LAND AND WATER 
July 10, 1915. 
the suhniarines seems to have been skilfully 
managed, for no torpedo struck any Russian ship, 
and one of the submarines was certainly rammed. 
The official German report makes no mention 
of any fight except the early morning engagement 
in w&ich the Albatross was driven ashore. But 
it does say that the intention of this reconnoitring 
force was the stereotyped manoeuvre of luring the 
Russians into the submarine field to which, five 
hours later, they were actually brought in their 
chase of the Roon. Neither the Tetrograd oflBcial 
report nor Renter's correspondent indicates how 
far south the squadron reached before the sub- 
marines compelled them to desist. 
At three o'clock on the same afternoon a 
squadron of the German battleships of the 
Deutschland class — 11-inch gun ships — the last 
built before the German Admiralty adopted the 
all big gun type — was attacked by Russian sub- 
marines in the Gulf of Dantzig, and the leader of 
the squadron was sunk. It would take a 15-knot 
submarine some thirteen or fourteen hours to reach 
the Gulf of Dantzig from the Ostergarn light- 
house, so that it seems certain that there is no con- 
nection between the cruiser actions of the morning 
and the submarine attack which took place two 
hundred miles away in the afternoon. The for- 
tunes of the day went strongly in favour of the 
'Allies. The Albatross was driven ashore and 
wrecked. A submarine was sunk, and more than 
one cruiser was seriously damaged. And, finally, 
a battleship was sent to the bottom. After the ex- 
it raordinary secrecy which has veiled all the naval 
proceedings in the Baltic, it is gratifying, but by 
no means surprising, to find that the Russian 
command is extremely alert, and that the Russian 
personnel are as capable as they are willing. 
GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY. 
But it is a little difficult to grasp the precise 
strategical idea the Germans are pursuing in these 
■waters. They have possession of Libau, and the 
left wing of their land force is, no doubt, trying 
to push on towards Riga. Monday's raid on 
[Windan, if it had resulted in the occupation of 
that place, would no doubt have strengthened the 
position of the left wing. But it is difficult to 
understand — if the Germans really attach great 
importance to possessing Windau — why so feeble 
a force was sent to attack it ; and if no importance 
is attached to its possession, it is still more difficult 
lo see why any naval force was risked in that 
direction at all. 
An alternative theory is that, possessing 
Libau, the Germans wish to turn it to account 
as a base of supply, and are making these naval 
demonstrations partly to ascertain the disposi- 
tion and to feel the strength of the Rus- 
Bian fleet; partly in the hope that activity 
on their part may deter the Russians from 
pushmg too far south, where they would 
Jnterfere with the proiected line of supply from 
Komgsberg and Dantzig. U this was their plan 
tbe Geman command should have been some- 
.J^hat disconcerted at finding that the Russian 
fStTti"^^" encountered their outposts were not 
feeling their way from north to south, but were on 
The truth of the matter seems to be that, as in 
the North Sea, so in the Baltic, the Germans are 
faced with this dilemma : They are in possession 
of what is actually a very considerable naval force. 
It seems absurd and irrational to possess this force 
and not to use it. It surely must be of some 
military value. But they cannot use it with effect 
on subsidiary objects, such as bombardments to 
assist landings and so forth, unless they first use 
it to win the command of the waters in which the 
bombardments, landings, &c., are to take place. 
The British fleet, it is true, is using the British 
Channel, and, indeed, all the seas as if it had 
already conclusively won the command. But it 
can only do this by being at any moment prepared 
to defend the ships that are using the sea, and, d 
fortiori, being always prepared to dispute the com- 
mand with any force which the enemy may send 
out. Faced with this position in the North Sea, 
the Germans have only used their fleet for cross- 
ravaging expeditions. Indeed, it almost loolcs as 
if the fleet had been built in the belief that some 
advantage was to be got from expeditions of this 
sort, apart from being able to command the waters 
through which the expeditions were made. 
Now, it cannot be questioned that if Germany 
concentrated the whole, or, at any rate, a very 
large part, of her naval force in the Baltic, she 
could meet the Russians in greatly superior force, 
and so reproduce in the Baltic the position we 
have created in the North Sea and the Channel. 
If she wishes to uie sea force to help in the attack 
on Riga, she has no alternative but to give the 
Russian Navy the option of a decisive battle to 
settle which of the two fleets is to command the 
Baltic. Why will Germany not take this risk ? 
The probable explanation is that the Germans 
are still uncertain as to whether the Gangoot, the 
Poltava, the Petropavlovsk, and the Sevastopol 
are really commissioned and ready to fight. If 
they have to run the risk of meeting these ships, 
reinforced by the Im-perator Pavel and the Andrei 
Pervoswanni, they have to remember that they 
would have to provide a force capable of meeting 
a broadside power of fifty-six 12-in. guns and 
twelve 8-in. This broadside is at least as 
powerful as the broadside of Germany's first 
eight Dreadnoughts, and, of course, far more 
powerful than the broadside of all her pre- 
Dreadnoughts put together. The situation in 
the North Sea being what it is, it is exceedingly 
unlikely that Germany will risk this great force in 
an engagement with the Russians, who, as recent 
events have shown, are not only perfectly willing 
to engage, but seem to be most admirably pre- 
pared, trained, and equipped to do so. All the 
evidences seem to show that Russian gunnery is 
of the greatest possible merit. Indeed, so 
high is the spirit of the Russians, and so marked 
the advantage which they have taken of their ex- 
perience of war, that the Germans probably fear 
that if they sought an engagement, not with eight 
Dreadnoughts, but with twelve, they might be 
promptly engaged, and that in such an engage- 
ment, victory, if won, might be purchased at a cost 
that would bring German sea power to a very low 
state indeed. 
This being the situation, it seems to me un- 
reasonable to expect a decisive action in the 
Baltic. The Germans, consequently, should not be 
able to aid their operations on shore by any co- 
operation of their fleet. 
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