LAND AND .WATER 
July 3, 1915. 
tn^ of the junction near Busk. The defensive 
line of the Bug does not cover the junction and is 
here insignificant as an obstacle. 
Such, then, being the situation of the slowly- 
retiring Russian line and of the corresponding 
•Austro German advance, let us next ask ourselves 
these two questions, which are essential to an 
understanding of the position :— 
First ■ what does the retirement mean, and, 
eecondlv, in what way was it conducted ? In other 
words what was its cause and what its nature J 
The cause of tlie Russian retirement is very 
simple, and well knowTi by this time to all readers. 
It has proceeded ever since the attack on the 
Dunajetz in April (though at first a rapid and 
later a much slower process), because the enemy 
accumulation of shell in the course of the winter 
(which accumulation has mainly been expended m 
fcalicia) was a very great deal larger than the 
accumulation on the Russian side, and much 
larger, again, than the proportion of total shell 
.which the Russians could, with their insufficient 
Bupply of rolling stock within their boundaries, 
bring up to the borders of Galicia. 
Whenever, after each space of time required 
for the bringing up of the shell to the front, the 
Austro- German bombardments were renewed upon 
any sector, they compelled the Russians upon that 
sector to retire. And this process can be con- 
tinued, not, indeed, indefinitely, but so long as 
there is full railway accommodation behind the 
Austro-German line. 
This first question, then, the cause of the 
Russian retirement, is simply and easily answered. 
The corresponding answer to the question of 
its method is far more important to our general 
judgment. Save at one moment, upon the Duna- 
jetz, two months ago, the Russian retreat has 
now^here betrayed characters other or worse than 
those Avhich mark it at the present moment. 
What are those characters ? 
The leading one, which must strike every 
competent observer, is that the retirement has 
throughout been effected with deliberation, and 
since May 16 each stage has been taken at the 
discretion of the Russian commanders and not 
under the compulsion of an action. 
A comparison of dates is sufficient to prove 
this. The enemy reached the line of the San m 
the middle of the second week of May. In other 
words, he had covered something like three- 
quarters of his task in less than the first fort- 
night of his effort. All that first retirement was 
exceedingly rapid and each step in it was forced 
by an action favourable to the enemy. But once 
the San line is reached and the great burst ol 
ammunition by the enemy is over, mark wiiat fol- 
lows. The Russians to retire across the San had 
to hold the bridge-head of Jaroslav. They held 
that bridge-head all during May 13, 14, and 15, 
though few troops covered it, and evacuated all 
the material it contained. 
Next came exactly the same game with the 
dangerous salient of Przemysl. It offered a 
splendid chance for breaking the Russian line, 
which is the one great object of the enemy. Yet it 
was steadily held for nearly a fortnight against 
the most violent attacks by a screen of Russian 
troops, and behind that screen all the guns, 
aU the stores, all the rolling stock gathered in 
Przemysl were deliberately, successtully, and 
methodically withdrav/n. The operation took a 
full twelve days— twelve days during which it 
was essential to the German plan to break m and 
take advantage of the awkward bulge m the 
Russian line. The enemy were unable to effect 
their purpose. Bv Jnne 2 everything had been got 
out of Przemysl, and the retirement was continu- 
ing in perfect order. . ■ 
It will be remembered that the enemy issued 
a bulletin in which he said that when he had 
counted his capture of material in Przemysl he 
would issue a list of it. He issued no such list, 
for there was no such capture. The enemy 
M 
y. 
(A 
Held tilt June 1st. 
Qtrman ad^'atice injxrst 
Fortnwht. 
Oermaa 
advance 
iriticxt 
(^ sr^ ^urawnow 
German 
advance 
-in next 
n 
2» 
