you can have two quite exact limits — a maximum 
and a minimum. I do not know how many people 
died in London last year, but I remember that 
Greater London has, roughly, six to seven millions, 
the death-rate, roughly, fourteen to fifteen per 
thousand, and I conclude that the deaths in London 
must be less than they would be if the death-rate 
were sixteen per thousand for a maximum popula- 
tion of seven and a half millions and less than they 
would be for a death-rate of twelve per thousand 
with a population of only six millions. I have a 
maximum and a minimum such that above the one 
and below the other I am not guessing, but am abso- 
lutely certain the figures cannot extend. Tlie truth 
must be somewhere within the limits. 
It is exactly the same with enemy casualties. 
iWe have not official statistics before us. The factors 
for our judgment are various — the enemy's own 
lists, our own known rate of wastage in compari- 
son with our own average numbers, our type of 
fighting compared with his, the known rate at 
which men return to the front from hospital, the 
known number of prisoners. 
Germany has not armed less than six million 
men since the beginning of the war; she has not 
armed more than seven and a half millions. The 
maximum that Austria-Hungary can add to Ger- 
many in man power is 80 per cent. She has cer- 
tainly not added less than 60 per cent. The Allies 
hold about a million and a quarter prisoners, at 
the very least, but not more than a million and a 
half at the most. The figures of wounded and 
missing to dead are, even in the severest trench 
fighting, not lower than four to one. Of wounded 
admitted to hospital and of some sick about 
half are discharged as fit to fight again some day 
or other, but of wounded only you cannot count 
on more than a fifth getting back on the average of 
all services within, say, two months. 
Now put all this together, and what do vou 
find? 
The average number of men in the British 
Expeditionary Force is not a twelfth of the 
numbers Germany has passed through in this 
war. We had less than a hundred thousand men 
in the field when Germany had more than thirty 
times as much. We have perhaps now in the field 
a sixth of what Germany has altogether put for- 
ward. The avei'age is certainly, I repeat, far less 
than a twelfth. The German forces have been com- 
pelled, or have chosen to undertake, the most 
violent and prolonged offensive actions. They 
have fought in the most expensive tactical fashion. 
Our casualties give 50,000 dead. Who can 
doubt that the total German dead must be over 
600,000? It is absolutely certainly an under- 
estimate; less than the lowest possible minimum. 
Austria-Hungary cannot conceivably have less 
than 60 per cent, of that total. It is certain that 
she has added more than 60 per cent. In other 
words, it is absolutely certain that your minimum 
of enemy dead must — absolutely without escape 
from the simplest laws of arithmetic — be over a 
million. You have certainly well over a million 
prisoners. Is it conceivable that disablement from 
wounds and prolonged sickness should be less than 
double the number of dead ? It is inconceivable. 
Well, then, the figure of four millions, so far 
from being an extravagant figure, is an extremely 
modest one. And when I said that the total 
number of enemy permanently out of action was 
-' nearer four than three millions " I was putting 
the figures far below even the strictest minimum. 
It seems to me certain that they must be over 
four. 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF INVASION. 
Current talk in the last fortnight and reports 
from private travellers in the enemy's country 
liave brought again under discussion the hypo- 
thesis of invasion. It may be worth while, there- 
fore, to -consider very briefly the political and 
strategical position of the enemy in this connec- 
tion. With the naval problem involved I cannot 
deal. But the general military problem is simple 
enoucrh. 
1. The principal military object of the enemy 
in proposing an invasion of this country would 
be the interruption of the aid this country can 
afford to the general alliance. This "interruption 
would take four forms : 
(a) The retention within the island of forces 
that might otherwise be sent abroad. 
(b) The hampering, in a greater or less 
degree, according to the confusion created in the 
public mind and in Government arrangements, 
of supply to the Army abroad. 
(c) The same with regard to financial assist- 
ance to the Allies. 
(d) The same with regard to the production 
of munitionment, of equipment, and of goods for 
export, which maintain the economic position of 
this country. 
2. The object of such an attack would be 
partly attained if it could be maintained as a 
serious threat without ever being put into execu- 
tion. Now, this truth, which is almost self-evi- 
dent, is, paradoxically enough, an argument in 
favour of an actual attempt at invasion. For it 
is manifest from experience that public opinion 
in general in this country does not regard invasion 
as a serious threat, and nothing but its successful 
practice would have the effects just enumerated. 
Therefore, those in the enemy's country who 
perceive the advantages which might accrue to 
them from the mere threat of invasion will equally 
be armed with arguments for its actual prosecu- 
tion. In other words, we may decide immediately 
that, unlike the corresponding doctrine in con- 
nection with aerial raids, the mere moral effect 
of a threat is not in contemplation, but either a 
serious attempt at invasion or none. For it is 
further obvious that an abortive attempt, whether 
resulting in the defeat of the enemy's fleet and the 
end of the whole business, or in the landing of a 
small force which should be quickly destroyed or 
repelled, would have a purely negative effect, and 
would hurt the enemy by increasing public con- 
fidence after such a success against him. 
3. The argument that such an attempt would 
be impossible, or unlikely, on account of the drain 
of men it would entail holds under the immediate 
circumstances of the campaign, but does not hold 
with the same force in case of certain future pos- 
sible developments. It is conceivable that during 
or after a period of temporary defensive upon 
the East as upon the West the enemy might 
detach a sufficient force to effect in his judgment 
the degree of disturbance which he regards as 
sufficient. We must remember here that we are 
dealing not with our own psychology but with 
the enemy's, and it is certain that he still estimates 
too low the power of resistance that can be offered 
once a landing is effected, and he rates the disturb- 
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