J^ /\ IN LJ 
TT iTl X 1-* J-%. 
of the watershed of the Alps to drift gradually 
into Italian hands. An offensive m the West 
must be the product of a deliberate policy— to 
give up trying to break Russia and to let Italy 
have her own wav. Short of such a policy, his 
main strategy must still consist in attempting to 
break the Russian lines and to get at last his long- 
deferred decision in the East : when, and only 
when, «an he move men back in sufficient strength 
to use them against both the Southern and the 
Western fronts. 
(3) We must not mistake the vigorous local 
Ciounter-oft'ensive such as he will be virtually com- 
pelled to undertake (if he has not already begun 
it) by the increasing French menace to his main 
lines of communication. 
This local counter-offensive would be no more 
than a defensive measure intended to maintain 
the Western line, and not intended to achieve a 
decision against those who contain him there— 
not intended, that is, to break through. 
A main offensive against the Western line 
would mean the concentration upon one single 
sector of it of certainly not less than ten, and 
better, fifteen, corps over and beyond those that 
are now standing from the Jura to the sea. That 
he can in the course of the summer obtain such 
forces by drawing upon all possible reserves and 
by maintaining the results of his Eastern advance 
without further attempting to pierce the Russian 
line is conceivable. That he can make this effort 
and at the same time undertake a sufficient defen- 
sive, let alone an offensive, on the Austro- Italian 
frontier is inconceivable. And when I say " he " 
I mean, of course, the enemy as a whole, for there 
is no distinction in this between the German and 
the Austrian forces, the moving of many men to 
one place meaning inevitably their absence from 
another, vv-hether for the purpose of Germany or 
Austria is quite immaterial. Even in the matter 
of a siege train, where Austria had such a great 
advantage over Germany at the beginning of the 
war, things must now be equalised; but there is 
no proof that the human material of the Austrian 
service at this stage of the war is inferior to that 
of its ally. 
THE ITALIAN FiU3NTIER : THE PRE- 
LLMINARY MOVEMENT FOR THE 
RAILWAYS. 
Though it is already nearer a month than 
three weeks since the Italian declaration of war, 
the mass of the Italian Army has not yet brought 
its pressure to bear upon the frontiers. We are 
still only dealing with the movements of what it 
may not be technically correct still to call " cover- 
ing " troops, but what are in numbers and pur- 
pose little more. 
It is the business of this screen, as has been 
repeatedly explained in these columns, to make 
itself master of the issues from which the enemy 
could threaten the main Italian advance upon 
Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula. These issues 
— the passes out of the Trentino and over the 
Carnic Alps — were, when the frontier was drawn 
up half a century ago, numerous, and each served 
by a road. To-day they are still in their last 
segments the same and still dependent mainly 
upon road traffic. But these last segments are of 
no use unless the much rarer railways behind 
them are continuously open to receive men and 
muJiitions from the Austrian bases. 
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You cannot supply a modern army with its 
provision, especially of heavy ammunition, save 
by a railway. If, "therefore, you have roads. A, 
B, C, D, issuing from mountain valleys and 
enabling vou to attack your enemy's communica- 
tions M-^N, these roads. A, B, C, D, are no use 
to you unless the railway E — F behind them lead- 
ing to your bases of supply is intact. If the enemy 
works round and cuts it, as, say, at G, your roads 
are useless. In other words, wherever the Italians 
isolate any particular road system of the Aus- 
trians from the railway system of Austria they 
close that avenue of attack against themselves. 
As was explained last week and the week 
before, there are three main groups of railway 
with which the Italians must concern themselves. 
First, that which feeds the Trentino; secondly, 
the main line to Vienna and its tributaries 
through the Pontebba frontier point; and thirdly, 
the system serving the Istrian Peninsula. 
The first is isolated if the Italians can isolate 
the junction of Franzenfeste ; the second is iso- 
lated in some degree if they can isolate the junc- 
tion of Tarvis; and the union between these two 
systems whereby one can help the other and troops 
and munitions can be massed laterally upon one 
or the other at will is destroyed if the line through 
the Pusterthal is cut. 
As to the third system, that which serves 
the Istrian Penin.sula and the towns of Trieste 
and Pola, it is a rather more difficult proposition. 
The Istrian Peninsula and Trieste are served 
by three main lines, each reaching to enemy bases 
of supply. They may be put diagrammatically as 
in plan III. The first runs up the Isonzo Valley, 
through Goerz, past Tolmino, under the new great 
Wochein Tunnel, and so up to the direct line to 
Vienna. At Goerz itself is a bifurcation ; two 
lines serve Goerz in its communication with 
Trieste, the one through Monfalcone, the other 
up the Branica Valley and across the plateau 
which the Austrians call the Karst. The first line 
is cut altogether if you cut it anywhere above 
Goerz, but Goerz can be provisioned by the lines 
reaching Trieste from the east unless both rail- 
ways south of Gop.rz are also cut. 
