May 22, 1915. 
LAND AND .W.ATER 
ROTE. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
THE AMERICAN NOTE. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
—This trtlcte bas been (obmitted to the Press Burean, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n» 
responsibility for the correctness ot the statements. 
SEVERAL events of great naval importance 
have occurred in the past week. H.M.S. 
Goliath (Captain Shelford) has been tor- 
pedoed in the Dardanelles. The British 
Legation at Athens has offered liberal sums to 
those who give information of the whereabouts of 
the German submarines. The Russian Fleet has 
had an inconclusive engagement with the Turkish 
Fleet — headed by the Sultan Janus Selim (late 
Goeben). It was inconclusive because the Turks 
retired. But for its ultimate influence on the 
naval war, President Wilson's Note to Berlin is 
likely to be the most important of them alL 
At the time of writing there is no indication 
of the sort of reception the German Government 
has given to this exceedingly explicit document. 
The Press, however, is in a very unrelenting 
mood. Nor is there any indication of the course 
President Wilson will take if that reception 
proves unfriendly. It may, therefore, appear 
premature to discuss its possible results; but it 
does not seem so to me, for Germany must either 
promise to desist from wholesale sinkings or 
refuse to desist, and if she refuses, America must 
either submit to a most outrageous snub or her 
relations with Germany must cease altogether to 
be friendly. If they cease to be friendly, those 
relations must be either those of open war or of 
passive hostility. In any event, then, the Presi- 
dent's Note cannot leave things as it found them, 
and, for obvious reasons, it is the war at sea that 
will be most affected by the change. 
The real interest of the Persident's Note is 
not that it calls upon Germany to cease offending 
America; it is a definite demand that she shall 
cease from her crimes against humanity. This is 
to take a very high line, and seems to create a 
situation which does not permit of an ambiguous 
reply. If Germany accepts the reproof, the 
simplification of the naval position hardly needs 
to be demonstrated. The Germans cannot, how- 
ever, be asked to abandon their right to stop con- 
traband in neutral ships or to capture enemy 
ships. And as submarines are the only craft 
she has available for either purpose she can 
only search and capture as far as a sub- 
marine crew can do these things. The ex- 
periment would be interesting. If loyally 
attempted, of course, without illegal sinking, a 
certain success could be possible, but only if the 
captains respected the fragility of the submarine. 
Great Britain would have no hesitation, one sup- 
poses, in undertaking that merchantmen should 
not attack them in return for a German promise 
to abandon the sinking of merchantmen. But the 
undertaking would have to include sinking after 
search as well as sinking before search. Is it 
likely that Germany will invite us to enter into 
any such bargain? It is more probable that she 
will reject America's claim to direct her method 
of conduct. What, then, will America do? 
Jhere seems to be a choice of three courses 
open. She can break off friendly relations with- 
out going to war. This, from a naval point of 
view, will leave things much as they aiie, except 
in one important particular. It is that the 
Americans will probably take strenuous steps to 
prevent goods being shipped from the States to 
Germany through neutral countries. If this were 
done, the task of patrolling the North Sea and of 
searching the trade now making for Danish, 
Swedishj and Norwegian ports would be greatly 
eased. 
It is more probable that public opinion in 
America wiU insist upon active hostilities, and 
if these were confined to naval hostilities the 
gain to the Allies would be very great indeed. 
Obviously if an effort were made to raise and 
equip a military force, industrial resources now 
devoted to making munitions for us might be 
deflected to making them for the national army. 
This would be a development highly deleterious 
to us, for no American army could be ready in 
any useful time. Nor would this deflection of 
munitions be the only disadvantage. The effort 
would so strain American financial resources as to 
make it impossible for the European Allies to 
expect assistance there. But with America at war, 
but not committed to a land campaign, the Allies 
who are so committed might, in addition to shells, 
guns, and rifles, have the benefit of the sympa- 
thetic support of the only great neutral money 
market in the world. 
It is, however, to the direct help of the United 
States Navy that we should look for the most im- 
portant and the most direct results. The IFnited 
States Navy is powerful in fighting units of the 
first class. It possesses no less than ten completed 
ships of the Dreadnought type. They can bring 
into battle broadsides amounting to eighty 12-inch 
guns and twenty 14-inch guns. And the Okla- 
homa and Nevada were within ten per cent, of 
completion on March 1. These two ships would 
raise the total of the Dreadnoughts to twelve, and 
add a further twenty 14-inch guns to the broad- 
side. The Pennsylvania and the Arizona are 
some way off from completion. Of pre-Dread- 
noughts there are five of the Kansas, two of the 
Louisiana, and five of the New Jersey classes, all 
laid down in 1904, 1905-6. These constitute 
twelve ships of reasonable speed and very consider- 
able gun power. There are, indeed, no twelve 
pre-Dreaduoughts in Europe more heavily armed. 
With the still earlier types, the three Maines, the 
three Alabamas, the Kearsage and Kentucky and 
the four old battleships of Mr. Witney's pro- 
gramme we need not concern ourselves. America 
possesses no battle-cruisers, but there are ten 
armoured cruisers, five armed with 10-inch and 
6-iuch, and six armed with 8-inch and 6-inch guns, 
all nominally capable of twenty-two knots. But 
these, again, are of no great value except for 
patrolling purposes. Of fast cruisers America 
has very few; in point of fact, three only, tho 
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