LAND AND .WATER. 
truly 3, 1915. 
THE VALUE OF THE INITIATIVE. 
(^Corilinued.) 
By Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B. 
IN my article last week I explained the gradual waning 
iu the value of permanent fortifications, which has 
been in progress for centuries, but has now reached its 
lowest level, thanks especially to the introduction of 
high explo.'ives in shells. It follows as a corollary that 
the value of the "initiative" ia strategy has increased iu 
almost inverse ratio. 
The term "initiative" in its technical sense do«s not 
necessarily imply an active offensive policy, either strategic- 
ally cr tactically; but covers the idea of power to compel your 
enemy to act as you would have him do, whether such action 
involves attack or defence. Thus the Germans to-day are 
attacking both in Galicia and in France, but in neither theatre 
of operations do they possess " initiative " in the technical 
sense. Reverting to last week"? pages, it is easy to sec how 
the change referred to has come about. In the days of Marl- 
borough, when a group of half a dozen fortresses, defended 
by, say, 50,000 n;en, could hold up half a million for several 
jncnths, it mattered little which side took the initiative at th'j 
outset of a campaign. The defending side withdrew behind 
the shelter of its fortresses and completed its arrangements 
for reopening tho campaign at its convenience. 
Nowadays, such an action has become impossible, and 
henc3 every Continental nation has been straining to the 
utmost, as regards its military side, to obtain an overwhelm- 
ing victory at the earliest possible moment, so as to force it 5 
en?my hereafter to conform to its dictation. It was this 
straining to get away even before the starting-gun was fired 
that led Germany into the fatal error of crossing the line into 
Belgium, in a flagrant violation of all rules of the game, 
which, from the first, deprived her of the power of free move- 
ment, and has ended up by landing her in her present 
quandary, in which she is always compelled to act as the 
Allies please, not as the better sense of her highest strategical 
talent v/ould desire. 
Let us see how the whole chain of cause and effect unwinds 
Germany had prepared for this war against the " Double 
rlnt«nte " for years, and to gain the initiative over France 
had plotted with unexampled care and accuracy a whole 
scheme of advance which should sweep through Belgium, and 
on to Paris, thus compelling the French Army to expend itself 
iu effort; to relieve their capital. Whether the French Staff 
would have conformed to the enemy's wishes is very doubtful, 
and it is not relevant to the present subject to inquire into it. 
The essential point is that the Germans believed that they 
could do so, and made all their arrangements on this assump- 
tion, never dreaming of the storm which their defiance of 
International law would let loose upon them. 
Within forty-eight hours, however, the Nemesis of the 
"7at€3 began to work, and the Higher Staff of their Army dis- 
covered that they had to deal with a factor which they had 
almost < mpletely left out of their reckoning, viz., the entry 
cf England into the struggle, and the consequent danger to 
their lines of communication. 
The danger was not immediate, it is true, for our " con- 
temptible " little aggregate of barely 100,000 men instantly 
available, could, they felt sure, be absorbed by their im- 
mense masses without even a perceptible shock to their 
machinery. But they also knew quite enough of European 
hist.ory to feel assured that that would by no means be the 
end of the matter, and considered as a body of educated 
thinkers, they did in fact expect more from the working of cur 
voluntary system than any of our leaders, with but few ex- 
ceptions, had ever dared to anticipate. That was the reason 
vil.y they had so sedulously tried to undermine our belief in 
cur own method's, and to seduce the imagination of our 
generals and politicians. 
Tho problem had to be faced, what would happen when p' 
they reached Paris and held it, subject to our power of in- b 
vasion along a coa:.t line of some 300 miles from Zeebru^^e 
to the mouth of the Seine. Actually, they had no datable 
guidj them as to how long it would "take lis to make ready, 
say, half a million men; nor were the possible dangers limitecl 
only to the numbers we might provide. The French alone 
were bound to outnumber them two to one on their frontier 
betore very long, and, thanks to our command of the sea 
tiiere was no reason why these numbers should elect to dasli 
them-selves frontally against the German lines when thev 
could be collected in secrecy in the .^nO.i and shipped round 
Irom Marseilles and Bordeaux to act against their flanks 
Itie Ojrmans Lava always been afraid of the secrecy that Sea 
14* 
Power carries with it. They were well aware of the extrema 
difficulty of guarding a long coast line, against any part of 
which, and with only a few hours' warning, a couple of 
hundred thousand troops may suddenly be thrown. 
