LAND AND WATER. 
June 26, 1915. 
would net take those risks unless it were 
guarded by mine-fields, Zeppelins, destroyers, 
and submarines. The mines and the sub- 
marines can be, and have undoubtedly been, 
disposed so that a British squadron attack- 
ing the German Fleet could be drawn into their 
zone as into an ambush. Whether the theory that 
the submarines have been chilled off to act in this 
way is true or not cannot be decided without know- 
ledge of the dates on which the German Fleet has 
coine out — knowledge which is not available from 
any public sources. 
The knowledge which is available certainly 
lends colour to the supposition that for the first 
three months of the war diplomatists were hold- 
ing the sailors back and limiting the activity of 
the submarines so as to give diplomacy a chance of 
using the situation which their successes had 
created. Two things seem to be almost conclusive 
on this point. First, the long pause after the sink- 
ing of the Lusitania; next, the unprecedented 
ferocity of the work carried through in the first 
fortnight in June. After the Lusitania was sunk, 
evervthing depended upon the action which 
America would take. Was she serious in saying 
that she would hold Germany to strict account i 
It looks as if the diplomatists had insisted upon 
time for these questions to answer themselves. By 
June it had become obvious that the American 
situation had become serious. An insolent reply 
had been sent, and had been recognised as insolent. 
It was obvious that German prestige must be kept 
up. Germany has only one prescription in this 
matter. The campaign must be made more fright- 
ful. Piracy and murder, then, were enlisted once 
more to help — or embarrass — diplomacy. 
During the first ninety-seven days of the 
campaign ninety-five ships were attacked. In 
the next twenty-two days fifty-four. From some- 
thing less than a rate of one ship per day, it had 
gone up to two and a half. High as this rate is 
compared with what it was, the actual ratio of 
ships lost to the shipping coming in and leaving 
British ports is still unimportant. From the point 
of view of an attack on the national Avealth or on 
the national source of supplies, the campaign 
remains as it began — completely ineffective as a 
aulitary measure. But it is worth asking our- 
selves if this rate will be maintained or increased. 
It depends upon two things — first, the political 
iiotive which may actuate to supreme direction of 
German policy, next, the facilities that Germany 
possesses for carrying on the campaign. 
THE FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN. 
On the political side, a great deal will turn 
upon the action of America. Nothing in the last 
week throws any further light upon the state of 
American opinion, which, on tne whole, seems 
resolute to support the President. Mr. Bryan's 
efforts to create a peace party do not seem to be 
succeeding. The situation remains, therefore, that 
America would have no choice between war and 
the sacrifice of self-respect, so that the issue is not 
in doubt. Germany must either cease the cam- 
paign or be prepared to fight America as well. 
Supposing she elects to fight, can she continue 
the submarine campaign ? Can she make it more 
intense ? Undoubtedly, it seems to me, she can do 
both. There is no doubt that her facilities for 
manufacturing submarines will increase, and not 
diminish, with time. But, while this is so, certain 
facts are reassuring. 
Practically no ship has been attacked in the 
Channel — that is, between east of a line from 
Portland to the Channel Islands and west of the 
Straits of Dover— since the beginning of the 
second week in April. In this limited area, 
therefore, the defensive measures taken by the 
Admiralty seem to have been perfectly successful. 
The fact that not a single transport or Channel 
steamer has been successfully attacked since the 
beginning of the war has always been eloquent of 
the effectiveness of the measures taken by the 
Admiralty in these waters. But the public might 
naturally suppose that these measures were 
limited specifically to the protection of the trans- 
ports and Channel steamers and not to making a 
given area immune from submarine attention. 
Although the Channel passenger traffic arid the 
Army transports have escaped, there was in the 
first seven weeks of the campaign a very heavy, 
toll taken of ships in the eastern half of the 
English Channel. Indeed, the waters between a 
line drawn from Dover to Calais and another 
from Havre to Portsmouth witnessed attacks 
of no less than eighteen ships between February 
19 and April 8. But from April 8 on this part 
of the Channel appears to have been perfectly 
clear. It is also gratifying that, except for two 
ships on June 12 that were sunk between Liver- 
pool and the Isle of Man, there has been no 
casualty in the Irish Sea north of St. George's 
Channel since the second week in March. 
It is, of course, obvious that precautions can 
l)e taken in narrow waters which cannot be taken 
where waters are more open. It will be remem- 
bered thcat in the earlier days of the " Blockade " 
the Admiralty announced that the North Channel 
— that is, from Fair Head to the Mull of Can- 
tyre — was closed to all trafl5c. Any submarine, 
therefore, wishing to operate off Liverpool would 
have to enter by St. George's Channel, which is 
not fifty-three miles across, and would have to 
make good its exit by the same way. Similarly, 
the Straits of Dover were announced to be closed, 
so that submarines, to operate in the Channel, 
would have to go right round Scotland and Ire- 
land and enter from the Atlantic. From La 
Hogue to Portland Bill is about the same distance 
as across St. George's Channel. For practical pur- 
poses, therefore, trafiic between England and 
France and between England and Ireland is safe. 
But it is equally obvious that no preventive 
measures have succeeded generally in mitigating, 
the operations of submarines either in the North 
Sea or on the. West Coast of Scotland and Ireland, 
or in the approaches to the English and St. 
George's Channels. 
THE NEW WAR LOAN; 
The new War Luan is bound to b© a sncoess, for it appeals to ©verj 
class of investor, and is founded on the highest security in the world-— 
the British Empire. It carries interest at 4^ per cent., and provides for 
optional ledemption in ten, or certain redemption in Iwenty years. 
Holders of the First War Loan, of Consols, and certain Government 
annuities can convert their holdings into New War Loan Stock — but the 
soundest feature in this gigantic .scheme is the opportunity it aSords to 
the small investor to share in the great obligations which the war has 
imposed on the country. There can be no better or more acceptable 
form of thift for the working classes, whose income has, generally speak- 
ing, increased more than that of any other class in the commnnity, and 
no better employment of capital than in the supreme interest of th« 
State. 
Those who knew Mr. McKenna's financial ability were greatly 
pleased when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the world at 
large will approve the statesmanlike basis of his finance at a time wbeii 
England has grave need of statesmen. 
10* 
