July 3, 1915 
LAND AND WATER 
Q^'^^^.t 
cussed, for it is a political matter. Only a few 
men in authority, and perhaps not these, could 
tell one whether new forces are to be expected 
from any quarter. But the first and the third 
are open to analysis. 
The first is the simplest to understand. We 
are dealing with an entrenched position of pecu- 
liar strength. It is four and a half miles long. 
It is adequately defended. 
Now, we know from the experience of nine 
months of such war what the power of the modern 
entrenched defensive is. We know how every 
week's delay increases and consolidates the 
strength of an already engineered defensive posi- 
tion. We know by similar experience, both of our 
attacks against the enemy and of his attacks 
against us in France and Flanders, what tre- 
mendous concentration of heavy gun fire with 
large shell upon a comparatively narrow front is 
necessary for even a painful and tedious advance. 
[We know that in the whole course of this cam- 
paign since last October the defensive has on the 
whole proved everywhere impregnable, even after 
violent artillery preparation, save in the one case 
of the Dunajetz front, where there happened to 
be a very grave disproportion between the muni- 
tionment of the enemy and of our Ally. 
We know that for the main offensive stroke 
in the West, or an enemy counter-offensive in the 
same region, there can be no chance of success 
until a vast accumulation of munitions is pre- 
pared and a corresponding concentration of heavy 
pieces provided upon the sectors chosen for attack. 
Well, now, knowing all this, and applying our 
knowledge to the case of the Gallipoli Peninsula, 
the conclusion is obvious. It is only what was 
said in these columns more than four months ago 
when the first expedition was designed. It is not 
too late to repeat it to-dav. As the thing stands 
in its present situation oi number and under the 
present condition of enemy supply, everything 
depends upon the provision of a suitable siege- 
train with its munitions. And an insufficient 
number of pieces or their insufficient supply of 
hea\y shell cannot be replaced by infantry work. 
llemember that the Achibaba position is not 
only naturally one of very great strength, but is 
twice as long as the line we attacked at Neuve 
Chapelle and nearly as long as the main part of 
the attack delivered by the French in Champagne 
at the end of the winter. It is slightly longer 
than the front the French are similarly attacking 
now south of the Lorette ridge. There is only 
room for a certain amount of men to deploy on 
such a front, and unless we have a concentration 
of artillery corresponding to what the French and 
British have used on similar fronts in France and 
Flanders, we must not expect corresponding 
results. 
So much for the first point, then, which is a 
matter of guns. Those of the Fleet, by the 
way, do not supplement the all-important factor 
of the great howitzer, and that for three reasons : 
The ship is a moving platform; the supply of 
large shell the ship can carry is limited ; the tra- 
jectory is a gun trajectory, and flat. 
Now, the last point, the hampering of the 
enemy's supplies in men and munitions, is less 
simple to discuss. 
It is not susceptible of any exhaustive study, 
save by men upon the spot, but we are justified in 
making a general examination of the problem 
from the evidence afforded us by maps and by the 
news sent us from the theatre of action. 
We first note that the enemy must be supplied 
from across the water, because the Gallipoli 
Peninsula, at its northern end, terminates in a 
narrow isthmus — the Isthmus of Bulair — com- 
manded by the guns of the Fleet. 
Since our ships are not yet able to reach up 
the Straits far beyond the mouth, the forts at the 
Narrows being still intact and barring the way, 
the easiest method by which the enemy can supply 
himself is to send men and munitions on vessels 
which go down the Sea of Marmara, and dis- 
charge at Maidos or at Kilidbahr (E), but the 
activity of British submarine work has made this 
very difficult. The central channel of the Darda- 
nelles is always over thirty fathoms in depth and 
in most places over forty. ' It is never less than a 
mile wide and in most places from two to four 
miles ; therefore the task of submarines in thread- 
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