May 29, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
As to the purely moral effect of certain names 
such as that of Przemysl, unless a garrison and a 
great deal of material were captured at the same 
time, it may be neglected. 
But the piercing of the Russian line would be 
quite another matter. It would be a decision. 
Now the elements which decide the chances 
of this event are numerous. They include, among 
the more important, the numbers of men engaged, 
and the equipment of the infantry and its muni- 
tion. But far and away the greatest of all the 
factors in the issue is the munitioning of the 
artillery, and particularly of the big guns and 
howitzers. Upon that, more than upon anything 
else, the issue will turn. 
We are not yet in possession of known facts 
which permit our judgment to repose upon a 
secure foundation. But we can estimate the pro- 
babilities of the situation. 
Power of artillery, and particularly of heavy 
artillery, obviously depend upon these four 
factors : 
(1) The number of pieces. 
(2) The munitions present — that is, the 
amount of shell present for discharge from those 
pieces. 
(3) The rate at which communications can 
send up supply to the front (which rate governs 
the rate of discharge). 
(4) The rate at which heavy munitions can Jje 
produced or purchased at the sources of supply, 
which ultimately governs the whole problem. 
To these four factors one might add two 
more : The power of " spotting," throiigh air- 
work or otherwise, so as to determine the range, 
and the general efficiency in the handling of the 
pieces. But these last two points may be elimin- 
ated, as they are pi-etty well equal on both sides 
upon the Eastern front. 
Now, these four factors being the deciding 
things we must first of all recognise that in the 
number of pieces between Central Poland and the 
Bukovina— that is, upon the three-hundred-mile 
line which is the scene of the present great battle 
— the enemy has certainly an advantage. He can 
produce heavj- pieces in greater numbers than the 
Russians can. And since he has been able to keep 
his heavy ai-tillerj- going forward at the rate of 
about five miles a day, he will, during the check 
imposed upon his advance for a whole week or 
more, have certainly got everything into line. 
Again, on the fourth point, the ultimate 
power of pixxiucing munitions, the enemy clearly 
has an advantage. He is far more highly indus- 
trialised than Russia, and Russia's power of pur- 
chasing from outside is limited by the blockade, 
including the closing of the Dardanelles, which 
leaves her no avenues of supply save the little gate 
round the north of the Baltic, the port of Arch- 
angel, and the very distant ports of the Far East. 
The issue really lies, tlierefore, in the second 
and third points : the supply of ammunition 
present on the front and the rate at wliich the com- 
munications can pass it up. Sooner or later the 
freat supply of heav^^ artillery ammunition can 
e reaccumulated by the enemy in greater amount 
than by our ally, but can he produce it in the crisi.s 
of this particular battle in sufTicient amount? 
And are the advantages of communication lying 
behind his line still so superior to those lying 
behind the Russian line that be will maintain a 
secure superiority in the crisiii of the battle? 
It may be doubted, and for the following 
reasons : 
The expenditure of heavy artillcr}^ ammuni- 
tion during the last month upon the enemy's side 
in Galicia has been like nothing hitherto 
attempted in the war. The dozen or so great pre- 
liminary actions by which the French have laid 
their foundation in the West, and the two or three 
in which the British have supported them, in- 
volved a concentrated fire of from half an hour to 
four hours at a time, with long intervals between 
each outburst. The intervals were thus prolonged 
because the Allies in the West rightly believed 
that time was upon their side, and were deter- 
mined, if they must shoot away very large amounts 
in these preliminary actions of the last three or 
four months, yet to shoot it away at a rate less 
than the rate of accumulation that was going on 
behind the line. They are rightly determined that 
when the biggest movement of all comes there shall 
be an overwhelming reserve of shell. 
But the enemy in Galicia was, during all 
May, fighting against time and determined, for 
political as well as for purely military reasons, to 
do his very utmost. The enemy in Galicia was 
doing with his munitions what the Allies in the 
West will only do with their munitions when they 
choose to provoke and to initiate the crisis of the 
war. 
Therefore the enemy in Galicia was perfectly 
lavish with heavy artillery munitions day after 
day. 
The intervals between each outburst of his 
concentrated fire were not inter rals of vveeks, but 
only of days, and sometimes of hours. There was 
a deluging of the Dunajec and Biala line for three 
whole days — the last two days of April and the 
first of May. Twelve miles further on, in the 
middle of the first week of May, there was another 
such deluge of shell. At the end of the week, a 
third upon the Upper Vislock and across the 
plain to the Vistula; two more in the next week — 
and so forth. While, upon reaching the line of 
the San, at the end of three weeks, the forcing 
of that river above Jaroslav was accomplished 
exactly as the forcing of the Dunajec had been 
accomplished twenty days before — by a riot of 
heavy shell. 
Let it be noted, further, that although the 
San was forced under this immense expenditure 
of ammunition, there did not follow a Russian 
retirement such as took place upon the Dunajec. 
A sector of the River San, a full day's march 
in length from the Jaroslav northwards, was 
possessed and held. But after that feat the Rus- 
sians forbade a further movement forward. They 
continued securely to hold the lower reaches of the 
river. To the north, beyond the Vistula, they 
actually advanced, as they did to the south 
between the Dneister and the Pruth. Meanwhile, 
such immediate visible supply of heavy ammuni- 
tion as the Russians could command had appa- 
rently been coming up from the bases in Russia. 
The railway system behind the Russians is in- 
sufficient, but it increases in power as the Rus- 
sian communications shorten. 
One may put the matter— quite hypothetic- 
ally, of course — in terms of given spaces of time. 
Suppose the enemy has largely exhausted hi."? 
supplies at the front, and cannot renew them for, 
say. a fortnight or more, that would be ample 
time for the consolidation of the new Russian 
