinion of the enemy is affected by similar news. 
At the same time we shall do well to re- 
member that all those strivings after a moral 
effect which have distinguished the enemy's action 
during the last month and more remain fruitful 
in his eyes. The Lusitania, for instance, has been 
sunk with a certain moral result which, probably, 
the enemy does not yet appreciate. But the imme- 
diate effect has not been to throw into the scale 
any tangible and measurable weight against him, 
for expressions of disgust, of horror, or of hatred 
produced by such acts, as also by the minor exist- 
ence of the same temper which is to be found in 
the use of the new poisonous gases, the bombard- 
ment of Dunkirk, the attempting to burn English 
watering-places, and the rest of it, will neces- 
sarily seem to those who have approved and sup- 
ported such conduct only so many tributes to their 
success. The impartial observer of the campaign, 
including, of course, the enemy's own General 
Staff, distinguishes clearly between what is a mili- 
tary and what is not a military action. You would 
probably find, if you could hear the discussions 
of the commanders, civil and military, of the 
enemy armies at this moment, that there was a 
party, consisting, presumably, of the more sol- 
dierly and better read or better travelled men, 
who doubted the value of such peculiarly civil 
experiments, just as during the French Revolu- 
tion the more soldierly-minded amongst those who 
conducted the State tried to make of the terror an 
instrument merely of martial law and tried to 
restrict its expansion into an instrument of 
torture. 
To take the specific instance just quoted, it 
is probable that quite a number of men, either a 
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