June 5, 1915. LAND AND .W.ATER. 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOG. 
N0TE.-Tl.i5 article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n* 
responsibility lor the correctness ol the statements. 
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no deBnite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE NEW ITALIAN FRONT. their existing fighting line, had not this numeri. 
THE work upon the Italian frontier is so ""^^ 'T/'^a l!^ ""'''' ^^' ^"fT ^^PP^'^"^ ^ ^^I"^'- 
farn^AliminoT.,.r^.,^, '''"^"- ^'■'^^^^^*^\}^ ^0 The Allies, as a whole, were already in 
covpST^S .X r-''?P''f'f'= numerical superiority over the enemy, and one 
armv sffll 31-: w^"" ^T^ ""^ ^° ^^^^ ^^^ absolutely certain to increase as time 
operations d^vP on Zf^tu"' . ^^f f''! T'"" ^^'^^^^ «^- ^ut the Allies, being divided into two 
Es r selfp oW^tw ""^^ ^^^.derstand them widely distant fields of action, that superiority 
of far Zlltvim^nllT fJ'''' JT'"'^'' ^^''^ ^,^e could not be used as a whole, and there was still 
sLceL^of th/Zfnn^^^^^ ^" opportunity for the enemy to show his 
ms^p? n.d fL i^ 11 ^^^.'"^' ^^' '"^''^S of superiority locallv upon the Eastern front. 
duSnirpnpHn/n/"'''K^r''VP^^^^^^ ^''''^' ^^ '^^ ^^"er if munitions, which are the 
during the period of mobilisation. other limb of the numerical calculation, the 
inese two points are, first, the numerical divergence was less pronounced in the West, but 
ejf ect ^hich the intervention of Italy will have probablv in the rate of production and accumula- 
upon tlie campaign, whether our new Ally is sue- tion of shell the Allies here had also some advan- 
cessim or unsuccessful in the main operations; tage over the enemy, and, with neutral sources of 
seconan tne tact that success in these main opera- supply open to them and an unhampered supply 
tions will very largely depend upon the railways of material, this superiority would presumably 
wliich either party commands. grow. But on the Eastern front the enemy pos- 
JSowhere in Europe, save upon the frontiers sessed a very heav}- superiority of munitionment 
ot Russian Poland and the Pyrenees, is there so over our Ally. 
great a contrast between two railway systems as Upon such a situation there enters upon the 
upon this new front. To great modern armies the side of the Allies a force which will reach in a 
fA^I IS everything. Not only does it actually comparatively short time the figure of 800,000 
feed them, but it supplies in a fashion quite ini- men, and behind these are reserves ultimately 
possible to any other form of transport those im- totalling at least another 800,000. 
mense masses of heavy artillery munitions upon What will be the effect of this addition ? 
which all work against the modern defensive is In the first place, to state the thing in round 
now proved to depend. figures, you have probably seven units of the 
Let us begin, then, by analysing the condi- enemy distributed thus : Two on the Western 
tions under which the entry of Italy into the field ^^pnt ; three on the Eastern front ; two, all told, 
will affect that numerical factor which is the basis within the area contained by these two fronts and 
of every sound judgment upon the war as a whole, ultimately available — counting the classes of 1916 
and 1917, or, rather, that part of those classes 
THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF which has not yet been used. 
ITALIAN INTERVFNTrONT «r ^^ against these you had on the Allied 
xxAi.i>^iN iiMiiKVtslNllON. Western side three; on the Allied Eastern side 
Call the total numbers of men fightincr on the ^^^®®- Behind the Allied Eastern side you had 
two fronts. Eastern and Western, thirteen! Then ^^^ number you like— two, three, or four — which 
on the same scale Italy brings in during the first °^7 waited equipment to appear in the field, and 
phase a further one. How can so slio-ht an addi- ^^^^^ could gradually replace wastage ; and on 
tion greatly affect the issue ? ° *^6 Western side already two, ultimately three, in 
Because this immediate addition of one (with PJ^^^ff. °^ rapid equipment and able in a very 
another one in reserve) challenges the narrowing short time to appear in the field, 
margin of man-supply remaining to the enemy . . ^^.^^^ ^^T Proportion, the advent of Italy 
To appreciate this truth, the argument may fult^l'l' "f ^- ^7^ ^^'^' ^"' ''P^^ *^^ '°^^^' ^^^ 
be tabulated as follows • ent may that at first sight seems a small figure. But the 
Roughly speaking, before Italy came into the ^l T^ produce, while depending largely, 
field the position was this • ^ ^^me into the upon the form which fighting takes upon this 
Of the enemy's total possible numbers of men abk ' "'"'' "^ '''^' ^ ' ''''''''^''" 
of useful age, efficient for service and available t^ • i. ^i. • , • , , . 
more than half remained ^°^"°=' ^^^^er that new factor is only the addition of one to the 
The Allies in the West had suffered far less fJif, nfllT mentioned let us see the, 
severely in proportion to their numbers and hS '^''^ ""^ l^f- '"'"'I'Von the enemy's reserve o man- 
in the new voluntary armies of the BrSish a ?'f ^^"^^^'^^ j^«^?-/f ^^^ of man-power at the 
perpetually growing reserJ^ fif^,"-' ^^^msted. Either against this on. which 
poS^Li t^^z!t^:^ri^i^ ^^s^r^ '^^ ^ --^— ^ - 
