LAND AND WATEK. 
May 22, 1915- 
tage of surprise doc- not exiat tlio means whieli esperienco 
has showa to be most effective in the long ruu would only 
liave been used by all combatants. 
In fighting day by day, a tou of high explordvc divided 
among-it many shells and discliarged from mobile v/eapous 
will do far more damage than a ton of chlorine, and takoi 
far le3?i haulage and trouble generally than will the appliances 
needed to discharge the gaa; hence, beyond certain lin:ited 
surprises, the Germans have gained but little in the theatre 
of war and have lost incomparably mora outiide it— namely, 
the last rags of consideration which their first outrages and 
crin;93 might have left them to cover the disfigured and naked 
body of their race, lliey have forgotten the dicium o? 
ClautewitT, th.tt the use of absolute force in war must be 
ternpsred by expediency; in other word.s, that it does not pay 
to outrage the general sense of decency and the feelings of 
the humau rac-e by methods more ruthless and ciuel than those 
Banctioned by custom. 
And, further, they have done this at the most inoppor- 
tune moment for their own cause. The resentment aroused 
by thjir atrocities in Belgium was beginning to die down, 
and in the general feeling of war-weariness it was in danger 
of being forgotten. It is mora than pos.sib!o that the sym- 
pathy of ali neutrals (iuoludtiig, of course, the United States) 
mi^ht liave been againnt the Allies in their det«rmination to 
exact terras of peace that shall en.TOre the root desti"uction of 
Prussian militarism. But the sinking of the Liisifama has 
opened the half-blind eyes of some parts of the world to what 
a renewal of war with Germ.any, following on a period of 
armed truce, would mean to all on whom she could lay her 
hands, and I doubt whether at the present moment there is 
a neutral Power in exislejioe which will have even a word of 
sympathy for Germany's inevitable punishment whea the end 
arrives. 
Fortunately the conduct of her sea pirates Las shown 
03 the practical way to attain our purpose in a manner that 
will enlist the sympathies of all neutral peoples. 
It was easy to talk of destroying " Prussian militarism," 
but, a.t the attempts of Napoleon after Jena proved most con- 
clu.-=iv-ely, it was by no means easy to suggest a practical 
method of doing so.^ 
But it will be well for all coantries to remember that the 
German Army can never again be foi'midable without it has 
83a power behind it. 
The present war has proved this up to the hjlt. 
Once normal conditions have been restored the Socialist 
Party in Germany will be quite strong enough to prevent any 
expenditure on a War Navy unles.<< it can be shown that sucli 
a fleet serves p.ome other purpose than that of supporting 
aggression. When it had, at the beginning of its oxistsnco, 
the plausible excuse of protecting its ocean-going commerce, 
it pofsesr.ed a motive strong enough to capture both commer- 
cial and labour votes. 
If we in the future rigidly proliibit any German-ov/ned 
vessel flying the Germ.an merchant flag from entering any 
port in the ci«lised world (even in tliose of the British Empire 
would suffice), then the argument of " commerce protection " 
would at once cea.'^o to exi.'^S, and consequently money would 
be lacking for a War Navy. 
Such prohibition would not inflict any injury on legiti- 
mate German trade (her merchant navy, of course, excepted), 
for it is all the same to the inland merchant wliO transports 
his goods over-seas, provided that freightage is rea^^onable, 
and the competition for the carrying trade between Brilish, 
Norwegian, Swedish. Danish, and Russian ships, &c., would 
eufiice to keep that down to about its proper level. 
_ Tneidentally, it would give back to the neutral nations 
their share in that trade which the German subsidised liners 
had taken away from them. 
Deprived of her fleets, Germany would then be in much 
the same position as Switzerland. No one would threaten 
her, for no one covets one acre of her legitimate possessions, 
and since, shorn of her weapons of aggression, she could not 
threaten in her turn, no matter how large her Army might 
be, and the pence of Central Europe would be secured for very 
many generations by this device. 
THE DANGEROUS TALK OF PEACE. 
By FREDERICK GRUiNDY. 
w 
HY not discuss the terms of peace ? " Such 
were the words that appeared over a long 
article by a distinguished writer a short 
time ago. No more depressing thought 
could well occur than such a discussion at 
»uch a moment as this. 
After nine months of warfare on a scale hitherto un- 
imagined, in which the units engaged are not mere armies, 
but nations in arms, and those the greatest nations of Europe; 
when for three parts of a year such countries of 
Europe as have not already been drawn into the 
bloody vertex have been shuddering on its brink; 
when an entire kingdom baa been laid waste and 
those of its civil population who are not refugees in 
foreign lands are dependent for their scant d.aily bread upon 
the charity of strangers; when iive-sixths of Poland is in even 
a more pitiable and desperate condition, after waging a war- 
fare which, in the words of that great patriot Paderewski, has 
been "Parricide, Fratricide, and compulsory Suicide"; 
when for month after month the ears of the world have been 
insulted and stunned by stories of inhuman cruelty and bestial 
lust, incredible but for the overwhelming evidence of their 
truth; when the killed, the wounded, and the captured are 
already numbered by the million — wlien these and a hundred 
other things are considered, it may seem strange to find any- 
thing depressing in the thought of peace. 
As a fact, there is much that is depressing, even alarrnin", 
in the way in which the idea of peace ia being put forward at 
the present moment. The danger is not lessened but rather 
increased by the fact that at the moment the majority perhaps 
of the British people will say, " We are not thinking of peaos, 
and will not think of it until the Allied Armies have achieved 
complete victory and the Allied Nations can impose Cttin^ 
terms. Beaides that, wo are being warned v/ith increasing 
insistency of late in the daily Press not to be deceived by the 
ia» 
rosy optimism which pervades the ofllcial reports. We ar« 
told that ' the changes of line in the last six months would 
hardly be noticed by a map-maker,' and see the Government 
being urged ' to use every effort to make the nation under- 
stand how small is the progress yet attained on land, and 
how great and manifold are the sacrific-es which must be 
faced.' If this be true, is it likely that Germany, any more 
than ourselves, will be willing to listen to peace talk vet 
awhile?" 
This is not difficult to answer. It is some little time ago 
now that " the directing mind " of Germany, as Mr. Belloo 
Las well called it, had been forced to the point of admitting, 
" We are prepared to meet a reasonable demand upon us and 
to discuss terms." 
It must not be thought that the recent unspeakable con- 
duct of the Germans, both on land and sea, betokens any idea 
on their part— or, rather, on the part of the "directing 
minds " — that they will ultimately secure complete victory 
over the Allies by the steady pursuit of their policy of 
"f rightfulness." The murder of harmless fishermen, 
asphyxiating gases, and the torpedoing of peaceful linera 
differ nothing in manner or degree from the horrors of 
Belgium and Poland. If after the latter Germany saw some 
li_opo of success in approaching Europe and the neutral 
countries with what am,ount«d to a request for " a draw," it 
is not likely that she will be deterred from that object because 
in the meantime she has committ.ed fresh atrocities. 
Indeed, when we consider the strange ramifications and 
perverted logic of the German mind, tlie very opposite is 
more likely to bo the case. " If all these atrocities have not 
made it impossible, but only rather difficult, to float the idea 
of a draw." such a mind would argue, " then let us try 
others." This, surely, ia the basic idea of the German polic? 
of "f rightfulness." ' 
It k tlus idea of '• a draw," or evea sometliing sliglitlj; 