It was the necessity of precaution against this danger 
that compelled them to divert the energies of a portion of 
their Staff, already fully occupied elsewhere, to the question 
of accumulating a fresh army m.ass in Belgium. Moreover, 
the vigorous attacks by the llussians, which necessitated the 
transfer of no less than four Army Corps from West to East 
at the most critical moment of the Aisne and Oise operations 
made their proble-n none the easier of solution. Then, as all 
will remember, began the great race for the North Sea. Tho 
Germans, den'.iding their lines in the Vosges and around Metz, 
whilst now formations were rushed into Belgium, and for 
some very critical days it seemed as if these new commands 
uniting in the region between Ypres and liille would succeed 
in piercing our line. But the providential appearance of a 
Division, and the incomparable heroism and endurance 
with wliich for a full fortnight they closed the gap against 
fully tenfold odds, enabled French reinforcements to arrive, 
and together we received the shock of the oncoming German 
masses. Then, as the French Staff History of the events 
claims, we broke the German offensive for good and all. 
From henceforward the "initiative" definitely passed 
into our keeping, and, cunningly worked in conjunction with 
the Russians, there has been no further great concentration 
of German forces which we have not succeeded in diverting 
from its intended purpose. Over and over again, big effort:i 
have been made by them to mass together an army vast 
enough to gain a decisive victory on a front of not less than 
twenty miles; but each time, long before a gathering was com- 
plete, a sudden attack, either from the British or French 
lines, whether in the district about Lille, in the centre about 
Perthes, or to their left in the Vosges, has compelled the 
Germ.ans to send off such considerable reinforcements that 
their projected attack has inevitably fallen through, or haa 
had to be made at a time and place not of their own free 
choice. 
The German Staff are not uninstruct«d enough to believe 
the fictions they disseminate for the consumption and encour- 
agement of their people in the Fatherland. I derived most of 
my early training from their predecessors' lips, and from the 
study of their literature, and I am absolutely certain that 
amongst the number of those that count there is not a man 
foolish enough to suppose that any attack made by a le.si 
strength than that sufficient to crush in at one effort a good 
twenty-mile breach right through our lines, can do more at 
the present time than delay temporarily the final issue. 
The officer who, in his diary before he was killed, wrote 
some weeks ago: " Too few to attack, too many to surrender, 
too proud to retire," simply gave expression to the whole of 
the educated opinion of the German Army, and now the sanio 
conviction is spreading to the rank and file. 
Let anyone take the map of the W^estern frontier and 
note the points at which the Germans are now threatened br 
forces of not less than double their own numbers, and fully 
equal to them, unit for unit, from the sea to the Rhine. Near 
the latter river the French now command a full forty-mile 
strip of Upper Alsace, a district large enough to contain an 
army sc strong it could pass over the Rhine and sweep down- 
wards through Baden. In Lorraine, a very short advance 
will sever the communication, both by road and rail, between 
Strasburg and Metz, and north of this line lies a grand 
manoeuvring country for all arms. 
Secrecy, too, as well as numbers are now on the French' 
ide. The ultimate secret, the choice of the exact point, or 
oints, at which General Joffre will decide to launch the final 
low, is securely hidden in his own brain and in his brain 
alone. 
Six months ago, the military situation might have been 
redeemed by a deliberate abandonment of Belgium and a 
retreat and concentration within German territory. 
Victorious here, they could have overrun Belgium again at 
their leisure, but for the threat of British sea power, which, 
from fir.^t to last, has held them in its grasp, from which there 
is no escape. 
We might have hastened events by a reckless waste of 
men — Joffre said as much nearly six months ago — but the 
effect would not have brought the realisation of our ultimat* 
purpo.se so completely within our grasp. 
