LAND AND .WATER 
May 29, 1915. 
Now let us see wliat has happened there at 
D. All the c.'id of the week— Friday, tlie 14th, 
Saturday, the ISih, Sunday, the 16th — a bonibard- 
ment was being kept up above the western works 
of Przcinysl, which the Russians had elected to 
defend. But it was not here that the main effort 
was to be looked for : that came ten miles away, 
to the east, at Hussakow, to which point the 
enemy got in his violent effort of the Monday and 
the Tuesday, the 17th and 18th. 
It would seem that he captured Hussakow 
upon Tuesday, the 18th, towards the end of the 
day. But he was driven out of it : apparently, 
upon the Wednesday, the 19th. He thereupon did 
•wnat he has done throughout this campaign — 
attempted a flanking movement, and struck hard 
at Lutkow — and Lutkow the enemy carried and 
held. Beyond this point he could not proceed, but 
the following rather more detailed sketch will 
Bhow how dangerously close he is to the railway 
at this short sector of the front. 
Meanwhile, away beyond the marshes, forces 
under Linsinger were fighting between Stryj and 
Stanislau, trying to occupy the Russians in front 
of them and prevent their sending reinforcements 
to the neighbourhood of Przemysl. They were, 
further, attempting to push the Russians before 
them beyond the line of the Dniester. 
In the Bukovina the Archduke Eugene was 
doing no more than hold his own after the retire- 
ments towards the Pruth, which has been lately 
mentioned. 
THE ENEMY ON THE EASTERN 
FRONT HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED. 
Now, the whole of this great battle, which is 
still in process, has clearly for its enemy object 
the piercing of the Russian line, while the object 
of our ally is to preserve the cohesion of his line, 
in spite of grave lack of supply and in face of 
what has hitherto been the far superior munition- 
ing of the enem)^ 
The whole meaning of this battle, therefore, 
lies in the two alternatives. Either the Russian 
line will remain intact or it wiU not. 
If it remains intact the enemy is, strategic- 
ally speaking, beaten. The fact that he has 
advanced; the fact that he has nearly cleared 
Galicia of the enemy ; the fact that he has reduced 
the Russian forces originally present in Galicia 
by a sixth or even a fifth; the fact that he has 
destroyed or captured of their field artillery a 
twentieth or a tenth; his possible entry into 
Przemysl — all these matters, which are so many 
scores on his side and which will necessarily, and 
perhaps rightly, impress general opinion, are in a 
different category altogether from the major busi- 
ness of his strategic objective — the piercing of 
the line. 
As to losses, though he has the advantage of 
taking prisoner the stragglers and wounded of 
the retiring enemy, his actual loss of strength is 
certainly very much heavier than that of the Rus- 
sians, for he has attacked in the most compact 
shape and every succeeding day with the intention 
on that day of breaking, at no matter what ex- 
pense, his opponent's line. As to his geographical 
advance, it gives him strategically only this 
advantage — that the good railway system of 
Galicia passes more and more into his hands, 
while his foemen are more dependent as they retire, 
upon the inefficient railway system of Russia. 
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