July 10, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
railhead, and as in front of Krasnik, he is being 
held up by the Russians rather more than twenty 
miles from the railway and Cholra. The precise 
place where the fighting of the Friday and Satur- 
day, which "went on at the same time as the fight- 
ing near Krasnik, took place in the ca.se of Column 
2 was in the triangle between the River Wieprz 
and its tributary, the Wolica, the Germans 
attempting to reach Krasnostaw, and the 
Russians holding them up in the angle between 
the two rivers. The rather narrow front of the 
principal action spread from the village of 
Tarzymiechy to the village of Krasnoe Stryeff. 
Precisely as in the case of the corresponding action 
for Lublin, so in the case of this action for Cholm, 
the fighting is not apparently yet decided, but it 
has hitherto gone more in favour of the Russians. 
The enemy attack and the Russian defensive in 
the angle between the two rivers fluctuates. The 
village of Tarzymiechy changed hands twice on 
the Saturday. On the Sunday what happened is 
not yet quite clear, but it is evident at least that 
the German attack on that day broke down, and at 
one point left a few prisoners in the hands of our 
ally. Unfortunately, a mere defensive against 
this second column does not counterbalance the 
retirement further west. 
It is evident that if the enemy should attain 
the railway and get a firm grip upon it at any 
point, and retain that grip, it would not matter 
very much to the issue whether his success were 
achieved at Lublin or at Cholra. 
One can understand that the Austrians, with 
their deserved reputation for the production, 
handling, and munitioning of heavy pieces, should 
' have done better here than the Germans, since the 
whole of the war, in this theatre, entirely depends 
upon the enemy's superiority in munitions for 
pieces of 100 millimetres and over. But which- 
ever of the two columns reaches its objective first 
is, unfortunately, indifferent. Either would suffice 
to do all that the enemy desires to do in this 
quarter. 
It remains true, of course, that with every 
mile of the advance the difficulty of bringing up 
heavy shell to the head of the Austro-German 
columns increases. But there is not a correspond- 
ing increase in the advantage the Russians have 
in approaching the railway, for they are now so 
near it that a few miles more or less does not 
count. 
The issue is not yet decided. The line is not 
yet grasped by the enemy; it still serves ammuni- 
tions, within its capacities, to that screen which 
our Allies have thrown before it and parallel to it 
to the south. 
But the enemy possesses still quite clearly a 
great superiority in heavy shell. 
That superiority he will retain for some weeks 
to come. It is possible that these actions are but 
preliminaries to the coming up of his main body 
of munitions by road, and that even if they are 
again favourable for our ally, he may yet have to 
give up the belt of twenty miles lying behind him 
and lose the railway. But if a week or two goes by 
without this defensive being finally forced, then 
we shall know that the enemy has made all the use 
he can of the roads, and that they are insufficient 
for his purpose. 
Such is the problem and its development, 
which we have to watch during the next week in 
this critical region of the war. 
It is, as I need hardly remind the reader, of 
a weight so grave in the whole war that it ia 
difficult to write of it with that detachment which 
a mere commentary on military affairs demands. 
The enemy has only to advance another few days' 
march, and, though he still has before him the 
formidable triangle Brest-Ivangorod-Neogeorgi- 
wiesk, upon which so much strategical writing 
has been produced — or wasted — it will hardly I)e 
possible for the Russians to hold permanently the 
Vistula line. That great issue is now in the act 
of decision. Its fate one way or the other will be 
clearer in a very few days. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
The last action in the Dardanelles, which 
took place on the last two days of June and thai 
first two of July, is of importance for three 
reasons. 
In the first place, it enables us to conjecture — ■ 
though only to conjecture — something of tho 
enemy's condition.' 
In the second place, it has inflicted upon the 
enemy a very appreciable loss. 
In the third place, it has resulted in a clear 
and calculable gain towards the Allied side in the 
siege work there proceeding. 
The first of these points, though it is the 
least directly measurable and contains so large an 
element of mere guesswork, is by far the most 
important for such notes as these, because it con- 
cerns the ultimate factors of strategy in this 
region. 
As has been repeatedly pointed out in these 
nctes, since the attempt to occupy the Achi Baba 
ridge at once failed, and since the fighting settled 
down to trench work two months ago, the main 
hope of success has lain in the difficulty the 
enemy must find in recruiting himself in men and 
heavy shells. Indeed he must have a difficulty in 
recruiting himself in all kinds of munition. 
But there is in this affair a most important; 
element of doubt proceeding from the two main 
things on which we must be ignorant in varying 
degrees : First, his original store or supply of 
big shell; secondly, the extent of the difficulty he 
finds in bringing men and all forms of ammuni- 
tion, but particularly big shell, down the Asiatic 
shore and across the Straits. 
We have seen in past numbers of this journal 
that he was hampered. Submarine work in the 
Sea of Marmara had largely condemned him to 
transport by land. This transport by way of the 
Isthmus of Bulair was forbidden him because that 
neck of land is under command of the guns of the 
Fleet. Transport down the Asiatic side is difficult 
because the roads are exceedingly bad and the 
distance great. Even the last stage of transport 
across the Narrows is somewhat interfered with 
by indirect fire from the Fleet— ^t any rate during 
fine weather and during the day. 
We may be certain that he piled up any 
amount of small arm ammunition in the many 
weeks of preparation which were afforded hiin, 
but the bringing over of great masses of men and 
still more the bringing over of heavy shell muss 
have been imposed upon him from quite an early 
stage in the proceedings. 
Now it is a legitimate conjecture- though, I 
repeat, only a conjecture — that this last attack of 
his, which has happily so disastrously failed, was 
prompted by some anxiety as regards his supplies. 
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