June 5, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER, 
and of 75 in each of the last. In 90 seconds, while making 
A single quarter-turn, therefore, the gimlayers in A would 
have got the range wrong by no less than 200 yards, and 
would probably have ceased hitting before the first minute 
was over. 
There is nothing novel or unexpected in war having 
brought this problem to the front. It is at least six years 
since the fire-control experts of the British Navy realised that 
no rate-finding or rate-keeping device would be adequate to 
the requirements of modern action unless it could automatic- 
ally deal with a varying rate, alter the sii/hts automatically 
as the rate varied, and, above everything else, be capable of 
generating the future hearings of the target — and tliis 
whether it was stationary or maintaining a previously known 
course at a previously known speed. The grounds put for- 
ward six years ago for maintaining that such a device was an 
elementary necessity of war were that in action it would often 
be necessary to manoeuvre, and that the target would be often, 
and for considerable periods, obscured by smoke. If, then, 
the loss of bearings meant the loss of the range, gun-fire 
would be inefficient because intermittent. 
But when, aft-er many years of patient and costly experi- 
ment, an automatic rate-finding and rate-keeping device was 
produced to meet these requirements, it was very early 
realised that, though evolved principally in view of the neoes- 
■itiea of naval action, it would be invaluable for either direct 
or indirect bombardment, where the attacks of destroyers or 
•ubmarines would make protective evolutions necessary. 
Indeed, the demand for a solution of the rate problem 
arose largely out of the perfecting of the long-range torpedo. 
For it was this that made it quite certain that destroyers 
armed with these weapons would in the future take part in 
Fleet actions. A threefold corollary would follow on their 
participation. In the first place, battleships would have to 
bo sub-divided into smaller squadrons — say, four ships in- 
stead of eight, so as to shorten the target front presented 
by a line of ships. Secondly, all evolutions would have to 
be carried out at the highest practicable speed, so as to in- 
crease the difficulty of aiming the torpedo correctly. And, 
lastly, sudden and large changes of course would be necessary 
so as to avoid or disconcert torpedo attack, when it was known 
to be imminent. 
At the time of wliich I am spealdng it was asiomatic that 
the moment a squadron changed couree gunfire would have 
to cease because the rate of change could neither bo accurately 
calculated, nor, if calculated, kept accurately on the sights. 
The solution called for by these conditions was really a de- 
mand that ships should be able to keep the range with exactly 
the same accuracy when manoeuvring as they could do whon 
they were standing stUl. It is one of the curiosities of modern 
naval history that when a solution in concrete form of the 
most obvious of all artillery problems was produced the mono- 
poly of it, which the Admiralty had paid heavily to mako 
possible, was abandoned before the device itself was tried. 
At the Dardanelles, where the targets are stationary, 
only one-half of the fire control problem comes into play — 
viz., making the ship's helm free once the range and bearing 
of the target have been ascertained. If ever a Fleet action 
takes place, the necessity for a solution of the other half of 
the problem will arise. We shall then have to find out the 
speed and course of the target, as well as its range and bear- 
ing. The range of any target at sea or on land must, at great 
distances, ultimately be found by the observation of fire. 
Obtaining its bearing is a comparatively simple, but not 
quite a simple business. But ascertaining its speed and course 
presents difficulties very similar to those presented by ascer- 
taining and keeping a variable rate. They become greater 
in proportion as the ship manoeuvres or goes faster. And no 
means are of the least use unless they give an instantaneous 
and accurate result in all conditions. Like the rate-keeping 
system, no manoeuvring by the firing ship must check or 
impede the necessary operations. 
A. H. POLLEN. 
ROUMANIA AND THE WAR. 
By COUNT CHEDDO MIYATOVITCH. 
Late Serbian Minister to the Court of St. James. 
