LAND AND tWATER. JiJy 10, 1915, 
been permitted; all military arguments are paigns — in general, one must admit miracles m 
obviously opposed to it. The arguments in favour favour of the enemy and against oneself. It is, 
of this 'course of action can only be political, perhaps, a wholesomer state of mind than the 
and, as such, are not suitable for discussion here, opposite extreme, but it is equally irrelevant to 
It is quite possible that when the policy of careful analysis, 
allowing cotton to enter Germany and Austria -was I will not burden my pages this week with a 
adopted those responsible did not know that repetition of the process of calculation brought 
cotton was used for the manufacture of propeUant forward again and again in these columns, but 
explosives. They have certainly known it for at when next a batch of evidence arrives, in the shape 
least eight months, however, because, let alone the of new enemy lists, or in any other form, it may be 
long analysis of the situation which appeared in worth while to present yet another full analysis 
these columns last year, the Press has, since the of the situation. 
beginning of this year, been full of protests. It It is enough to say for the moment that the 
is, therefore, indisputable that some political maximum enemy capacity in the field is certainly 
reason must have decided the issue. What that past, and that nothing could restore his original 
was the present writer is neither able to discuss preponderance save a very great offensive on the 
nor in a position to discover. part of the Allies, if that offensive broke down. 
The second group of correspondence which I It seems hardly worth while repeating, and 
have received relates to numbers. Since the Press, yet it is essential to the most elementary sense of 
or, at any rate, that part of it which has most the situation that the figures so arrived at do not 
weight to-day in London and great towns, has propose or indicate victory in themselves. What 
worked to depress the public mind, and since the they can do, and what is amply worth doing at 
continued attempt to increase that depression has this moment, is to check the irrational and exag- 
been permitted by the authorities — though it pro- gerated, and, above all, hopelessly vague, concep- 
ceeded from men quite incompetent to judge the tion that the enemy has some marvellous powers, 
situation — the simplest processes of arithmetic are or some inexhaustible reserve of numbers, which 
doubted if their result seems to tell against the make his armies and their achievements different 
enemy. from those of his opponents. He is in exactly the 
For my part, I cannot see how those plain same boat with us, save that one of his opponents 
arithmetical rules should lie. In order to doubt is far less fitted to produce equipment and muni- 
the truth that the enemy has permanently lost over tions than the rest and that he himself has not 
a third of his total man-power, and has lost out of command of the sea. His success or failure will 
the field, from various causes, close upon half, one depend upon exactly the same elements in all other 
must believe that his losses in a series of violent matters : numbers are one factor, and the avoid- 
offensives in every part of the field of war have ance of bad strategical mistakes is another, 
been far less in proportion than those of the That his wastage can go on at the present 
Allies; one must also believe that his own pub- rate, and that without obtaining a decision for 
lished lists are wilfully swollen and exaggerated ; very many more months, is impossible unless you 
one must refuse tp accept the analog)^ of past cam- allow two and two to make five. 
A GENERAL SURVEY. 
(Continued.) 
IS AID in my last pages of this general survey war with the conception that very great losses in a 
of the situation (which appeared the week very short space of time were first, worth while in 
before last, there being no space for a con- critical moments, because they would, even under 
tinuation last week) that the fifth of those modern conditions, achieve their object, and, 
theories with which the enemy began his great secondly, were, once you could prove them worth 
campalgn^yas of an importance that merited a dis- while, possible to expend usefully, because the 
cussion to Itself. For upon his error or judgment strain could, even under modern conditions, be 
therein was largely to depend the result of his effort, met by a sufficient discipline. 
Let us see how far he was right and how far " The whole thing is a question of degree, 
wrong in entertaining it. At least, so far as the Everybody knows that you must not miss a critical 
experience of the campaign up to this point has moment by fearing to lose men. Everybody knows 
given us results from which to judge. that there is a point after which, if you have lost 
rhe theory is not yeiy easy to define. To call men without anything to show for it, you have 
It a dependence upon close formation would be far simply proved yourself spendthrift and a bad cal- 
too narrow a definition. To caU it a contempt for culator. The difference between the mood in 
hredLsciphne, accurate shooting with a rifle, and which Prussia approached modern warfare in this 
IXullf } ^^^^''l^r^^^^^^^'^''^'''^^^ matter and the mood in which her opponents 
in^^rr? .k" .u^''''^f' ^^^^•- ^^. "^^ °^^y d« approached it was a difference to be represented 
tprnif .ni T^ 7?"iu"S'^'''.^"^'"^g^^^^^l numerically by a comparatively small fraction. 
eenTr^lW Ln ^'l,'"'' ^ ^^^ opposite one more yet that difference exercised, and is still exercis- 
her dpnp^nSll^ T "t^f '""'^ ^^"""^ ^'"'''^ ^^^ ^°g' ^ ^^^^ powerful effect upon the campaign. 
&/ll '"'"'S''-"^ ^ 7.^'- . A metaphor will, I hope, make clear what I 
servicpSiir.'^^^ E'^ J?^\ the Prussian mean. Two men are to run in a mile race. The 
French n^ T^^ doubtfully than did, say, the one believes that if he sprints fairly fast at the 
tiiemrrnhT^f • "^^^^0^^ '° ^^^ whereby beginning he will obtain a lead which he will 
oneraS ^J^LT'' ™°^f ^^^^^ available for an never lose. His opponent believes that this policy 
PrussS f nn. T\"!i V . . ^« ^ ^^^^ke, and that it is far better to go slowi' 
x-iussia approached the chance of the modern on the average, and that sprinting at the begin^ 
8* 
