L A JN D A JN U W A r Jl K , 
dune xii, lyio. 
9. Ascertain the quickest means of obtaining assistance 
from tha Fire Brigade and Police. Post up the 
neccssarj pai^iculars, uearest fire-alarm, 4c., on 
the ground floor. 
10. Don't run or shout. Keep calm. 
Fires caused by incendiary bombs may be prevented 
from spreading, regardless of the high temperature generated 
at the actual seat of the outbreak, if water be promptly 
applied in fair bulk, force, and continuity. 
The Brag^-Smith Anti-Submarlne Aerial Bomb. 
It is very rightly questioned whether a moving aircraft 
is capable of dropping a bomb straight on to a moving sub- 
marine. Besides, it is very likely that a submarine, when 
seen from an aircraft, would be moving a few feet below the 
surface of the wat«r; so that an ordinary aerial bomb, even if 
it fell over the submarine, v/ould, on striking the water, im- 
mediately explode, while the submarine itself would remaia 
uninjured, and be free to continue ita career. 
An anti-submarine air bomb must, therefore, be de- 
signed to damage the submarine, whether it actually strikes 
the submarine or not, provided it falls within 20 or 30 yards 
of the submarine, and it must not explode on impact with 
the water. 
Such anti-submarine air bombs have now been designed. 
There is, for instance, the Bragg-Smith air bomb that will 
not explode until it has penetrated into the water to a pre- 
determined depth. Such a bomb, hy i/n explosion under the 
water, would destroy or would capsife a submarine, whether 
it actually struck the submarine or fell some 30 yards 
from it. 
WE reprint from the Trihune de Geneve the following 
letter writen by Professor de Wilde apropos of a 
recent article by Mr. Desbleds in L.^nd tMO 
Watek : 
I have read willi keen interest an .article in your paper by Mr. Blin 
Desbledj on "a sehemo to revolutionise warfai'e." 
I venture to point out that the 2,140 trains which, according to 
the author of the stheme, must every day cras3 the fifteen principal 
bridges over the Rhine in order to re-victual the German army operating 
in Belgium and llie North and North-East of France, must also pad> 
over the bridges of the river Meuso at the following points : Vis^, Liege, 
Huy, Namur, Anjcremmo near Dinanb, Cliarleville, and Sedan, which 
makes only seven bridges instead of fifteen. 
AU thoso bridges are in the hands of the Gcrmana. Those at Hujr 
and Ansoreramo cannot bo of much use as they only serve to connect 
small railways consisting of but a single lino. If the traffic on the other 
five bridges weie stopped the Geiman army, at the end of a few days, 
would be without food and without munitions. 
The great railroad from Cologne to Paris, via Aji-Ia-Chapene, 
Li^ge, Naraur, Charleroi, Maubeuge, runs through the valley of the 
Vesdre between Verviers and Liege, and through the Valley of tha 
Sambre, between Namur and Maubeuge. In these two valleys there 
are at least thirty bridges whose destruction would be fatal to tha 
Germans. 
Also, if the aeroplanes were to start from Doullens or from Amiens 
(Departement do la Sommo) the length of the flight would be reduced 
by half. 
In modifying Mr. Blin Desbled's scheme in the manner I have just 
indicated it would bo rcndeied much easier of execution and much mora 
economical, wlule, at the same time, its full eflicacy would be preserved, 
P. De WILDE, 
Honorary Professor of the University of BruaseU, 
THE VALUE OF THE INITIATIVE. 
By COLONEL F. 
THE principal cause of the confusion which exists in 
many minds as to the relative strength or weak- 
ness of the military situation arises from the loose 
and inaccurate way in which technical terms are 
being used by those never trained to appreciate 
the exact sense in which they are employed by experts. The 
experts themselves are also a good deal to blame in the matter, 
because out of sheer intellectual slothfulness they have con- 
tinued to employ words which, owing to the rapid change in 
conditions, no longer give a correct picture of the phenomena 
they are intended to describe and ignore entirely that these 
meanings also vary with the rank and position of the men 
who use them. 
