JTune 19, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
KOTE. — Tliis article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n» 
responsibility lor the correctness of the statements. 
In accordance with the requirements ol the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustralinji this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no dcSnite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE PAST WEEK. 
THEEE has been no decisive action, even 
of the smallest kind, during the course 
of the past week. 
The considerable movements to be 
expected in Italy have not yet matured. The vrork 
there is still the work of comparatively small 
bodies, well provided with artillery, preparing the 
way for the main forces which are to come up 
after full concentration is effected. Such as it is, 
that work consists in an advance against the 
Austrian railways system, as we shall see in a 
moment. 
Upon the Galician front there has been a 
thrust back and forth that results in an undecided 
position. At one moment — upon June 10 and 11 
—it looked as though matters here had reached 
their turning-point, the last enemy offensive across 
the Dniester having been thnist back with very 
considerable losses of men and guns, but the effect 
of this success is lessened by a counter-stroke 
which took place within forty-eight hours to the 
north, and brought the enemy forces well across 
the San. The enemy even profess that our Ally is 
upon this front in full retreat towards Lemberg. 
But the situation had not sufficiently developed by 
Tuesday evening to merit any conclusion. 
In the West there has been no more than a 
continuation of the slow but continually advanc- 
ing pressure of the French concentration north of 
Arras and east of Soissons, unless we except a 
minor success in Lorraine. The Belgians have 
thrown a certain force forward on Dixmude. The 
role of the British containing the considerable 
German concentration in front of them remains 
the same. 
In the Dardanelles there has been no change 
at all up to the news last received at the moment 
of writing; but the French Government have 
thought it advisable to issue an official document 
which tells us much what the general criticism of 
that campaign had already decided — to wit. that 
the task is very much more formidable than the too 
facile expectations formed in this country at its 
origin expected. 
A statement of total casualties made by 
the Prime Minister in the course of the week is 
one of the most noticeable pieces of evidence we 
have upon which to base oar estimate of the 
present phase of the war. 
The chief of these points will be dealt with 
in more detail later on, but we may, perhaps, as a 
preliminary, this week consider the chances of 
that renewed offensive in the West upon the part 
of the enemy, which has spread like a sort of 
rumour, though without direct evidence to back 
it, during the last few da vs. 
A RENEWED ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN 
THE WEST. 
The chances of the enemy's abandoning quite 
shortly his long-maintained and now perilous 
defensive attitude upon the AYestern line have 
been discussed much more among the general 
public of Western Europe during the last week 
than has been the case for many months past. 
There is no official warranty for such an attitude. 
It is not a case of expert or secretly instructed 
opinion leaking out and informing the mass of 
opinion. The expectation is rather due to the 
great length of time that has passed since the 
fuller operations of the dry weather began and 
the absence during all that time of any big 
German move in the West. This, coupled with 
the continued postponing of a corresponding offen- 
sive on the part of the Allies (which was expected, 
by opinion general and particular, to be due at an 
earlier date than the present), has led to the sug- 
gestion mentioned above. 
What the intentions of the enemy may be in 
the matter no mortal can tell. A mere prophecy 
upon it would be inane. But we can at least esti- 
mate the conditions under which such an offensive 
would be undertaken, and show what it would 
connote elsewhere. The chief points seem to be 
these : 
(1) The enemy can undertake such an offen- 
sive without wholly abandoning his effort upon 
the Eastern front, though he would have to give 
up his hope of a decision tliere. The accumulation 
of shell which he has expended in that effort 
cannot represent his total accumulation, for even 
though, as is probable, the enemy is producing less 
shell in proportion to his numbers than are the 
Western Allies, yet the three millions odd which 
he is supposed to have accounted for in the 
Galician movement, even if this refers only to 
heav}^ shell, by no means represents his total pos- 
sible" accumulation of the winter and spring 
months. 
(2) Since it is not lack of munitions that 
will prevent his attempting a renewal of this 
offensive upon the West, although, unlike his 
Eastern effort, he will there be met by what our 
Russian Ally can unfortunately not meet him 
with — that is, a Aveight of heavy gun fire superior 
to his own — the matter is rather a problem of 
men. 
Now we know pretty accurately what the 
enemy's reserves of men are — at least, of men at 
all useful for his purpose, and excluding the boys 
and middle-aged people, whom popular jour- 
nalism summons up to swell his figures; and from 
these known figures it is certain that if he 
attempts any great offensive in the West he must 
do so entirely at the expense of the Italian fron- 
tier. He can only concentrate men, sufficient for 
an attack on even one principal sector of the 
Franco -Belgian lines, by leaving everything south 
