LAND AND 5V:ATER, 
June 12, 1915. 
Eelds, but except at the Dardanelles, when the 
passage of the mine-fields is completed, the sub- 
marine finds itself in open waters. In darkness, 
therefore, its progress, except for the risk of 
collision, is safe. But darkness would only add 
to the danger of the Dardanelles passage. More- 
over, the surface itself is for some miles domi- 
nated by an extraordinary array of all sizes of 
guns, from 14-inch to quick-firers. For a boat to 
Bhow its conning-tower above water would be to 
risk detection should searchlights suddenly be 
thrown on. It would seem, then, that the long, 
and not too easy, channel of the Dardanelles — for 
a three to four knots current adds considerably to 
the dangers of navigation where the seaway is so 
narrow — would have to be negotiated for the 
most part by an underwater run. The difiiculties, 
therefore, must be enormous, and constitute a test 
of nerve and skill of the highest possible order. 
But once in the Sea of Marmara, it is possible 
that the British submarine's task will be easier 
than that of the German submarine when in the 
neighbourhood of Gallipoli. The total number of 
Uestroyers at the disposal of the Turks is not 
large, and few, if any, of them are really fast. 
Such as they are, they must probably be kept to 
guard the batleships. But it must not be supposed 
that the transports are left to look after them- 
selves. The Turks have plenty of small craft, not 
so fast or perhaps so well armed as destroyers, but 
all formidable to the submarine. 
The task of the German submarine presents 
'difficulties of quite a different order. They have 
first to find a secure base, and next, to avoid our 
<lestroyers' counter-attack in making any effort 
against our ships and transports. As I have 
said, all presumed or possible bases are, no doubt, 
by this time being mercilessly hunted out and 
shelled. That is, all bases but Constantinople. 
And though, if thej reach the field of their 
work, they will find more targets than our 
boats will find in the Sea of Marmara, those 
targets will have the benefit of a far more 
numerous and far more active protection. As 
things have gone, the honours in numbers of 
victims are with us, although in the military 
value of the victims bagged, the honours are with 
the enemy. It would certainly take many 
Turkish transports to counterbalance Triumph 
and Majestic, old as those gallant ships were. 
OBut if we look, not to the direct military value, 
but to the moral value of the successes gained, it 
is probable that the advantage is entirely on our 
side. We have not only heard throudi Sir Ian 
Hamilton's report that the sinking of Triumph 
and Majestic has not deterred our battleships 
from joining in the operations, but there have 
been unofilcial reports, both from Athens and else- 
where, that reinforcements have been reaching 
the Allies continuously during the week. 
It is the British public that has not stood the 
loss of the battleships quite so well. But the 
British public was hardly in the right mood for 
BO severe a test. For three weeks, at least, it has 
been subjected to a continuous bombardment of 
high explosive journalistic pessimism. And, as 
this bombardment may continue, and as it is cer- 
tainly possible that more ships — transports, if not 
war vessels — may be lost, it may not be altogether 
out of place to state again the simple facts of the 
jBituation, even though it be a thrice-told tale. 
First, then, we must realise that, while there 
exists no means whatever by which ships and 
fleets can be absolutely protected against sub- 
marines, a screen of fast craft, moving at high' 
speed, and exercising the keenest possible 
vigilance, can make operations so dangerous to 
the submarine itself as almost of necessity to 
drive it away, or keep it so far under water 
as to be powerless. I say almost because the cases 
of Triumph and Majestic do show that the vigi- 
lance of destroyers can be eA^aded. But, as these 
are the only occasions on which this vigilance has 
been evaded, it seems unreasonable to suppose 
that such a success can be often repeated. 
If submarines cannot be driven from the 
neighbcurhod of ships by destroyers cv fatfc 
craft, the ship has no defence except to 
make itself a difficult target by moving 
quickly and on a changing course — measures 
which also reduce the chances of submarines 
getting within striking distance. But even 
speed is far from being an absolute protection, 
although, except in the case of the Lusitania, 
which was nearly 800 feet long, there is, I believe, 
no known case of any ship faster than fifteen 
knots being hit. At the Dardanelles, bombarding 
ships and transports engaged in disembarking 
troops would have to rely for protection upon the 
vigilance and activity of destroyers, because the 
character of their duties would make it necessaryj 
to remain absolutely or nearly stationary. 
THE ALLIED FLEETS. 
In the Baltic there seems to have been a 
lively exchange of submarine amenities. The 
Russians have lost a transport, the Germans three 
war vessels. From the Adriatic there is much 
more news, and the strategic importance of it is 
manifest. The cross-ravages of the aircraft can 
be ignored, first because experience shows us now 
that the permanent military damage which air- 
craft may inflict is small, but mainly because 
neither side is ever likely to tell us the truth as to 
the damage actually done. One wishes one could 
believe the Roman report that the dirigible's 
attack on Pola not only caused a considerable fire 
in the naphtha stores, but drove the ships out of 
harbour in some sort of panic, so that a battleship 
rammed and sank a destroyer. In the kind of 
fighting that is likely to take place in the Adriatic 
a loss of destroyers by the Austrians would be 
serious indeed. But it is wiser to keep our specu- 
lations for the more reserved statements of the 
official bulletins. 
From these it appears that at least two 
squadrons of the Italian fleet and one squadron of 
destroyers have been busily at work since the 
beginning of the month. Three separate bombard- 
ments of Monfalcone — an important minor dock- 
yard and destroyer base — have been carried ou^ 
by destroyer flotillas, one on the 1st and the other 
on the 5tn of June. The newer Italian destroyers, 
be it noted, carry even heavier guns than ours — 
4.7, instead of 4 inch. And on the second occasion 
a squadron of larger ships were in attendance. 
Monfalcone is surrounded by shallow water and 
no deep-draught ships can get within range. The 
work, therefore, had to be left to the destroyers 
only, and it is to be supposed that after the first 
bombardment the Italians fully expected the 
Austrians to attempt to cut off the flotilla when it 
withdrew. But no such attempt was made. 
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