LAND AND WATER. 
June 12, 1915. 
THE EVACUATION OF THE SALIENT 
OF PRZEvlYSL. 
It was pointed out in these columns many 
weeks ago that the salient of Przeniy.sl was a 
serious danger-point upon the general Russian 
line. If we. regard that line in its entirety, as it 
was taken up at the end of the great Russian 
retreat through Galicia— that is, as it lay in tlie 
middle of May, three weeks ago—it is, roughly 
speaking, the line also of the San and of the 
Dniester Hirers, which two watercourses are 
joined geographically by the course of the 
,Wiznia, a stream not shoAvn in the accompanying 
sketch, but running into the San above Jaroslav, 
pointing with its course directly at the Dniester, 
and filling the gap between that river and the San. 
The line of the San, the Wiznia, and the 
Dniester is one continuous defensive natural line, 
which ritands in front of Lemberg, and protects 
the railways leading from tlie Russian bases up 
to the front. 
From that line the semicircle round 
Przemysl projected in a dangerous salient. Why 
such a salient was dangerous was discussed in 
the last two numbers of this journal. A salient 
alwa} 3 requires for the protection of its long con- 
tour a larger number of men than would be 
required for the protection of the direct line 
across its neck. It is vulnerable to attack against 
either side of that neck. If the neck is pierced 
the whole of the salient and of the men and guns 
and material contained in it fall into the enemy's 
Lands, and it is even ])ossible that the double 
pres.sure upon either side of tlie neck, if it be 
successful, may carry the enemy right through 
the mam line behind it, and pierce the resistance 
of those whom he is attacking. That is why, in 
the foregoing sketch, the neck of the salient at 
Przemysl was marked with a D, as indicating 
the danger-point existing during the last three 
weeks upon the Russian line as a whole. 
Wiien this salient first appeared in the 
middle of May upon the Russian line, it was 
admitted in these columns that the writer could 
discern no sufficient reason for the retention of so 
very perilous an extension to the general defensive 
position of our Ally. Further news enables us to 
fill up this gap in our knowledge, and we can dis- 
cover why the salient of Przemysl was retained. 
It was held, not for sentimental reasons (which 
should surely be of no effect in a campaign of this 
magnitude, and threatening such dangers, and 
promising such fruits as does the great war !), but 
m order that there should be ample time to 
remove from within that railway junction all 
stores and rolling stock, and, further, in order to 
be able to remove (a much lengthier business) such 
heavy artillery as the enemy may have left intact 
when he capitulated upon the 22nd of March. 
It must be clearly understood that there were 
no munitions for these guns, the enemy having, 
as a matter of obvious necessity, destroyed his 
munitions before capitulating. And it must 
further be understood that the permanent works 
of the fortress had also been destroyed before the 
capitulation, so that Przemj^sl was not a strong- 
hold at the moment when the Russians decided 
still t-o preserve it as a .salient in their .general 
line. Such defences as the Russians threvv up 
were evidently field defences exterior to, or im- 
provised upon, the old ruined permanent works. 
J^'^ith all this clear, we can appreciate more 
or less what happened. For a fortnight the 
enemy forces chietly concentrated to the north 
and south of the " neck " of the Przemysl saHent, 
somewhat exposing themselves to attacks upon 
their communications upon the north, at least 
round Jaroslav. Such an attack the Russians 
could not press sufficiently to iniperil the enemy's 
advance, but, on the other hand, the enemy 
obtained no decisive result against the neck of 
the salient. He lost very large numbers of men in 
direct assault against the southern and the 
northern face of the " neck," and could not have 
reduced it to a less width than twelve miles. He 
claims to have dropped shells on the railway 
leading out of Przemysl, but it is unlikely that he 
did any damage by this long-distance fire, because 
we know that the mass of the material within the 
town and surrounding it was successfully with- 
drawn. 
In the last days of May the Russians had 
allowed to remain, apparently, no more than a thin 
covering line coincident with the heights upon 
which the old permanent fortifications had stood 
before their destruction. 
During the Saturday and the Sunday, the 
29th and 30th of May, the last remaining defence 
of the field works established upon,or just exterior 
to, the old permanent works of Przemysl gave 
way before the direct pressure from the west, 
north, and south. It was late in the afternoon of 
Monday, Mnj 31, that the fort m.arked 9 upon 
the following sketch was evacuated; but it 
was recaptured and held until nightfall. The 
whole process vras obviously no more than th^ 
covering of the general Russian retirement. In 
the same evening the works marked 2, 3, and 4 in 
the above sketch were carried by Bavarian in^ 
fantry and permanently held. With the next 
afternoon, Tuesday, June 1, the southern forts (7, 
6, and 5) Avere evacuated, and before dawn on 
Wednesday the enemy entered. The Russian line 
by the week-end had straightened out and 
shortened beyond the San, passing through 
Medyka, as does the line of crosses in the following 
sketch, and the salient of Przemysl, the rolling 
stock, stores, and probably the greater part of the 
artillery within it being now withdrawn, was 
abandoned by our Ally. 
I will not further labour the point that the 
straightening of the line and the giving up of this 
salient is strategically of no advantage to the 
enemy whatsoever. The enemy not only has not 
J pierced through the Russian line at this point, but 
las given up the attempt to pierce through here. 
His real eft'ort is now being directed at a point 
some forty miles away to the south and east beyond 
the marshes of the Dniester, to which point we will 
next turn. 
It is an effort based upon the town of Stryj, 
which he captured the other day (getting at the 
same time, unfortunately, control of the great oil- 
field), and it is for the moment in front of Stryj 
and against the Dniester line that he is attacking 
for the third time (the first was in front of Jaro- 
slav, the second was at the salient of Przemysl) to 
pierce our Ally's line. Unless he ficrces it, let us 
always remember, he has jailed in his strategic 
ohjectire. 
This effort, based upon Stryj, stands to the 
whole line in a fashion characteristic of every 
effort the enemy has made East or West. Every 
one of his great efforts to br'cak the containing 
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