;ruly 3, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEU. 
U uiiltin- in it« service another and still larger group of 
nations. °We just now spoke of the possibilities inherent m 
the principle of freedom and of the future opened up to 
humanity by the mere natural action of growth and sel - 
development. This ideal is rtill in its dawn, nor are its intel- 
lectual and spiritual effects as yet fully apparent. Its gradual 
growth, its influence upon life, its place in Europe to-day, 
and the rallying of the nations round it are points oi view 
from which it may be regarded. If Prussia b the foremost 
champion of the idea of dominion, we ourselves, at least in 
the sphere of practical politics, may lay claim to the leader- 
ship of the forces of freedom. The evolution of this pnnciple 
forms the backbone of English history, while our quite recent 
adaptation and use of it as an imperial bond uniting a society 
of free nations is an event of capital importance to the world 
at lar-e It is at this moment, when the principle of freedom 
emerg°es from a state of merely national to a state of u^^-ersa 
consequence, that it meets on the world-stage the nva 
prSple of' dominion, similarly emerging out of national 
Llation, similarly presenting itself as a world-ideal and led 
on to th; attack by the armed might of Prussia Not wih- 
out cause is it that Germany reserves an especial hate tor 
England for. unprepared and unformidable in arms as we 
ap^ared yet ideally wo were the most irreconcilable of her 
f^ MorJover, iroi the moment we set about arming, and 
our recruits came streaming to the flag from -ll/^^ English 
nations overseas, her instinct recognised the gait and aspe 
of that great ideal betwixt which and hersclt the combat n 
"""^ We have tried to indicate a point of view. If wc succeed 
in our interpretation we shall in the end come to see the 
shock of armies as the outward sign of an inward encounter 
of ideas. Behind the armies we shall see two philosophies 
each a..piring, one by persuasion, the other by force, to world 
sunremacy and to the direction of the future of mankind. 
Their deadly animosity indicates their profouna incompati- 
bility of nature and the magnitude of the struggle measures 
the Importance of the issues which are -^ ^t«k«- /-ry inc. 
dent of the war, the means employed by both s.des the 
BBirit and temper evoked by the contest, the attitude of 
neutrals and their adhesion one by one to the cause of l,e 
Allies is an authentic lineament of the ideal combat in tlia 
backg;ound. This it is which shines t^lirough the -- ^ « f ^^ 
we see or read about illuminating them with int^l ectual 
sT'nilcance. To see the war thus is not only to understand i 
ri^crhtly, but it is also to realise its importance-not for 
us 01 fy and for the present generation but for the future 
and or the whole world-and To to confirm our deternnnation 
to fight on, not counting the cost, until we are victorious 
or fof as lo^g as the strength to deal a blow remains in us. 
THE ATTACK BY AIR, 
By L. Blin Desbleds. 
TO the majority of people a powerful aenal offensive 
only means a succession of air raids, but to those 
who have closely followed the development of the 
offensive potentiality of aircraft it is nothing of 
the sort. An attack by air, with a view to 
•hortenin^ the war and to putting an end to the present 
dwperately costly system of trench warfare, demands a great 
amount of co-ordination and of organisation. R«"<1<""/'^- 
Ucks or random raids by air cannot be expected to lead to 
results of permanent value. 
It mu^ not be supposed, for instance, that for a country 
io possess a large number of machines and a large number 
of pilots is to place it in the position to carry out a real war 
by air with efficiency and success. To cut off the German 
Vestern army from all communications with its bases is, in 
«aty a stupendous task. Yet. provided the necessary 
Imoun of atte^ion is given to it. it is a task winch may w^l 
U accomplished by a carefully studied and organised com- 
prehensive and sustained aenal offensive. 
^ Real war by air. therefore, should possess the same three 
characteristics as real war by land or by water: that .s it 
niust be organised, it must be comprehensive, and it must be 
rostained. , , j , 
We should not expect victory from our land and our 
«a forces if they were not organised for their special needs^ 
How, then, can we expect to derive the fullest advantage from 
our newest service, which is at the same time the most scienti- 
fic unless we give it the amount of study and of organisation 
.liich, by reason of its proved merits, it certainly deserve 
We should not expect to threaten the communications of the 
German Western army with a force of a few hundred men^ 
Why then, should we think that an aenal force of a few 
flights of aeroplanes launched against the enemy s numerous 
hne of communication could notably alter the '^l-'-^^'^'^ "j 
trench warfare, a method of warfare wh.c li the enemy had 
{oreseon and for which they were thoroughly prepared? 
Ha, it not vet been realised that the enemy s plan '.n 
the present war r'ests on the quick transference of their troops 
the pres^ent wa 'j .- ^ ^^.^,^11 our while, there- 
from one front to anotner . as .1 lj ,«.„„u ,« nostible' 
f«rp to render that transference as oifficult as possioie. 
S^ we have no choice of method. The way of the a.r 
rlhe ;nTy way by which we can get beh.nd the enemy. 
front and his network of fortified pUces or trenches. A e 
we not Voing to avail ourselves of the route that »« open to 
^riinoM, of course, be almost useless to send only a 
few dozens of aeroplanes to try and destroy the '^o";'""'"^;)- 
tions of a wary and resourceful enemy. Our aenal attacks 
must be comprehensive. , 
They must also be sustained. Whenever a line of com- 
munication is destroyed, it must be kept destroyed. Aeria 
attacks, therefore, for their success demand a very careful 
organisation and planning. War in the air, like war on land 
and on sea, is not all dash and bravery. For complete success 
it demands just as much science, just as much cool organisa- 
tion and forethought, and just as much military genius as its 
elder brothers, the war on land and the war on sea. 
The organisation of real war by air is, in essence, dif- 
ferent from that on land and on sea. For complete success -t 
demands a distinct method of procedure. I have, therefore, 
on various occasions, both in the Press and on the platform 
advocated, as strongly as I possibly could, the creation of 
some organisation which, as regards aerial offensive opera- 
tions, would occupy the same position as the War Oflice and 
the Admiralty in their relation to the Army and the Navy 
And an Air Ministry-to call the special organisation by that 
name— will find its position no sinecure. 
It will have to deal with the continuous strengthening of 
our air fleets both as regards the number of machines and 
their designs and construction; it will have to decide the 
course of training best suited to the men entrusted with he 
various kinds of aerial operations; the °';gf"'^^^^«°. f J^" 
necessary motor transport; the forming of the needful engi- 
naeringandmechanical staffs; the means of repairing machnies 
at the front; the study and design of weapons especially suit- 
able for aerial offensive operations and for %.lf"g hostile a.r^ 
craft; the careful examination of numerous ideas in a bi ai ch 
which, because it is still in its youth, daily pour f lom the 
brains of inventors; the careful co-ordina ion « niet.0^0^ 
logical date bearing on aerial operations; the « "Jj jf^J,« 
question of armour and armament of ^--aft; and aboj al . 
U will have to conceive the plan of a comprehensue and sus 
tained aerial offen.'ive. • 1 := nnp which 
Such an operation, as I have a ready said, '« one «h>cl 
requires careful and -jentific study^ J, 'i^o'n. de.- that a 
occasions, explained in th.s PU^l-cation why I con u, 
fleet of aeroplanes 2,000 .trong «.rf '^£h on te deration 
could exercise a considerable '"""--^j^^^ro such a fleet 
and the character of the war. The P.oduc.ion o ^^^^ 
would require a great effort for its efficient wo>k, g 
that effort is well worth making. 
t3» 
