L A N D A X D W A T E R . 
June 19, 1915. 
There remains the third sector, the prime 
objective in whirh is the Franzenfeste, the two 
subsidiary objectives in which are the cutting of 
the lines down the Valley of the Adige, above 
Trent, and through tlj€ Pustertbal. At this point 
we must Ciirefuliy note, but not be misled by, the 
position of Cortina. Cortina has been occupied 
oy the advanced Italian forces — in what strength 
we do not know. Two roads lead from it. The 
one to the Adige Valley, through the Falzarego 
Valley, and across tlie Tresassi Pass; another to 
the Pusterthal northwards. The mere distance 
from Cortina to the railways is tw-enty-fxre miles 
in the one case, as the crow flies, and only twelve 
miles in the other, and the observation of such 
short intervals has led to hopes which may be dis- 
appointed, or at least may be premature. Tlie 
'A ^PtisarAeL. 
■"^^ ^ CORTINA 
Vf. 
Italian advance posts have, indeed, penetrated up 
both these roads for a few miles, but all the heavy 
work still lies before them. It is, as has been tw ice 
repeated here, the worst possible country for an 
offensive : a tangle of high mountains, and the 
main ridge of these still in front of our ally in 
either case. It is to be presumed that a very 
vigorous effort will be made to reach the Puster- 
thal and cut its all-important railw^ay. There 
are positions not six miles from Cortina whence 
that line could conceivably be shelled, and a suc- 
cessful action upon the pass at the head of the 
Ruffredo would leave the advancing troops with a 
clear road before them down into the valley. But 
the task will be a hard one, and it is not yet 
accompli.shed. 
The other, much longer, road to the west has 
this double drawback, that two ridges have to be 
crossed; tliat under the Pordoi Peak, as well as 
the Tresassi, and that even when the whole moun- 
tain road is forced and the railway ]-eached, one 
only comes on to tiiat railway at the lower end of 
the Eisach gorge, nearly tliirty miles below the 
point of Franzenfeste, with no chance of a tuin- 
ing movement upon either -iide of that deep cut 
through the hills. 
To get upon the railway near Bozen would, 
indeed, isolate Trent, but it would leave the enemy 
f j'ee to move troops from any one of his great bases 
towards the Adige again. To cut the railway in 
the Pusterthal \\ould be to do much more, for it 
would prevent the two main lines from backing 
ea<h other up, but it would still leave each of them 
independently able to act. To seize the Franzen- 
feste would paralyse the enemy altogether, but the 
Franzenfeste is precisely what it is most difiloult 
to reach in all this system. 
THE GALIGIAN POSITION. 
It is too early j-et to say what exactly has 
happened on the Galician front, but the news 
received up to Tuesday evening presented the 
following situation : 
(1) The main crossing of the Dniester at 
Zurawno, which the enemy had forced upon 
June 6, broke down badly, and the circumstances 
of its breakdown point to a cause precisely 
similar to that which has affected the successes as 
nuich as the checks of the enemy throughout the 
whole of this great offensive in the East — the 
factor of heavy artillery. 
When his great guns are on a railwav or close 
to a railway, and liave behind them short good 
roads from railhead, the enemy can at regular 
inten'als, imposed hj the necessity of bringing up 
sliell, pursue his advance. He does not break the 
Russian line, as is his object, but he pushes it 
further and furtlser back with the spasmodic 
effort of heavy artillery acting every few days 
after it has time to acquire a further local accu- 
mulation of munitions. 
But onc« you put an obstacle between railway 
and gun (even if it be only that of the UppeV 
Dniester, with its muddy banks and bottom, and 
the absence of a good road upon the further side), 
so that his trr.nsport of big shell is hampered, the 
effort breaks down. We have had exactly the 
«ime thing repeated half a dozen times since the 
great Galician offensive began. 
(2) Meanwhile, to the north, in front of 
Jaroslav, and as far north as Sienava and as fjir 
south as Mosciska, there has been a sharp advance 
upon the part of the enemy. He claims as many 
prisoners as the Russians counter-claim in their 
more southern success at Zurawno. But the im- 
portant thing is not the number of wounded men 
picked up as one advances over the belt through 
which one's enemy has retired, but the strategical 
effect one has produced by one's advance. 
Xow, in this little sector in front of Jaroslav 
there is no good natural obstacle between the San 
and the district of Lemberg. The River Lubac- 
zowka does not bend down southward enough to 
form a barrier. The true line here, as was pointed 
out when we analysed this front more than a 
month ago, is the line of the San continued by 
the line of the Wiznia. But the line of the Wiznia 
is turned once the San is crossed in force at Jaro- 
slav, and to the north of that town, and the up- 
shot of the matter is that if the German claim is 
w-ell founded it amounts to this : 
The attempt to force tlie approaches to Lem- 
berg from the south by Zurawno have failed. 
Troops and munitions have been brought round to 
the northern sector, and a vigorous advance, 
which is in process of succeeding, and has not 
yet fully suceeediKl, is taking place thei-e. The 
set-tor upon which the attack has been delivered 
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