June 5, 191c». 
LAND AND ^WATER 
Here is the matter in its simplest diagram- 
matic form. 
side a totally different state of things. There foi 
the whole distance of this front we have but ona 
lateral line, marked (2 2) upon the sketch, confined 
strictly to a narrow mountain valley, and not pos- 
sessing any branch lines at all. The enemy would 
-=— -1 
A certain point (T) and its territory (Trieste 
and the Istrian Peninsula) being of political im- 
portance and the objective of an Italian advance 
(1), is defended by a certain strategical frontier, 
A B, which is the line of the Isonzo, with its 
principal nucleus at Gorzg (G) ; but the political 
frontier, turning round by the north along A C D, 
has given to the enemy openings which are the 
mouths of the valleys at E and F, from which 
enemy forces can come down right upon the flank 
of the main line of the Italian offensive (1), and 
interfere with its communications. The line 
A F C E D is the mountain line of the frontier, 
the bulge at C is the point of the Trentino, and 
the gates upon either side, E and F, are the passes 
out of the Trentino on to the Italian plain, 
notably by the Val Sugana and over the Tornale. 
It is obvious that under any conditions of 
warfare a force acting along the line (1) against 
A B would have to protect its flank thus menaced 
from the north. 
But the factor of railways, especially as 
supplying the munitions for artillery, and par- 
ticularly for heavy artillery, adds something to 
the problem of this frontier which was not pre- 
sent when the great campaigns of the past 
— notably the victorious advance of the young 
Napoleon — established the military study of the 
district. 
The contrast between the railway systems in 
this region is a product of the Alps. To some 
extent it redresses the disadvantage under which 
Italy suffered from the way in which the frontier 
is traced ; but, apart from any advantage or dis- 
advantage upon either side, it makes the posses- 
sion of certain nodal points absolutely essential 
to the campaign. How this is so the following 
sketch will show. 
The Italian plain has running through it a 
line (111), serving Verona (V), Vicenza (v), Tre- 
viso ^T), Udine (U), which permits of rapid 
lateral transports of men and munitions from East 
to West, or vice versa, at will. Further, this main 
backbone is supplemented by, and relieved by, 
sundry other lines, some of which are shown in 
the sketch, and which, all between them, form a 
perfect network of communications available to 
the Italian commanders for the supply of muni- 
tions laterally to any point of concentration and 
back towards their main bases. This is because 
this system of railways is the system of a plain, 
and of a plain very densely populated and highly 
developed by modern industry. But once we have 
passed the frontiers we have upon the Austrian 
J 
^ ^^truizi3, 
'OSes 
lb ttalian 'Bases 
only bring up munitions to his front along one of 
two lines, that marked (3) passing through Ta 
(Tarvis), that marked (4), and passing Tr (Trent), 
and his only means of concentrating munitions 
and men at will from one of these lines to the 
other is the narrow mountain communication 
(2 2), a good railway line with plenty of rolling 
stock, but iinrelieved by any branching lines. 
Further, it is evident that the capture by the 
Italians of three points, nodal points, or junc- 
tions, in this system, would necessarily have the 
greatest effect upon the war. These three points 
are Tarvis (Ta), Trent (Tr), and, most important 
of all, the mountain jimction of Franzensfeste 
(F). There are altogether three, and only three, 
railway lines of advance out of the Alps on to 
the Italian plain upon this front, and these are 
the Pass of Pontebba above Tarvis, which I have 
marked P (1); the Val Sugana, which I have 
marked P (2) ; and the Valley of the Adige, which 
I have marked P (3). Now the capture and 
retaining of Tarvis (Ta) blocks all entry by the 
pass P (1). It renders circuitous and difficult the 
supply of munitions for the capture of that pass. 
The capture of Trent (Tr) closes the two railway 
entries P (2) and P (3), but for a counter-attack 
down the Adige Valley you would still have the 
whole railway system of Alpine Austria concen- 
trated upon them. For though munitions and 
men could not use the pass P (1), blocked by the 
occupation of Tarvis (Ta), yet the full communi- 
cations on the east with the Austrian basin, the 
railways (3 3), could add their effect to the rail- 
way from Innsbruck (4 4), and, so far as a single 
double-line railway could be used, the line down 
the Adige towards Trent (Tr) would be a perfect 
avenue of supply. The railways do not join again 
save sixty miles away and more behind the great 
mountain masses. 
Franzensfeste itself is only the name of a 
fort, but it is the junction of the railways here in 
the neighbourhood of the village Aicha. It would 
be no good holding the mere town and station of 
Brixan, half an hours walk away, unless the 
junction were seized. 
3* 
