LAND AND WAT E R . 
June 26, 1915. 
tumult behind the train is sufficient to whirl paper and other 
light articles iu all direciion", owing to the rush of the mole- 
cules of air to fill the vacuum created immediately behind the 
last carriage. If such an agitation and rush of air prevail 
behind a railway train where the over-ali area is only about 
10 feet in height by 6 feet in width, what must it be im- 
mediat-?ly beneath an airship travelling at identical speed, but 
where the surface measures 525 feet by 30 feet ! It is safe to 
assert that no aeroplane could live within a considerable radiu.s 
of the centre of diislurbanee ; it would be drawn into the vortex. 
If the aviator be immediately above the airship wlien a 
rapid descent is made by the latter, the aeroplane would be 
drawn downwards, and its equilibrium would be destroyed, 
as in the case of Lieutenant Warneford's machine. 
When the vulnerability of the Zeppelin from overhead 
attack was first appreciated, an effort to remedy this disad- 
vantage was made by mounting a quick-firing gun upon the 
top of the vessel. Trials were made with this weapon, but it 
was found that the recoil of the weapon caused a pronounced 
vibration of the structural members of the rigid framework. 
Accordingly, the fixed quick-firer was abandoned, although 
the po.=.ition was preserved for the convenience of one or two 
members of the crew arm.ed with magazine rifle.s, which it 
was maintained would be adequate to repel hostile attack 
during the period the airship was being prepared for a 
hurried descent. This fact is worthy of mention, because it 
is claimed that the gun position upon the top of the airship 
was abandoned owing to the danger of the flashes from the 
arm firing the hydrogen gas exuding from the envelopes of 
the balloons within, but this escape of gas is just as observable 
below as above the airship. 
Until such time as artillery science produces a missile 
which will act in a similar manner to the bomb depending 
upon the force of gravity for its volition, and which upo7i 
striking the envelope will disrupt the latter and fire the in- 
flammable gaseous contents, the only means of bringing a 
Zeppelin down is by securing a position overhead. This fact 
has been appreciated by Count von Zeppelin and the German 
military dopartrrient from the very first. But there has 
always been one saving factor. The aeroplane does not 
possess the capacity to hover; it must travel at an appreciable 
speed to maintain dynamic equilibrium in the air. Hurling 
a bomb from a rapidly moving vehicle at a definite target is 
one of the most difficult tasks ; a miss is more likely to be 
recorded than a hit. The possibility of a dirigible being 
pitt«d against a dirigible is too remote to be entertained, but 
if one such vessel sliould get the position above another vessel 
of this type, then the fate of the under-dog is sealed. Conse- 
quently, all things considered, it was accepted in Teuton 
military circles that it would be an extremely diflScult task 
for the hostile aeroplane to secure the dominating position; 
the possession of the speed gauge was against the enemy. 
The destruction of the Zeppelin in Belgium has precipitated 
a snarl of intense rage through Germany, not so mucli 
becau.se the Zeppelin was destroyed, bub for the plain reason 
that the British had discovered the tactical point of attack 
and had proved the vulnerability of the mechanical mon- 
strosity when assailed from such a point. In a word, th« 
Allies have learned the true significance of f/etiing above the 
Zeppelin, and one may rest assured that in all future opera- 
tions less effort will be expended upon the firing of rifles and 
machine guns in the hope of disabling the jiropelling 
machinery; the main object of attack will be to force the air- 
ship to the under position, so as to bring it within bomb 
range, because the bomb dropped from overhead is the only 
known means of consummating the complete destruction of 
this vessel. 
To as-sail a Zeppelin from the ground with shrapnel, Or 
from a point below the airship with guns mounted upon 
aeroplanes and firing the common type of projectile, is a 
waste of energy and ammunition, as I will explain in a future 
article. 
THE AERIAL OFFENSIVE. 
MK. L. BLIN DESBLEDS was the first writer to svggeU 
a comprehensive and sustained aerial offensive as the 
most effective means of shortening the war. 
We publish on another page a letter from Mr. H. G. 
Wells, who shares Mr. Deshleds's views on this important 
tubject. 
