LAND AND WATER, 
July 3, 1915. 
Rffection of civilian opinion in enemy or neutral 
countries counts for less to- Jay thcan in any cam- 
paign of the past. . . 
More than in any campaign of the ])ast. it is 
etrictly the business of every Government, and its 
only business, through the medium of its soldiers, 
to destroy the armies of its opponents. 
Well, judged bv that standard, to what does 
the Russian retreat through Galicia amount | 
What is the measure of the enemy's success, and 
in what posture do we lind our Ally ? 
There is only one answer, and it is the answer 
that would be given, I think, by every sober and 
competent observer of the affair as a purely 
military operation. . 
The success of the enemy consists m the ob- 
taining of certain .supplies, notably petrol, about 
which he was becoming anxious, and m securing 
from a similar anxiety his food supplies m Hun- 
gary, and the possibly doubtful allegiance ot the 
population there. In his main task, the breaking 
of the Russian line, he has, .so far, completely 
failed. His losses have been at least equal to those 
of the Russians. Tliey have been enormous, and 
they are, in his case, irreidaccable. 
He has produced r. salient upon the nuip— 
for Warsaw^ projects far beyond a hnc drawii 
from the frontier of East Prussia to the frontiers 
of Galicia, but this salient upon the map has not 
the disadvantage of your ordinary strategical 
salient; it is far too large, and Warsaw can only 
be obtained through direct action against the 
northern or the southern railways converging 
upon that centre. 
There remains one conception which one 
hears commonly enough : The conception that the 
enemy, having pushed the Russian out of every 
portion of his territory, will create a defensive 
line upon the East, just as he has created one upon 
the West, and. reiving upon comparatively small 
forces for holding this line, return Avith his 
surplus of men and munitions to an offensive 
against the West in its turn. 
That he may attempt an offensive ngamst tne 
West after having in the main failed in his offen- 
sive upon the East is probable enough. That he 
can create a permanent defensive line in the East 
as he has in the West is impossible. The dis- 
tances are too great. Until he shall achieve some 
decision against the Russians, whether by divid- 
ing their armies, or at least by capturing the Vis- 
tula line and getting the Russians behind a hedge, 
he must continue his Eastern effort. That effort 
is bleeding him of men and is eating up his shell 
very much faster than that shell is produced. 
There would seem to be the heart of the situa- 
tion, and with the reservation that one is only 
speaking for the Eastern war as it has hitherto 
developecii the balance is not in favour of tiie 
enemy, as it appears to be from mere movements 
upon'a map : it is against him. 
I know that an expression of such opinion is 
unpopular in certain circles to-day, because a 
mood of uncalculating doubt, as ill-considered as 
the ee.rlier optimism, is a.ffecting newspaper 
opinion in this country. But I am not concerned 
with such things. I am only concerned with pre- 
senting the situation as it appears to me, and with 
as m.uch detacliment as possible, and I say that 
this situation shows, after two months' total 
enemy losses of at least 600,000, a grave depletion 
of the enemy in accumulation of shell and the 
Russian line intact. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
The position in the Dardanelles has been 
stationary for so long that opinion has almost 
ceased to consider the factors of the problem 
there. Yet it is impoilant to return to them from 
time to time, bccuiise the difficulty of the task, 
great as it is, is surpassed by tlie very high value 
of the stakes engao;ed. 
Mr. Arnold" Bennett ]>ut it very well the other 
day in the Daily News when he wrote (in connec- 
tion with the situation in general) that the failure 
of tiie attempt to force 'the Dardanelles would 
not leave the Allies as a whole appreciably weaker 
tlian it found them, v\'hile success in that venture 
would immcdii-.tely change the v.hole character of 
the war. 
These things Iieing so, let us briefly recapitu- 
late the chances of the experiment. 
My readers will remember that the esseiitials 
of the position are expressed in a diagram printed 
some v,-eeks ago, which I w ill repeat here. 
A narrow channel of water, with its critical 
point at the Narrows, between E and F, is being 
fought for. If we have in cur power the Narrows, 
we have also the whole thirty miles of the Straits. 
In order to become masters of that critical 
point, the Narrows, we require to be masters of 
a certain plateau overlooking it on the European 
side known -cr, the Plateau of the Paslia Dagh. 
This plateau is everywhere buttressed by steep 
slopes^ so tiiat all round the edge of these there is a 
strong defensive position to be established, and 
this rnust be forced before the plateau itself can 
be occupied. 
But, apart from this strong defensive posi- 
tion on the Pasha Dagh, there is an advanced 
position in the shape of the Achibaba ridge, which 
stretches for rather more than four miles right 
across the Gallipoli Peninsula. The main part of 
the attacking force has been la.nded at various 
points along the edge of the end of the peninsula 
—near ]\I — and faces Turkish entrenchments in 
front of the Achibaba position. A subsidiary por- 
tion of the attacking force has been landed at N, 
and has there entrenched itself, the role it has 
to play being a junction with the main attacking 
force in the south when or if that force can carry 
the Achibaba position. 
We are now at the very end of June. The 
month will be over when these lines appear in 
print. The first attack against the Achibaba 
position and its failure is two months old. The 
second attack, which has also failed, is a month 
old. We have ample opportunity for judging the 
situation as r. whole, and there is no advantage in 
silence, save upon details. 
Such a general judgment leads one to the 
following conclusion : — 
The forcing of the two successive defensive 
positions of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the occu- 
pation of the Pasha Dagh Plateau depend upon 
any one of three faci^ors, or any number of these 
in combination, and these three factors are: — 
(1) A sufficient siege-train. 
(2) The arrival of new and larger forces 
(with their due complement of artillery). 
(3) The hampering of the enemy's supplies 
in men and munitions, which supplies can only, 
reach him (for reasons to be described in a 
moment) from across the water. 
Of these three great conditions upon which 
success depends, the second must be left undis- 
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