LAND AND WATER, 
June 2&, 1913,. 
from Tarno{X)l (11>; while kis niovetncnt of 
troops is further ease<I by the cross line leading 
from Tarnopof (12) to line No. 7 and by the junc- 
tion between it and the main. Lemberg line (13). 
One has but to look at such a diagram as the 
foregoing to note its position towards the frontier 
and to observe the fact that beyond that frontier 
there are only two single lines, A and B, con- 
necting the Russian bases, to see what Lemberg 
means in a modern war conducted upon Galiciun 
mA, It is the very heart of th« whole system of 
communications, aiid the passage of it from one 
eoiumander to another means, after the brief 
delay required for tlie restoring of broken bridges 
and "cut culverts, the passage of power over all 
et>BWBUJncatioiis from one side to the other. A 
naaii possessing roughly the line C — D, with Lem- 
berg at its centre, against a thrust coming from 
along the arrow is, so far as communications can 
make him so, master of the movements required 
f©r defence back and forth. Let him lose that line 
£' — D^ and with it Lemberg, let him be compelkd 
t© fall back to the line E — F, and he has at once 
lost his power of lateral movement and handed 
that advantage over to his enemy. 
That is the really great strategical import- 
aaee of Lemberg which distinguishes this nodal 
point from all the merely geographical points 
hitherto acquired by the enemy in his advance 
through Galicia. 
As against this, however, there is one matter 
worthy of remark. Heavy as is the blow dealt to 
the Russian forces by an enemy occupation of 
Lemberg, there does liot lie behind that position 
any considerable opportunity for a further 
Austro-German advance. 
How true this is a further consideration of 
the territory over a somewhat wider area will 
easily prove. 
Lemberg is Galicia. But the enemy's main 
object must still be to break the Russian line, 
and that task, when or if the Russians fall back 
et further behind Lemberg, is not made easier 
y such a success, but, on the contrary, more 
difficult, as will appear from the following 
argument : — 
The Austro-German offensive against the 
Russian line has, as all the world knows, succeeded 
wholly through an immense superiority in heavy 
guns and the ammunition therefor. The bring- 
ing forward of munitions for these pieces, and, 
for that matter, the moving of the heavy pieces 
themselves, demanded railways. All the main 
advance has taken place along the great double 
line railway, which is the backbone of Galicia, 
and "divorced from railways the German war 
machine can do nothing. 
Now, while the possession of Lemberg brings 
the enemy a complete and concentrating system of 
railways for his supplies, the moment you reach 
the frontier of Galicia not only does that advan- 
tage disappear, but every accident of ground in- 
creases the handicap. 
How true this is will aiopear from the 
annexed diagram. The frontier is here indicated 
by dotted lines, and it will be seen how, across that 
frontier, come the two main railways which lead 
to the Russian bases in the south and east, and 
converging upon Lemberg itself at L. 
From Lemberg, as we have just seen, run all 
tb^Qse subsidiary railways which have been de- 
scribed in the last few paragraphs, one of -which 
I 
only, that to Tomasow^ crosses the frontier. Now, 
beyond that frontier there is absolutely nothing 
in the way of railway communication until 
we get to the single line railway which, from 
Ivangorod, upon the Vistula (I), runs down past 
Lublin (Lu), and so joins up to the first of the rail- 
wavs to the Russian bases (1). In other words, 
you have all round Lemberg a sort of spider s.w^b 
of railways (single lines, it is true, save the main 
one through Przemysl, Grodek, and Lemberg 
itself) which make the movements of troops and 
ammunitions easy. Beyond the frontier you have 
nothing but this' one single line from Ivangorod 
(I), past Lublin (Lu), to the fortified junction at 
Rowno (R). 
Now, it is clearly evident that a force which 
has had to fall back from the line of the River 
San, and, roughly, from w^hat we called in the fiist 
diagram the defensive position C — D to the de- 
fensive position, E — F, though it has sacrificed 
the immense advantages of the Galician netw-ock 
of railways converging on Lemberg (L), yet is 
retiring parallel to, and ultimately supported by, 
the main Russian railways coming up from the 
south-east, and in particular by the line through 
the junction of Rowno (R), past Lublin (Lu), to 
Ivangorod (I.) 
This disposition is particularly important 
when we remember that once the line falls back 
yet further, as along the line of dashes in the 
diagram, it is in ground full of woods and marshes 
and offering the greatest possible difficulties to the 
advance of heavy guns and their munitions. 
While the falling back upon this line and still 
further retirement, dragging with it increasingly 
difficult communications for the enemy — exactly 
like the direct communications on the Niemen six 
months ago — brings the Russians nearer and 
nearer to tne railway which can supply them along 
a line almost exactly parallel with their front. 
And the matter is further to be examinedlii 
the light of the position of Warsaw. It has been 
sufficiently emphasised in these columns for many 
months past that Warsaw, with its bridges and 
the convergence thereupon of so many lines, of 
railway from the interior of Russia, is the' capital 
strategic point (for Russia upon the defeosi've) of 
