LAND AND .W.ATER, 
May 29, 1915, 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
NOTE -ThU .rtlcle h.s b«n submitted to the Pres. B«reaa. which does not object to the publication as censored, and tal^es no 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
T 
A WEEK OF CHANGES. 
HE past week has been almost barren of 
naval news. No operation at sea is re- 
ef the hands of Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher 
and confided to others. 
It is no part of my duty here to 'discuss this 
exceedingly important event. But it is ri<?ht that 
ported. There appears to be no material ^j^^ public should be reminded of a thing which' 
change in the position in the Dardanelles j^^^g j^g^jj completely lost sight of, where it has not 
— none, at least, affecting the share the Na\7; j^^gj^ misrepresented^ in recent discussions. Much' 
is ultimately to take in that exceedingly import- j^^g j^gg^ ^^^ q£ ^Ijg splendid services and eminent 
ant field. There have been, as so often before, talents of the veteran Admiral of the Fleet who 
rumours that the German High Seas Fleet was jj^^g retired from the arduous office of chief naval 
on several days west of Heligoland. But even an member of the Board of Admiralty. Unfortu- 
excursion in force to the Dogger Bank hardly lately, enthusiasm has carried many of his 
justifies its sonorous title, and certainly does not admirers far beyond the limits of usefulapprecia- 
prove any intention to seek a general action. It tion. They injure the person they are trying to 
is free to " come out " when it likes. For a cer- ggj.^g^ ^^^ they imply that the British Naw, de- 
tain radius, its action is not, and in modern con- ^-p^y^^ ^f ^ particular leader, must lose much of 
ditions apparently cannot be, interfered vfith by -tg fiahting value. This is grave injustice to 
the capital ships under either Sir John Jellicoe 
or Sir David Beatty. But it is a restricted chain 
that tethers it to Heligoland. It dare not get 
beyond the range of a safe run back to the mine- 
fields, unless it is willing to dare everything. If 
it could lure our faster squadrons into fighting on 
ground prepared by mines ; where submarines are 
waiting; into which destroyer flotillas can be 
poured — a partial battle in conditions of German 
choosing — our enemy have always been ready to 
offer us. But it seems that we may wait for ever 
to the decisive fight. 
There is a lull, whether intentional or not 
we cannot yet tell, in the submarine war. Only 
two ships have been attacked and sunk ; two ships 
and a few trawlers. Has the American Note 
brought reflection to the Wilhelmstrasse ? It is 
not impossible. Neutrals are becomJng scarce. 
The pirate campaign has been in every sense a 
failure. No future success can compensate for 
the loss of reputation it has brought ; for nothing 
short of seriously crippling British trade and 
food supplies is a success at all — and three 
months of brigandage have shown both these 
objects to be unattainable. And the submarines 
are wanted elsewhere. The Kaiser might intend 
to make an American virtue of a German neces- 
sity and call the whole thing off. He must do so 
sooner or later. It is not inconsistent with the 
facts that it has been called off already. It will 
take some time to give new orders to all the sub- 
marines. Many must be away on long-spell 
cruises in distant grounds — and their wireless 
is not good for more than one or two hundred 
miles. Even if piracy and murder were officially 
and publicly renounced — and nothing else can 
ensure the Americans keeping the peace — we 
should expect sporadic attacks to be made until 
all the U boats had returned within a communi- 
cating radius. 
But for all the dearth of news, the week has 
been an eventful one. No eight days s'ri-.^e 
August may, eventually, be found to have affected 
the naval aspect of the war more profoundly. 
Italy, possessing the most powerful of the neutral 
navies, has joined the Allies; and the supreme 
command of the British Navy has been taken out 
flag officers who are now serving. To those who 
know anything of the professional estimate of the 
outstanding figures in the three Admiral lists 
nothing can appear more ludicrous than to sup- 
pose that there could be any serious difficulty in 
finding a competent First Sea Lord. If there were 
any difficulty, it would be limited to the em- 
barrassment of those who had to choose the most 
worthy who could best be spared from other 
duties. That there are many worthy is obvious. 
It is one of the most curious of our characteris- 
tics as a nation that while public curiosity has 
brought every other class into the glare of news- 
paper notoriety the officers of the Navy remain 
unknown. Accidental circumstances have fami- 
liarised us with a few names — all of men long 
since retired. Of the younger generation the 
reader of newspapers knows nothing. It looks, 
therefore, to some as if to pass the supreme com- 
mand from a known to an unknown man were 
equivalent to exchanging the leadership of a 
genius for that of an incompetent. The sooner 
this delusion ends, the better for us all. The 
Navy has men of talent, knowledge, courage, and 
experience not only to fill all the commands, but 
to make at least two alternative Boards as well. 
It is no service to the nation or its Allies to speak 
as if this were not the case. 
THE ITALIAN NAVY. 
THE intervention of the Italian Navy should 
have a profound effect, not only in the 
Mediterranean but elsevvhere. Its materiel 
consists of four Dreadnoughts completed before 
1915, and two are due for completion this 
year, and, for all one knovrs to the contrary, 
may be completed already. These ships are 
armed with e-^ceptionally hea\y broadsides. The 
first four can bring no less than fifty-one 12-inch 
guns to bear in a fleet action. The last two add 
twenty-six more to the battle force. Of pre- 
Dreadnoughts there are ten of comparatively 
recent date, and some older and slower ships, for 
whom a value may be found. There is a certain 
number of protected cruisers, but the noniinal 
speed of the fastest is only 22 knots. But thera 
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