June 26, 1915. 
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EWTISH, ALLIED. AND NEUTRAL VESSELS SUNK BY SXTSMAKINES. 
VON TIRPITZ V. VON HOLLWEG. 
It is not at all improbable that from the very 
beginning of tilings the military staffs of Ger- 
many and Austria took the direction of national 
affairs entirely out of the hands of the Chancellor 
and Ministers. There were many indications that 
the political oversights wliich so affected the 
Glerman policy were the oversights, not of the 
diplomats and Ministers, but of the soldiers. It 
seems quite certain that it was the disappointed 
rage of the sailors that resulted in the astonish- 
ing -departure which we now know as the '' sub- 
marine campaign." Von Tirpitz's threat of 
Deoember became settled policy early in the New 
YeaT, and, in spite of American protests, the sub- 
marine campaign began on the appointed date in 
February. If we are to understand the course 
which this campaign has taken we must realise 
that it originated as a stroke of naval revenge. 
Its profes^d object was to threaten an embargo 
on the importation of foodstuffs into England; 
it was used as a lever to get us to raise our em- 
bargo on wheat entering German ports. But it 
must always have been obvious that it could never 
be an effective embargo, and it is difficult to 
believe that the Chancellor ever supposed that the 
threat would achieve a diplomatic success. 
This being the position, we should expect 
the submarine campaign to have been in all its 
earlier stages tentative, the naval party pushing 
for the blind use of force, the statesmen urging 
moderation in a course that was regarded as an 
experiment, the effect of which was to be watched. 
A superficial glance at the graphic and 
chronological pixsgress of the submarine campaign 
seems to confirm this theory. Note, for instance, 
that there is a considerable pause after the first 
■opffniwg of the campaign in the last ten days of 
Jeferoary. Tliat campaign has interesting 
features of its own. Nine ships were attacked 
between Februan^ 19 and Fdjruary 26. inclusive. 
All tbe attacks bui two were made in the Channel 
between Folkestone and the Chfinnel Islands. The 
other two were made in the neighbourhood of 
Liverpool. From the 26th to the 7th there was 
a ten days' pause. Was this pause made with a 
view to watching the effect ? There is another of 
four days at the end of the second week in April, 
and but for two attacks in the North Sea, almost 
a total cessation between April 18 and 28. There 
is a long pause of nine days after the Lusitanin 
campaign. 
THE PERIODICITY THEORIES. 
A theory has been propounded that these 
pauses are due to the submarines being recalled to 
fill up with stores, fuel, and torpedoes. But if 
refitting only were in question, there would be no 
occasion to recall all the boats together. If a 
special effort had been made, as was the case with 
the Lvsitanisi, to capture a particular ship, 
obviously the more submarines that were devoted 
to the purpose the greater the chances of success. 
But if it is simply a question of running amok 
nothing is gained by submarines working 
together. They cannot support ejxch other as sur- 
face craft can do. They are exposed to less risk in 
proporti<wi as they are isolated. The danger 
from hostile destroyers must obviouslj^ be less. 
A secx)nd theorj' has been propounded that 
these long pauses are to be explained b}' the occa- 
sional recall eitlier of all the boats or all except 
one or two, so that they could be available for 
the discharge of their true military duties. The 
primary duty of German submarines is, of course, 
to attack the" main units of the British battle fleet. 
Once an attack was made on the Dardanelles those 
w?,ters obviously became a field for at least some 
of them. The attacks on the English battle fleets 
in home waters have from the very beginning of 
the war until to-day l)een absolutely fruitless. 
But thei*^ wa.s a secondary function — to protect 
their own fleet in its occasional parades in the 
Nortli Sea. In going into the Nortii Sea at all, 
the German Fleet undoubtedly takis risks, and it 
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