June 12, 1915. 
LAND AND S^TATER, 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOG. 
NOTE. — This article bas beea submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the pnblicatioo as censored, and takes 00 
respoustbility tor the correctness of the statements. 
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
IHE really important thing which has 
happened in the campaign this week — 
that is, up to the news received upon the 
evening of June 8 — is the evacuation 
without disaster of the salient of Pr,Teraysl. 
If the campaign upon every front be re- 
garded soberly in its largest aspect, no other 
event connected with it during the last few days 
bears comparison with this very considerable 
feature. For it was doubtful during a whole fort- 
night whether the salient of Przemysl held by tlie 
Russians right in front of their general line might 
not lead to the piercing of that line. 
Next to this matter we must note in order of 
importance the violent effort proceeding from 
Stryj whereby the enemy is attempting to force 
the Russian line on its left centre, having failed 
to force its right centre at the salient of Przemysl. 
.With regard to this enemy success we only 
know that German and Austrian forces have 
established themselves just beyond the line of the 
Dniester. There is, of course, no sort of claim as 
.yet that this forcing of the river threatens the 
whole line. But we shall do well to fasten our 
attention upon the enemy's success here in front 
of Zurawno because it may lead to bigger things 
in the near future. 
Upon the analogy of the similar effort nearly 
a month ago in front of Jaroslav and the crossing 
of the San, we might discount this new enemy 
success. But all that is conjecture. It is our busi- 
ness rather to appreciate exactly how much tha 
enemy has here done. 
In the other theatres of operations there has 
been a very violent and quite inconclusive action in 
the Gallipoli peninsula. I will deal with this in 
its order, though briefly, for it needs no diagram 
and is simply a case of an assault directed against 
a line which is not yet pierced and against a posi- 
tion which still stands firmly. 
It would seem, as we shall see later, that tha 
real problem in the Dardanelles is the possibility 
or impossibility of cutting off the supplies for the 
enemy in the Gallipoli f roni. the Asiatic shore. 
Upon the Austro-Italian frontier nothing 
has been doing upon which one can base any effec- 
tive account of the operations. Upon the side of 
our Ally mobilisation is still proceeding; upon 
the side of the enemy no considerable forces hava 
yet been gathered, even for purely defensive pur- 
poses. All that can be discovered — as we shall 
see later — is that the Italian covering troops have 
occupied, as they were bound to do, the passes 
leading into the projecting " bastion " of the 
Trentino : have, with rather less advance, pro- 
ceeded against the passes in the second sector of 
the frontier, the Carnic Alps, and have attempted 
their chief preliminary effort against the line of 
the Isonzo, occupying the Monte Nero, and 
attempting to turn the whole line of the Isonzo. 
isko 
Sieniawa 
^Lezacliow- 
0\ ^omarno 
lOOMiles 
^Cz^rnowitz 
i« 