PUBLIC opinion in Britain, as well as in some other 
countries, gives evidence of disappointment that 
Roumania, the youngest member of the Latin 
group, has not entered into the war simul- 
taneously with Italy, her elder and more powerful 
■ister. In some quarters, even, the opinion is held that 
Boumania is sitting on the fence waiting to act on the side 
of the group of Powers to which victory inclines. Such an 
opinion is a great injustice to Roumania, and we ought at 
once to recognise that her situation is far more complicated 
and difficult than that of Italy has ever been. 
Italy had only one Italia Irredenta, but for the Rou- 
manian people there exist two Roumanise Irredentae : Transyl- 
vania and the Tarnish Banat under the crown of Hungary, 
and Bessarabia under the sceptre of the Tsar. Until quite 
lately Roumanian statesmen were divided into two groups: 
one group was of opinion that the problem of greatest urgency- 
was the delivery of Bessarabia from Russian rule, while the 
other group thought it more urgent that Tran^sylvania should 
be delivered from Hungary. It is not surprising that of late 
a new group has been formed of opportunists pure and 
simple, who thought that the problem as to which plan 
should first be put in execution would be determined by cir- 
cumstances. Under King Carol, the first of the three groups 
was decidedly predominant, but during the la.st ten years the 
second and third groups were gaining in influence, and since 
the declaration of war they are apparently in the ascendent, 
although there is still a considerable nuralier of Roumaiiir.ii 
politicians who distrust Russia to a greater extent than they 
distrust Austria and Germany. These men are not inactive, 
even to-day, when the un.=heathing of Italy's sword gives 
greater probability of victory to the Allies; the Roumanian 
situation is complex, because opinions are so far removed froia 
unanimity. 
But, even if opinion had been unanimous on the side of 
the Transylvaiiian programme, it would be necessary to 
secure the' success of that programme not only daring the 
war but also during the negotiations for and the conclusion 
of peace. It was absolutely necessary to make an arrange- 
ment with Russia, and that arrangement i.* no finij)^ affair. 
The eventual annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina, and 
Banat by Roumania affects the interests of Russia, Bulgaria, 
and Serbia. Russia, in negotiating with Roumania, has to 
consider not only her own interests but also those of her 
two protegies, Serbia and Bulgaria. Put differently, it 
might be said that Roumania has to consider every detail 
of her immediate future, and to take into consideration the 
harmonising of her interests with those of Russia, Bulgaria, 
and Serbia. Negotiations are a difficult matter, for they are 
affected by very complex questions, and I am not at all sur- 
prised that they are not yet concluded. 
I must say, and that with sincere regret, that a certain 
responsibility rests on the Roumanian Government for the 
slow progress of the negotiations, owing to her claims having 
been excessive at the outset. These claims included not only 
Transylvania and Bukovina, but with Banat was claimed the 
whole left shore of the Danube from the Turnu-Severin up 
to a point opposite Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and this 
in utter disregard of the fact that a large part of Banat and 
the v.'ide Danubian zone, from Baziah to Panchevo, is Serbian 
country, inhabited by Serbs in overwhelming majority. For- 
tunately, there is now a fair prospect that the interests of 
Serbia and Roumania can be harmonised in that particular 
zone. 
But the greatest difficulty in the way of a speedy declara- 
tion of war on Austria-Hungary by Rcumania has been pro- 
vided by the attitude of Bulgaria. Only Bulgarians can 
understand that attitude fully, but no doubt they are the best 
judges of their own interests. They strenuously deny the 
accusation which has been made against them to the effect 
that they have written compacts with Au.'tria and Turkey 
binding them to remain strictly neutral, and they have 
declared that they will remain neutral even if Roumanii 
attacks Hungary. But as they are at the same time com- 
plaining bitterly against the injustice done to them by the 
terms of the Treaty cf Bucharest, and vow to redress that 
injustice at the first opportunity, they are regarded distrust- 
fully by all their neighbours — Rou.manian.i, Greeks, and 
Serbs alike. M. Veiiizelos, an acute and far-seeing statcs- 
n.an, con.iidered that it would be nei^essary to .■•ecurc the 
13* 
