June 12, 1915. 
L AND AND WATER. 
largely commands the valleys to the south and east 
beyond the town of Tolraino. Why have they at- 
tempted this turning of the line of the Isonzo 
through the mountains upon the north ? 
In order to ansv«er that question one must 
recall the point which was empiiasised here last 
■week, that the war on the Anstro-Italmn frontier 
will necessarily he a war for railivays. 
Now, observe how the railways run just here 
upon the frontiers of Istria. 
From the Austrian bases to Trieste there are 
two lines — one coming through Laibach, far off 
to the east, at present out of reach of the Italians 
(and marked A A on the preceding diagram) ; the 
other comes directly down by the shortest road 
from the north, through the long tunnel under the 
Jelov/er Wald at C, and so combes down by 
B D B to Trieste. 
Now, an attempt to cut this line by attacking 
anyivhere along the lower Isonzo w^ould mean 
trying to force the very difficult positions in that 
valley, which are probably well defended. Gorz 
and its fortification protects the main junctions 
at the foot of the Alps and closes the gaps. But 
by getting right up into the hill country and 
coming down upon the railway to Tolmino at such 
a point, say, as D, it is hoped to cut the railway. 
to paralyse the supply of Gorz, and to halve the 
supply of Trieste. All that district is highly 
mountainous — the summit of the Mont€ Nero 
(which the Austrians call the Krn) is 6,000 feet 
above Tolmino in the valley — and it is probable 
that the vigorous effort by the vanguard of the 
Italian force is made here because they found 
hardly any defence prepared in these northern 
hills. 
It is evident that to cut tlje railway at D 
would be to destroy its value for Trieste alto- 
gether. The other line coming in from E comea 
in from and is held by Italian territory. It 
does not communicate with, the Austrian basei 
at all. 
To cut the railway B B at D or thereabouti 
is not to isolate Trieste, beciiuse there exists tht 
alternative road A A; but it prevents Trieste 
having two avenues of communication and it cuts 
the shorter and more important one — so impor- 
tant that in the creation of it the Austrians have 
been at the pains of tunnelling under the main 
range (the Wochein Tunnel — four miles long^. 
Further, the danger to the railway at D is difficult 
to meet. Reinforcem.ent can only come up from 
Gorz by the narrow gorge of the Isonzo — a 
dangerous and insufficient avenue of approach. 
A GENERAL SURVEY. 
FOR some reason or other, in part because 
the siege work in the West has lasted 
just long enough to try public opinion, 
there has appeared in the last week 
or so an uneasy spirit which was absent during 
the earlier spring months. The first consequence 
of this uneasiness has been a disarray of judg- 
ment. The firm major lines upon which all sound 
opinion should base itself have got blurred. You 
hear people asking perfectly meaningless ques- 
tions, such as, " Is it true we have not enough 
shell? " — one can never have enough shell. Or, 
" When will the war come to an end ? " — to which 
on the face of it any answer would be ridiculous. 
In a v/ord, educated opinion in this country 
has quite latterly fallen into som.ething of the 
mood which you' will find present in men who 
have undertaken some financial speculation when 
that speculation has not yet decided itself, but 
has lasted longer in its development than they 
had expected. Commercial men so situated often 
show this sam.e vacillation of emotion and suffer 
this same loss of grip which general opinion 
to-day is in danger of suffering in connection with 
the vital matter of the great campaign. 
We all know that in such commercial ven- 
tures the rule is to bear steadily in mind the 
main factors which moved our judgment when we 
first entered the speculation, and that the most 
important point of all it not only to face reality 
where reality appears adverse to our schemes, but 
to appreciate it as a whole : favourable, adverse, 
or neutral. Mere delay (and very often the delay 
is not greater than experience warranted) should 
not be allowed to disturb our conclusions. 
This disarraj'- of civilian judgment having 
set in (the process arises by m.uch irresponsible 
writing and talking from men not competent to 
judge), the best way to check it is to recapitulate, 
for the purposes of the present moment, those 
5» 
main elements in the campaign upon which alone 
any ordered judgment can repose. 
Only when we have grasped this once again 
can we proceed to a true estimate of the present 
position. 
I shall beg my readers' leave in this and suc- 
ceeding numbers of Land and W".\teh to present, 
as I see it, the whole situation at this moment. It 
may be that in the course of such a presentation 
very great happenings will make the drab pre- 
sentation of the campaign as a whole seem un- 
worthy of the moment. It may be that a con- 
tinued and wise postponement of the great offen- 
sive will leave room for such a summary. But in 
any case a summary of such a kind is essential as a 
corrective to too great a doubt bred by delay, as it 
is to too great a hof>e bred by the very vigorous 
action immediately before us. 
For the purposes of presenting such a survey 
I will begin at the beginning, and, at the risk of 
some repetition, first lay down the political 
foundations upon which all our calculations upon 
the war must be built. 
There were three great political military 
ideas upon which the enemy acted when he pro- 
posed this enormous conflict. 
There was first his intention to take the offen- 
sive against Russia and France, after a prepara- 
tion of three j'^ears — a. decision taken nearly four 
years ago. There was, secondly, the enemy's con- 
ception of how alliances for and against him 
W'ould stand this adventure of his when he took 
the field. There was, thirdly, his judgment, not 
nearly so unwise as opinion in the West at first 
imagined — that is, that his attack would be im- 
mediately successful. 
I will deal wdth these in their order. 
1. The enemy consists in a certain group, 
generally called " the Germanic Powers," and 
consisting politically of 123-5 millions who are 
