1j A n u 
I\. Vi u 
i\Y. A X Jii ii , 
ouiie o, liJio. 
aentrality of Bulgaria by the cession of Kavalla before Greece 
conld join in the war on the side of the Allies, as is her fervent 
.wish. Roumaiii", for this Eame reason of the doubtful 
neutrality of Bulgaria, could not venture to invade Transyl- 
vania until some security against attack by Bulgaria had 
been obtained — for Bulgaria looks forward to the reconquest 
of Silistria, and not only the territory ceded by virtue of the 
Treaty of Bucharest, but the entire Dobrutcha. Koumania 
seems to be willing to buy security by the cession of some ter- 
ritory to Bulgaria, but wants not only a special treaty with 
'Bulgaria, but also a guarantee from the Entente Powers that 
Bulgaria should in no case occupy Dobrutcha. Bulgaria, a 
proud country, considers a foreign guarant-ee of her own 
formal engagements a superfluity, and at the same time the 
Entente Powers do not see how they could guarantee to 
Koumania the attitude of Bulgaria in all circumstances. 
I wish to state only the difficulties which Roumania Las 
to overcome before she can join in the war on the side of the 
Allies. These difficulties are great, but not insuperable; for 
Roumanian diplomacy is very able, and is assisted by Russian 
diplomacy, the ablest and most resourceful statecraft of the 
world. The sentiments of the Roumanian people have always 
been in full sympathy with the aspirations of France and 
Italy, and they have never been more in sympathy than now, 
when these two countries are fighting for the highest ideals of 
humanity and for a permanent peace in Europe. But, apart 
from sentiment, the political and economic interests of 
Roumania — indeed, her duty to Roumanians outside the 
bounds of her rule— are clearly pointing to the one possiblo 
policy — intervention on the side of the Allies, and the render- 
ing of assistance in the task of securing freedom, justice, and 
permanent peace, which means a new organisation of Europe 
on the basis of nationalities. Roumania will undoubtedly 
join the Allies as soon as her diplomatic relations with Russia, 
Bulgaria, and Serbia are completed, and we shall not have to 
wait very much longer for the successful conclusion of 
a full and reliable understanding between these four 
countries. 
THE VALUE OF ITALY TO THE 
GREAT ALLIANCE. 
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, GB. 
DURING the critical weeks preceding the declara- 
tion of hostilities between Italy and the Dual 
Alliance, it seemed to me that her ultimate 
decision was so inevitable that not even the 
dullest of diplomats could fail to perceive the 
'danger of delaying preparations to meet her entry into the 
struggle on the side of the Great Alliance. Yet the news 
which has come through during these first few days is sufficient 
to show that Germany is very far from ready to afford substan- 
tial assistance to the Austrians, who, on their own part, are 
already so pressed by the Russians in the North that the troops 
already in position to meet the Italian invasion are far from 
adequate to the occasion. This only serves to throw into 
stronger relief the desperate nature of the German offensive 
against the Western Carpathians and to expose the motives 
underlying the extraordinary exaggeration of the first 
bulletins announcing glorious victories. Clearly the whole 
undertaking was set on foot to impress the Italian diplom- 
atists, and so all-important was this end to German policy 
that she concentrated every available man and gun for the 
purpose, hoping that the first gain of ground, which was 
inevitable in view of the forces she had assembled, might 
stave off the danger of Italian intervention, even at the 
eleventh hour. 
I doubt whether the German General Staff ever ex- 
pected more from their blow, for no men in the world 
have been better trained to understand the fatal dangers 
which arise from lessening in any way the mobility of a 
Tield Army, and the veriest beginner amongst them must 
have seen from the first that if an expenditure of between two 
million and three million shell a day was an essential element 
of the plan, the momentum must die out from their attempt as 
Boon as the Army had advanced more than fifty miles or less 
than one hundred from their last railway depots. After 
which the rate of advance would be limited to the rapidity 
with which the railways and roads destroyed by the Russians 
in retreat could be reconstructed— say to four or five miles a 
day; whereas the Russians, on the wings of the great 
phalanx," still retain their full freedom of movement at 
the rate of between twelve to fifteen miles a day, and it ap- 
pears very clearly from the most recent reports that they are 
using this advantage most thoroughly. 
Since the Defence of the Realm Act applies not only to 
our own future movements but to those of our Allies, any 
attempt to forecast the strategy that the Italians wiU adopt 
13 impossible, but it is permitted to us to speculate freely on 
our enemy s means and movements, and the following figures 
will suffice to give a guide to our readers. It £ worth 
while recapitulating them because although published 
officially Dy the French Government in January last, their 
ublic"" "''* '^^""^ ^ ^""^^ ^^^" ^"'^ "P°° ^^° ^"^^tish 
According to these figures, the Germans in January last. 
over and above the 4,000,000 men (the approximate strength 
of the armies actually at the front), had only 2,000,000 me;i 
fit for the field, comprising the 1915-16-17 classes, as well 
as untrained Landsturm. At the rate at which their armies 
had been wasting through killed, wounded, and prisoners— 
not sickness — it would have taken rather under than over 
ten months to exhaust them. Aft«r that data the armies at the 
front could no longer be maintained at their full numerical 
strength and collapse would be inevitable and speed v. 
Now the established rate of wastage, making due allow- 
ance for wounded rejoining from hospital, but still not for the 
sick, was 260,000 a month, and since the fighting has con- 
stantly been growing in intensity and wiU continu°e to do so 
amazingly in a very short time, it is reasonably certain that 
this rate of wastage has been maintained at least, and will 
certainly have been found to exceed it during the two months 
which have just gone by. 
It is clear, therefore, that Germany can have no new. 
formations to send against Italy, and therefore, unless she 
leaves her ally in the lurch altogether— in which case Austria 
will collapse — she must build up a new army from troops 
already engaged on her several frontiers, and it seems to me 
beyond the wit of man even to suggest whence they are to be 
taken. 
It is a case of " catching a Tartar " literally and on the 
grandest scale, for certainly the Russians will not let go their 
hold either in Galicia or Poland, nor does it seem probable 
that General Joffre or General French will allow such a 
weakening of the line in front of them to take place 
unpunished. 
To be of any use to their hard-pressed ally at least 
ten German Army Corps will bo required, for not 
only can the Italians keep an army of at least a 
million in the field, but they have more than a million 
beliind to replace their casualties, and thanks to the lateral 
railways which connect the two wings of the Army one on 
the Isonzo, the other on the Adige— they can play upon their 
enemy the same game by which the Germans in Poland and 
GaUcia have for so long been able to hold in check the 
R.ussians, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had con- 
vincingly asserted the superiority over them in each of the 
three arms — cavalry, infantry, and artillery. 
There is no such superiority here in the case of the 
Austrians, for in fighting records the Italians stand much on 
a par with their opponents, even when both start fresh and 
equally equipped. Austrian victories in Italy have invariably 
been due to superior readiness and superior generalship but 
now the readiness is on the Italian side and the Austrians 
have no Radetsky to rely upon. 
When the fresh redistribution of German troops can be 
ascertained the apparent deadlock which has for so lono- dis- 
heartened the pubUc wiU be broken and decisive eventi wiU 
begin to crowd on one another. " 
14* 
