June 12, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
■cachine ■which will nullify the enemy's, and then 
ttse the weight and c^lity of our man-power. 
Since we are not fighting for an equivocal peace 
but for the unconditional surrender of Germany, 
we must have the men to launch on her when we 
have shattered her defences. Exaggerated notions 
about the value of sea-power have tended to 
obscure in the minds of many people what such 
a decision as we are aiming at really involves. .We 
are not fighting for insular security but for vic- 
tory, and therefore it is not enough to sweep 
German merchantmen from the seas or even to 
destroy her Navy. Germany will not be beaten 
by shortage of food or shortage of munitions, but 
by shortage of men, and her decisive crushing can 
only take place by land. We must shatter her 
power in her own element; otherwise the war is 
as indecisive as the traditional combat of wolf 
and shark. 
2. The Machine. — Here we have a long lee- 
way to make up in certain breaches. There is, 
first of all, machine guns. The Germans are be- 
lieved to have at least twelve to a battalion; our 
maximum is four, and that is not often reached. 
In all the trench fighting machine guns are highly 
important, as important as the bombs and 
grenades wliich we have learned to use most skil- 
fully. The German line when it is attacked tends 
to '■ bunch " and collect into fortresses which 
bristle with machine guns, and the eflect of this 
equipment is as if their troops were armed with 
a ^^'onderful new automatic rifle. 
Another deadly part of their machine is their 
poisoned gas. I am inclined to think that we are 
on the way to get even with this devilry without 
using a tjounter- poison. Our latest type of res- 
pirator is very good, and it vi'as found in the fight 
at Ypvos on May 24 tliat those troops who had 
been ju-actised in their use till they were handy 
w^ith tliem got off wonderfully lightly. Most 
people would prefer that we should not use a 
similar weapon in reply. We can probably 
devise a gas as deadly and as practicable as the 
German chlorine. 
Most important of all is the supply of high 
explosive shells. It is useless to indulge in re- 
criminations on this subject. Probably it will be 
found that none of the experts till quite recently 
were quite clear on the matter, and if experts 
speak with a divided voice the administrator at 
home is helpless. But t-o-day there is no ques- 
tion about the need. A German artillery or gas 
attack can only be met by a counter-bombard- 
ment. At the second battle "of Ypres, which began 
on April 22, our line was maintained against im- 
possible odds and with very great expenditure of 
life. Again, infantiy cannot advance against 
trenches and entanglements, as the enemy con- 
structs them to-day, unless an artillery prepara- 
tion has broken them down. The French movement' 
the other day towards Lens succeeded, because for 
four miles they had sterilised and flattened out 
the ground witih their gunfire. The sight of that 
tremendous performance — great guns firing all 
day with the rapidity of maxims — was a lesson 
in the practical business of war. For miles there 
was nothing left of hostile parapets and entangle- 
ments — only a ploughed countryside, and frag- 
ments of wire and humanity. After it the 
infantiy could advance as safely as on parade. 
It is useless to labour this point, for we are 
all agreed. The m.elancholy reflection is that we 
11* 
have not yet got the adequate machine, and until 
we get it we fight at a disadvantage. The 
bright spot is that once we have got it we have 
a clear superiority. "Germany has trusted too much 
to her machine. Under cover of it her soldiers 
have dealt out death at long range, and they are so 
familiarised with this method of fighting that it 
may be doubted if they will do well at close range. 
Certainly in the last month their infantry attacks 
haA^e been fiascos. Von Mackensen's thrust on the 
San, so far as we can judge, has been chiefly an 
affair of artillery. Counter their artillery with 
an equal or stronger weapon and the Allies are 
free to get to grips with them. I do not think there 
is a single case where, when we got to close 
quarters, we have not succeeded. 
THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE. 
There are three ways in which an enemy can 
be defeated. You may outflank him, roll in his 
wings, and compel a wholesale surrender. Or 
you may wear him down in a series of small 
actions where his losses are on the average much 
higher than yours, till a point is reached where 
his resistance crumples from sheer lack of 
numbers. Or, finally, you can make in his line a 
rent wide enough for your wedge to move in, roll 
up the ragged ends, and break his cohesion. 
The first plan is impossible in the West, 
where the flanks of the armies rest on the Alps 
and the sea. The old manoeuvre-battle is hope- 
less, since you cannot alter the configuration of 
Europe. The second is the plan the Allies have 
pursued during the winter. A war of attrition 
is successful when the enemy's normal rate of 
wastage is greater than yours, and this has been, 
generally speaking, the case whichever side 
initiated the attack. But attrition is a slow 
business, and a decision reached by exliaustion 
is not as valuable for our purpose as a series of 
crushing defeats in the field. For one thing, it 
costs the victor too much. Besides, if Germany 
is beaten by a slow wastage she may still trust 
in her military machine and believe that later, 
under more favourable conditions, it may suc- 
ceed. But if the very gods in which she has 
confided play her false she may turn to more 
wholesome deities. 
The third plan — to tear a great rent in her 
line — is the most hopeful. If that rent is wide 
and deep enough we may succeed in cutting the 
communications of a large section of her front, 
and so forcing her to shorten it and take up a new 
line. The same manoeuvre repeated may drive 
her back inside her own borders, and give us the 
first stage towards victory — a campaign within 
German territory. But to make the rent needs 
a machine the equal of her own — more guns, far 
greater reserves of ammunition, and a great 
weight of men. We can provide all these things if 
we choose, and so the issue is in our o\rn hands. 
One last word. Germany is formidable not' 
because she is more wicked and unscrupulous 
than ourselves. Her vices and follies are in the 
long run hindrances to her, not assets. She is 
formidable because of her virtues — her patience 
and science and foresight, the astonishing unan- 
imity and discipline of her people, the endurance 
and self-sacrifice of her armies. We can win only 
by showing superior virtues, and that is an en- 
couraging reflection for honest men. The Devil 
has not yet got his own way with the world. 
