LAND AND WATER, 
May 22, 1915. 
minurity or less j/owerful than the rest amongst 
those conducting German affairs, see that a crime 
such as that conunittc^d against the Lusitania, 
while it has very little direct military value, in- 
directly lowers the chances of a successful issue, in 
so far as purely moral agencies can tend towards 
that result. But we cannot expect the mass of the 
German population to follow reasoning of this 
kind, and we should do well to remember that 
every new accretion to this pressure of terror 
upon enemy civilians is supported by the mass of 
German opinion. 
In the same way, not only the most soldierly, 
but all of those who are occupied in purely mili- 
tary direction upon the side of the enemy, know 
perfectly well what the retirement of the Russian 
Army from Galicia means. They set down on the 
credit side the Russian loss of the passes, the 
security of Hungary for the moment (and a most 
important moment it is), and the Russian losses 
in men and material; but they set on the debit 
side the failure to break the Russian line, which 
was necessarily the ultimate object of so consider- 
able an attempt. 
They know that Russia is fighting upon two 
fronts at once, or, if the Eastern front be divided 
into its two natural sections, then upon three 
fronts, and that the Austro-German coalition 
cannot undertake a great offensive with its la.st 
reserves of this kind without correspondingly 
weakening, and ultimately dangerously weaken- 
ing, the forces in the rest of the field. In other 
words, every impartial student of the campaign, 
whether hostile or friendly to the Austro- 
Germans, recognises that a great expense in men 
and munitions of this kind is in the long run worse 
than immobility, unless it succeeds in its main 
object. 
But here, again, you cannot expect the man 
of uninstructed German opinion to have any such 
detached and purely intellectual standpoint. We 
have only to remember how opinion at home is 
moved by the news of a small advance and 
depressed by the news of a small retirement to 
judge the like leakage in this, as in most other 
affairs of popular emotions during the strain of a 
war. 
What is the practical effect upon our analysis 
of the operations of this judgment — if it be 
correct (as I believe it is) that the enemy's civilian 
opinion is now more confident by far than it was a 
few weeks ago ? 
So far as I can judge, the main effect would 
seem to be this : that this opinion will be prepared 
for very heavy losses indeed during the heavy fight- 
ing that is bound to come with the early summer. 
It would seem to me to mean that what the French 
call the " va-tout " upon the part of the enemy, 
an expenditure of men more lavish than even he 
has yet attempted, will be the result of the 
reaction of this civilian temper upon the military 
commanders. And with regard to this judgment, 
if it be sound, we may further say, as we have said 
throughout this campaign, that two alternatives 
present themselves, the second far more probable 
than the first. 
Either by deliberately incurring a quite 
abnormal wastage in men the enemy will achieve 
his main object, which is the piercing of the lice 
containing him to the east or to the west, the 
recovery of his liberty of manoeuvre, and the 
defeat upon a large scale of some considerable 
body of those pierced and turned — a main success 
which would be followed by the drawn peace at 
which he is aiming, including the retention (of 
course) of the Belgian ports : that is the first alter- 
native. Or — the second alternative, and the more 
probable if we are to judge by the analogy of the 
whole campaign from the battle of Ypres in 
October and November to the present day — this 
vast expenditure of men for which he is preparing 
opinion at home will fail in its object. If it does so, 
then it will have precisely the effect which the 
Allies would most desire. For, at the risk of very 
tedious repetition, it must again be insisted upon 
here, as it has been insisted upon so often in these 
columns, that this siege warfare is ultimately a 
warfare of wearing down. The enemy deliberately 
chooses to lose more men in proportion than he 
can make his opponents lose. He deliberately 
chooses this expensive policy, enormously more ex- 
pensive in the West, and probably somewhat more 
expensive in the East, because he believes that 
sooner or later it will bear fruit which will make 
the expense worth while ; but with every failure the 
depletion of his numbers makes it less and less 
probable that the next attack will succeed, and 
there is a certain limit after which his losses will, 
if he does not break the containing lines, produce, 
as a mere arithmetical certainty, a state of affairs 
in which he can no longer hold his own lines at 
their present length. 
What will be the effect of all this on neutral 
intervention and what would happen to the 
enemy's numbers and to his use of men if Italy 
should declare war, or, better still, Italy and 
Roumania between them should declare war? 
Without attempting to prophesy, which is 
manifestly futile, one may suggest a consequence 
which is almost certain. The arrival of Italy into 
the field would draw away from the Eastern and 
Western fronts not less than ten corps. The arrival 
of Roumania as well into the field would make 
that ten grow to not less than fifteen. 
Let no one imagine that these numbers are to 
be drawn from some supposed reserves of men 
already trained which the enemy has not yet 
thrown into the fighting line. It is the very 
characteristic of the present situation, it is the 
very root of the German confidence and of the 
fury of the Austro-German attack in the East, 
that the enemy is putting into the fighting line 
at this moment every atom of fighting power he 
has at his command. 
The intervention of a neutral at this moment 
would not presumably be felt upon the West, 
though it would prevent anything more than a 
very brief attempt at attack towards the West. It 
would probably be felt upon the Eastern line. For 
there the insufficiency of Russian equipment and 
munition presents a better hope of holding the 
results already acquired with a lesser number of 
men than those now occupied in pressing forward. 
HILAIRE BELLOC. 
MR. HILAIRE BELtOGS WAR LECTURES. 
Mr. Belloc's next ledare at Queen's Hall, London, will b$ 
on WednesJa\). June 2nd. It will be illustrated ti) coloured slide* 
oj the recent fighting and will deal with the present position of 
the War. 
Mr. Belloc's next lecture at the Winter Gardens, Boarac 
mouth, is at 3.30. Tuesday;, Max; 25th. 
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