LAND AND WATER 
May 29, 1915. 
reaches just snuth of that town the sea marshes 
beyond which uuthing can be done. The total 
distance from the issue of the hills to the marshes 
is, as the crow flies, no more than fourteen miles. 
All the first part of this — that is, all the left 
bank of the Juarli as far as Brazzano — gives the 
Austrian defensive an excellent series of posi- 
tions, though there are places where the right 
bank dominates the left, while south of Brazzano 
and half-way between that point and Palmanova 
tliere is a knuckle of high land — X — north of 
Medea, on which any delaying action fought by 
the Austrians against the Italians on this narrow 
gate would find a point d'afpui. 
But let us suppose no attempt is made to save 
the merely political line. The Austrians can 
readily abandon it, and discover immediately 
behind it (not three hours' march away) the 
parallel and much more formidable line of the 
Isonzo. 
This river issues from a gorge which can be 
defended with the utmost ease as far as Salcano, 
while the southern part of the line towards the 
sea is dominated everywhere by clearly marked 
heights from Kubbia to Monfalcone on the sea 
itself. These heights I have indicated on the 
sketch by the letters C-D. 
There remain between the two positions the 
plain and town of Gorizia. This plain is not 
moi*e than six miles across, encircled everywhere 
with hills, and in a situation for artificial defence 
as good as any to be discovered on the frontier. 
The line of the Isonzo is a really formidable 
line. Until it is carried Trieste and the Istrian 
Peninsula are safe, unless, indeed, a naval argu- 
ment modifies all these conclusions, drawn from 
Continental conditions only. It is the point of 
sea power. The sea road towards Trieste is but a 
ribbon, everywhere confined betAveen hill country 
and the water, hut it is everywhere under the guns 
of the Itcdian Fleet. That fleet is, by far, 
superior to the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic. 
On the other hand, this war has shown that 
a fleet cannot cover a coast against the danger of 
submarine attack. 
The modification of the land strategy pro- 
duced by this consideration I must leave to my 
colleague who deals with naval affairs upon this 
paper, for I am not competent to discuss it. I 
merely note it in passing as conceivably negativ- 
ing all that is to be said upon the strength of the 
Istrian frontier regarded merely as a military 
line by land. 
To sum up : In all three sectors, though for 
different reasons in each, an Austrian defensive 
has very heavy opportunities against an Italian 
attack. In the first sector, the Trentino, because 
the Austrians hold the mouth of an enclosed 
valley. In the second, because they have a vrall, 
the Carnatic Alps. In the third, because they 
have on the frontier itself, but much more on the 
Isonzo, a good natural defensive line. Those who 
conceive of the campaign as a mere occupation of 
the flat country below the Alps by the Italians, 
accompanied by a voluntary retirement of the 
enemy until the watershed is reached, have not 
paid attention to the details of the ground. 
The Italian offensive all along this stretch 
then, from the Lake of Garda to the Istrian 
Peninsula, is heavily handicapped. It has only 
ore leal advantage over the defensive— a .serious 
one, it possesses a first-rate lateral communica- 
tion in the railway running on the Italian side 
along the foot of the Alps from Verona, through 
Trevezo, to Udine, which railway throws out 
branches to the north. The defensive in the hilla 
lias, of cour.se, no such power of moving from right 
to left, or of sending munitions at will from point 
to point. But it is so governed by natural cir- 
cumstances that this Italian advantage in arti- 
ficial lateral communications is far outweighed. 
Meanwhile we must carefully note that there 
does not exist on the Italian side corresponding 
advantages for the defensive against an offensive 
undertaken fi'om the Austrian side of the 
frontier. 
The defensive is so strong nowadays when it 
is properly entrenched that, with suflicient pre- 
paration, almost any line can be held. These 
remarks must, therefore, not be taken to mean 
that an offensive in equal numbers from the 
Austrian side would be successful. It might or 
might not be. But it would only be acting under 
the difficulties that every offensive acts under in 
modern war unless it is backed by very superior 
heav}' artillery. 
So far as purely natural features are con- 
cerned, the uihole frontier is, strategically speak- 
ing, as much a temptation to the enemy to advance 
as it is the threat against an Italian attempt at 
the offensive. 
All this is supposing that the enemy can 
really spare the men for a proper defensive, or 
even for an offensive. Whetiier he can spare them 
or no we cannot tell until the action has developed. 
But as I write this — upon Tuesday evening — 
there comes the news that skirmishes have already 
taken place upon the third of these three sectors, 
the front behind which lies the position of the 
Isonzo. 
THE HEAVY GUN. 
But this discussion of geographical details 
and the artificial strengthening of specified 
points is subsidiary in the present campaign 
to that one factor which is now known to be 
everywhere the decisive thing — the heavy gun and 
its munitionment. 
Does Italy propose to force the extremely 
strong defensive line of her enemy? Only a 
superior concentration of heavy artillery deliver- 
ing a tornado of high explosive shell will be of 
effect. 
Will she find herself in a position to force 
the permanent works round Trent? They will 
resist for months, just as Przemysl resisted for 
months, unless there is brought against them in 
great numbers the heavy mobile howitzer and 
with it masses of munition. That modern instru- 
ment of war, supplied for even forty-eight hours 
with an uninterrupted stream of projectiles and 
charges, will, as w^e know, dominate most per- 
n.anent works. In a week or ten days it will 
dominate any permanent work. Five days nearly 
did for Troyon ; ten days entirely did for Manon- 
villiers; rather more than a week for the perma- 
nent works of Maubeuge; a day or two for 
Antwerp; and a few hours for Namur. But in 
the absence of the weapon and its provision the 
permanent work resists indefinitely. 
The lesson is such a simple one, it was .so 
early seized by the French General Staff', it is so 
clearly the great tactical issue of the campaicrn, 
that one is almost ashamed to insist on it aga^n, 
