LAND A N D WATER 
June 5, 1915. 
(4) It leavpR you free to face an indefinitely 
long future secure in an increasing stream of re- 
cruitment, calculable exactly in amount. 
(5) It provides a universal system every- 
where equally cemented by the strongest sort of 
discipline. Tliere arc no patches. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
Now. it is quite evident from such an exam- 
ination of the full arguments for and against that 
the two main propositions we have put forward 
above can be established. 
(1) The compvlsonj principle applied in the 
midst of a campaign is valuable in inverse pro- 
portion to the "rate of voluntary enlistment 
already developed and con tinning. 
Supposing that a nation has in adult males 
of military age a total of eight millions. Suppos- 
ing that of these eight millions six millions at the 
outside are efficient; ^ supposing that of these six 
millions (under the particular conditions of the 
country in question) the number of men who — 
though efficient for military service and of 
military age — will be required for transport, for 
manufacture of munitions, clothing, &c., for 
carrying on the foreign trade, for supplying not 
only its own armies but also, perhaps, those of its 
Allies, three million must remain behind. You 
have then a maximum of three million left. 
Supposing that of these three million two 
million have voluntarily enlisted. It is presum- 
able or certain that these two-thirds will physic- 
ally be a pick of the whole ; that the strict regula- 
tions fur their enlistment will have eliminated the 
older men and the less fit, who will only be taken in 
the last emergency. It may justly be postulated 
that with two million thus voluntarily enlisted the 
grave dangers and disorder and delay occasioned 
by the sudden adoption of a compulsory principle 
would not be compensated by a corresponding 
advantage. You might get another half -million 
equal, as material, to the two million you had 
already obtained, but half a million will be the 
outside figure. The chances are that most of those 
not enlisted would be men somewhat over the age 
or somewhat less efficient than your voluntarily 
enlisted material, or (as the state of the labour 
market proved) required for the civilian work of 
making provisions, of transport, &c., upon which 
every army in the field reposes, or for some purpose 
of commerce, or exchange vital to the alliance. 
Supposing, upon the contrary, that with, three 
million really available, only a million or less had 
enlisted. Then you would be justified in running 
the risks and suffering the disadvantages of a 
belated application of the compulsory principle 
even during the strain of a great war. 
The whole thing is a balance, a compromise 
between the advantages and the disadvantages of 
getting the greatest possible number upon the one 
hand — and lack of homogeneity in the forces, the 
immensely laborious business of segregating 
those who may go from those who may stay, find 
ing new cadres and new equipment, the con- 
sequent vast confusion and delay, &c., &c., ujjon 
the other. 
.Where exactly the balance must be struck 
only those who study existing conditions in all 
their details and who have all the statistics (many 
01 them secret) before their eyes are in a position 
to judge. But one can repeat that wide margin 
between a certain minimum and a certain maxi- 
mum, and say that if anything like two-thirds of 
the total maximum are obtainable by voluntary 
recruitment, the difliculties attaching to a com- 
pulsory principle for the remaining third out- 
weighs the advantages. While at the other end 
of the scale one can say, with equal certitude, 
that anvthing like a third, or, at any rate, much 
less than half, of the total available strength 
appearing on the voluntary principle during the 
first part of a campaign shows that the compul- • 
sory policy, witli all its drawbacks, is worth 
applying. 
bne may add that the compulsory principle 
has better arguments on its side if the higher figure 
be nearly, but not quite reached, than has the 
voluntary principle on its side if little more than 
the lower figure has been reached. 
With very high figures of voluntary enlist- 
ment (such as three-quarters of the men available 
having already appeared in the first months of the 
war), the belated application of compulsion would 
manifestly be a folly. If only a third — or, at any 
rate, less than a half — of the available numbers 
has'e appeared, it would as manifestly be wisdom 
— that is, it would be wisdom in a great war 
involving the very existence of the nation. 
(2) But the second proposition is of at least 
equal importance with the first. The value of 
compulsory service applied in the midst of a cam- 
paign varies with the exjiectation of the length of 
the war, and with a comparison between that ex- 
pectation and the time elapsed since its outbreak. 
If, from the course of a campaign, it seems 
probable that the first part, which has already 
seen a very large voluntary enlistment, will not 
be followed by many more months of hostili- 
ties, then the tardy application of compulsion 
would not be worth the disadvantages attach- 
ing to it. You would find yourself at the end of 
the war suffering from all the friction between 
volunteers and conscripts, with masses of men 
on your hands whom you would have to dis- 
band and who would have been called up for 
nothing, whom you had yet but imperfectly 
trained and probably had not equipped at all. 
You would have struck a blow in the void. 
If, on the other hand, the war seemed des- 
tined to long duration, and the lapse of time 
between its outbreak and the application of 
compulsion was little compared with the prob- 
able lapse of time between the application of 
that principle and the close of hostilities, then 
the argument for compulsion would become 
stronger and stronger in proportion to your ex- 
pectations of the length of the campaign — and 
that for two reasons : — 
First, that the compulsory principle would 
call in year after year men who had just 
reached military age, and in regular numbers. 
Secondly, that, tardy as equipment must be 
for great improvised armies, and slow as must 
be the provision of officers for them, the lapse of no 
more than six months would set this right. If 
the war were destined to continue one, two, or 
three years after the compulsory principle had 
been adopted, then its adoption would be 
amply justified. 
REGISTRATION. 
In thus presenting the merely military; 
arguments for or against the compulsory prin- 
ciple at this moment in the campaign, there 
must not be omitted a certain third course for 
which the strongest arguments exist and 
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