June 5, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
COiVIPULSORY SERVICE ESTAB- 
LISHED DURING THE COURSE 
OF A CAMPAIGN. 
But while the arguments for and against con- 
scription on its purely military side must thus be 
stated strongly in favour of the system, when there 
is time for preparation, and when it is being 
established under peace conditions — with presum- 
ably a long time before one in which to mature it 
— quite another set of arguments attach to the 
application of compulsory service during the 
actual 'process of a great campaign. 
The two great examples, of course, are the 
French Revolutionary Wars and the action of the 
Northern States during the Civil W^ar in 
America. The analogy of these examples in the 
past is imperfect, but so far as they teach us any- 
thing we shall discover from them exactly what 
we find upon an examination of the conditions 
applying to Britain to-day— to wit, these two 
main propositions : 
(1) Compulsory service thus applied in the 
midst of a war is valuable or necessary in inverse 
proportion to the established rate of voluntary 
enlistment. 
^2) Compulsory service is valuable or neces- 
sary in proportion to the expected duration of the 
campaign after the policy is adopted, compared 
with the time through which the campaign has 
run before the policy was adopted. 
To examine these fundamental propositions : 
Let us first eliminate those arguments in 
favour of a long-matured scheme of conscription 
which obviously do not apply to universal com- 
pulsory service during the course of a war. 
Next let us state the military arguments 
against the adoption of such a policy in the midst 
of a war, and, lastly, let us state the arguments in 
its favour. 
When we have thus surveyed the field we 
shall see that the two propositions laid down 
above are true and are the main truths that we 
Lave to consider at this moment. 
L— THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT 
AGAINST. 
(o) The advantages of a conscript system 
which do not and cannot apply to compulsory 
service inaugurated in the midst of a war are, 
first, and most important, the provision of older 
reserves. A long matured conscript system gives, 
as we have seen, an exactly calculable reserve 
of older men behind the existing young men of the 
active army. We can call up for the purpose of a 
small war so many men ; of a larger war, so many 
more. If we have only trained a certain propor- 
tion of our total manhood, yet under a conscript 
system we know exactly how many of the re- 
mainder could pass the doctor, where each is to be 
found, what his trade is, and what his age. 
A conscript system applied in the midst of a 
war does not enjoy these fruits of long prepara- 
tion. All the work of registration, &o., has to be 
undertaken in the midst of the other very heavy 
work of the campaign ; the reserve of previously 
trained men does not exist, and, presumably, a 
great proportion of the men available have 
already volunteered. 
{h) Next, we have not that element of sim- 
plicity which a conscript system long established 
during peace would have given us. Many units 
are formed; the new le\y will add bodies varying 
in character from those we already possess. 
The " cadres " — that is, the body of profes- 
sional officers and non-commissioned officers whidi 
form the framework within which the new units 
are organised are not in existence. 
IL— THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT 
AGAINST. 
W^ith these two negative points go, of course, 
the positive arguments directly opposed to com- 
pulsion in the course of a campaign, as follows : 
(a) A compulsory levy suddenly calls for 
the training of a great body of new officers, the 
material for which you may not be able to find. 
(&) It calls for new equipment which you will 
not have ready. 
(c) It sharply differentiates within the body 
of your army between the men who have already 
volunteered and the men who have been summoned 
— the moral effect of this upon any. armed force 
must be very seriously weighed, and is one of the 
principal checks against a rash and unconsidered 
application of the policy. 
(d) Lastly, you have — and vastly the most 
important point — the fact that the compulsory 
principle suddenly applied in the midst of a 
great campaign involves the setting up of new 
machinery by which to decide who is required for 
work at home and who can best be sent to the 
front. To segregate men into these two c Xegories, 
to make certain that you will be making the most 
of your industrial power, to turn out the maxi- 
mum amount of ammunition, and of weapons, and 
of ships, and of clothing, and the rest of it, is a 
business at once lengthy and laborious. It will 
throw chaos into every branch of public service, 
and it will, as a mere mechanical task, be one of 
months. Finally : 
(e) (An argument which has its military 
side). If of many allies one in particular is of 
use to its fellows in spheres other than the field 
itself — e.g., as holding the sea, commei'ce bearing, 
transport work, coal supply, finance (which re- 
poses on production and commerce), manufacture 
of equipment, &c. Then the arguments in favour 
of restricting the total body of men to be used in 
the field obviously apply to that ally as a member 
of the whole. If it put too many men into the 
field at the expense of other activities necessary 
to the whole alliance that alliance would lose far 
more than it would gain. 
III.— THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR. 
The merely military arguments in favour of 
adopting the compulsory principle in the midst of 
a war are simple, and may be put very briefly. 
(1) It provides in the long run (supposing all 
its disadvantages can be got over) the full maxi- 
mum of fighting power. Sooner or later a com- 
pulsory system, even though it be applied after 
a campaign has already run a great part of its 
course, will give you all the men available for the 
completion of it. 
(2) It gives you a simple machine calculable 
in all its numerical relations and freed from every 
anxiety upon recruitment as a whole, or the excess 
of men in one service at the expense of another. 
(3) It ultimately permits you to arranga 
exactly the man-power in manufacture and trans- 
port required behind your army for its supply and 
maintenance. 