The following extracts from Mr. Desbleds's articles ia 
Land and Water are of interest at the present time : 
" Without in the slightest degree criticising what has 
been done by our commanders, to whom the State has en- 
trusted fhe task of carrying out the operations to enforce our 
views and those of our Allies, the writer desires to press 
home the point which he has already, on two occasions, 
brought forward in these columns — namely, that a strong, 
comprehensive, and sustained aerial offensive might result iii 
a much earlier victory than would otherwise be the case." — 
Land a:;d Water, Fehruarif IS. 
" We are now, as regards military aeronautics, in 
possession of data which were not available when the war 
broke out. Some preconceived ideas concerning the value of 
aviation have received terrible blows and have met with a 
quick destruction. Unforeseen uses of the aeroplane have 
come into prominence. Our airmen have shown a greater 
valour and adaptability than even the most enthusiastic sup- 
porter of the new arm could have expected. 
"A most important quality of the aeroplane has been 
brought to light. This quality is its value for offensive 
operations. . . . For offensive work, of permanent value, 
it is not an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is required, 
but one of about a thousand, or more, strong 
" Now the que.slion which presents itself is whether it 
would be po.ssible for this country to build, in the space ;;f 
a few months, 2,000 aeroplanes, train the men necessary to 
pilot them, form the necessary contingent of mechanics which 
would be required to accompany them at the front, and 
organise an adequate transport service. The writer has gone 
carefully into these questions, and he is convinced that, 
though the effort would have to be a considerable one, the 
formation of a powerful offensive aerial fleet, thoroughlv 
equipped and manned, could be produced in this country in 
the time stated. It can, besides, be asserted that such a "fleet 
sould be brought into existence without interfering with, or 
hindering, in the slightest degree, the development of tho 
present air fleet v/hich is so necessary to our armies for 
reconnaissance and kindred work. . . . 
" If, therefore, the country decides to endeavour to 
obtain an aerial supremacy which would enable us, almost 
immediately, to carry the war right into the heart of th'i 
enemy's territory, a special offensive air fleet must be created 
at once." — Land and Water, March 6, 1915. 
" In her ability to produce aircraft Britain stands 
alone. . . . The occupation by the Germans of the highly 
industrial districts of Northern France .... has reduced 
the industrial resources of our Ally It is upon ua 
that the burden rests of creating such a fleet. It is a duty 
which we are bound to perform, since it may, without inter- 
fering with our other arrangements, lead to a much shorter 
war and to a smaller sacrifice of lives. 
... The writer estimates that the possession by 
the Allies of an offensive air fleet, 1,000 aeroplanes strong, 
and kept at this strength, would, in a very short time, render 
the maintenance of the German Army in the Western theatre 
of war a matter of extreme difliculty, if not of impossibility. 
Add to this the fact that with a disorganised railway traffic 
the enemy would be unable to transfer quickly troops from 
the Western to the Eastern theatre of war, and vice versa, and 
the damage which a strong offensive air fleet could do to the 
German arsenals, and you will come to the conclusion that 
a powerful air fleet could now not only prevent men, ammu- 
nition, and arms from being sent to the German front, bub 
could also interfere with the manufacture of those arms and 
ammunition " — Land and Water, Maj/ S, 1915. 
THE BLERIOT MANUFACTURING AIRCR.A FT 
COMP.VNY. 
We publish on another page the prospectus of the above convpany , ia 
which £100,000 sliarea are oficied for public subscription at par. The 
object of this company, which is to provide additional aeroplanes for lh« 
use of the War Ofiice and Admiralty, is one which must meet with 
universal approval. It is, moreover, a need which has repeatedly been 
emphasised in this journal. Probably no one has don« more for the 
cause of aviation than M. Bleriot, and fortunately for the company ha 
combines practical ability with inventive genius. This is shown by tha 
remarkable and increasing success which the business of M. Bieriot haa 
achieved in the last five years, the English business alone havioe 
made nearly £40,000 profit for the twelve months ending March 31, 
1915. With the addition of further capital the company is likely ta 
make good use of the unique opportunity awaiting it. 
14" 