Writing from the strategist's point of view, it is technic- 
ally correct to speak of the Allies in France as the attacking 
party, and the men in the trenches are equally correct in con- 
sidering themselves essentially as defenders, though by their 
defensive action they are in reality furthering the cause of 
the offensive just as materially when repulsing German 
counter-attacks as when storming the opposing trenches with 
the bayonet. 
If strategists had thought out their subjects with greater 
precision, I think they would long since have limited the use 
of the word " attack " in their field of action, and substituted 
the word " initiative " to cover all cases where in fact one 
side exercises by free choice the power of compelling his enemy 
to assail him. I am dwelling on this point because it seems 
to me that the main cause of the wave of pessimism that is 
passing over us is due to the fact that the public neither 
understands or believes how thoroughly the Allies now possess 
this power of " initiative " or how, though the Germans per- 
sistently attack us locally, we have in fact thrown them on 
the defensive, and tlieir only form of defence is the local 
counter-attack, which they are compelled to deliver in the 
hope of holding us at arm's length for as long as possible. 
We have obtained this initiative not only because our 
resources in men, and material are greater than those opposed 
to us, but because our leaders have the will and the skill to 
use them to better advantage. At first, after the closing of 
the gap at Ypres, we were thrown purely on the defen- 
sive—that is to say, that we had to await passively the 
delivery of the enemy's attacks at points of his own 
choice, for at the moment he was still superior in avail- 
able resourcss. But presently, as our aircraft and the French 
artillery established their supremacy, a gradual progress was 
apparent, beginning in November," and continuing^on unto 
the present time; and we— t.f., the Allies— by degrees 
asserted our power of attack against certain well chosen 
points in the enemy's line which he had to hold at all co?ts. 
N. MAUDE, C.B. 
Soissons, Perthes, Les Eparges, the Vosges, to cite only a 
few examples. To defend these the enemy was compelled to 
rush his reserves about by rail, concentrating and attacking 
first one point and then another, and always sacrificing men 
in the ratio of from 3 to 1 to 4 to 1, thus gradually bleedin'^ 
himself to death. 
Then, when to end this annoyance once and for all, the 
Germans brought up the great reinforcements they had been 
preparing throughout the winter, we, hearing of their concen- 
trations, primarily thanks to our aircraft, began a series of 
attacks at Neuve Chapelle, Hill 60, Arras, &c., which com- 
pelled him to disseminate his forces instead of assailing U3 
with a great concentrated effort. 
Except through the use of poisonous gases, he has gained 
nothing at all by this vast expenditure of energy, and, thout^b 
wo know, with a fair approach to accuracy, the numbers of his 
army corps which have been shaken and demoralised by their 
repeated failures, it is not yet certain whether more remain 
behind or not. 
If his furious attacks now cease, the conclusion that there 
are no longer fresh reserves to be drawn upon follows, and if 
there is any doubt on the matter, a further application of 
pressure in any one of the many sectors open to us should 
settle the point beyond disjiute. 
This is the main line of thought which must be 
held fast in spite of all distractions, for distractions, of 
course, there must always be as long as one is dealing with 
human factors. Great masses of stores, artillery, and troops 
cannot be moved by enchantment, but time and all the 
vicissitudes of active service have to be taken into account, 
and it would represent an inconceivable degree of perfection 
if, in the execution of such movements, troops were not sub- 
jected locally to very high strains, being, in fact, called upon 
to purchase with their lives the time needed to overcome tha 
internal friction of the whole machinery involved, which 
stretches back, say, from the gun at the front, through count- 
less factories and workmen's hands, till we reach the crude ore 
or other raw material from which the finished article — shell, 
boots, &c. — is made. 
Such moments of exceptional strain on the men have been 
frequent lately, and one can well understand the depressing 
effect of heavy casualty lists on their friends and relations" 
but the mere fact of these great efforts of endurance bein» 
demanded is proof positive that the superior command under" 
stands and appreciates the value of the material he employs, 
and is exercising a wise economy in its expenditure, so as to 
keep in his hands the most crushing superiority possible when 
the time comes for the knock-out blow. 
14» 
