LAND AND J^ATER. 
July 10, 1915. 
of the three main lines of traffic, St. George's 
Channel, Bristol Channel, and the English 
Channel. If these routes were observed to a point, 
say, fifty miles south-west of Ireland, it would 
necessitate the patrolling of an area of 6 by 250, 
or 1,500 square miles, assvuning that it was prac- 
ticable to hmit routes to a width of one mile only. 
How many destroyers would be necessary for this 
task ? If fifty destroyers were available, it would 
mean thirty miles of route for each destroyer. If 
we suppose the destroyer to cruise at 20 knots, and 
to have a radius of view for scouting purposes of 
three miles in all directions, it means that she 
would have a fifth of her beat always in view, and 
could bring the whole of it under observation in 
the course of ninety minutes. If only twenty-five 
destroyers were available, the beats would have to 
be sixty miles long, and so forth. But the system 
would only be efficient with the largest possible 
number of patrolling ships. 
Correspondents send me many and most in- 
genious suggestions for enabling merchant ships 
either to defend themselves by mines or gunfire or 
to evade pursuit by making a smoke screen. But 
i fear it is not practical politics for merchant 
ships to do anything more in self-defence than to 
go at a higher speed than a submarine, when they 
are capable of such a speed, or to confine their 
stay in a danger zone to darkness, when the dark- 
ness is deep enough and lasts long enough. The 
escape of the Anglo-Californian can only be 
explained by the fact that the submarine had 
exhausted her torpedoes. Outside of this they 
must either look for protection to the Admiralty 
or reconcile themselves to the fact that there is 
no protection possible and take their chance. 
The capacity of the Admiralty to defend the 
merchant shipping seems to depend almost en- 
tirely upon possessing an adequate number of fast» 
weU - armed patrols. The number, of course, 
depends upon the area to be patrolled. A system 
that would confine merchant shipping entering or 
returning from the Atlantic to definite routes 
would reduce that area to one-fortieth of its pre- 
sent size. It should not be very long before a 
number of destroyers sufficient to patrol such 
routes will be available. I say this because I 
naturally assume that special provision was made 
for increasing the number of destroyers in the 
first months of the war, when it was seen how 
great a role the submarine would play, and that 
this provision was doubled, trebled, and quad- 
rupled in December last, when the Germans 
announced the intention to add murderous piracnr 
to their other crimes. And now that the English 
Channel seems clear, could not the French de- 
stroyers be asked to patrol the area between the 
Atlantic and these Channels? 
THE ATTITUDE OF ROUMANIA. 
By Dr. E. J. Dillon. 
CHIEF among the conditions essential to the 
speedy and successful ending of the present 
world-war are the reopening of the Dar- 
danelles and the active military co-operation 
of the three South-Eastern States which still 
remain neutral and self-complacent. At bottom, these 
two conditions are so closely interwoven with each other 
that the realisation of one would entail that of both. But 
as yet we must content ourselves with speaking of either 
achievement in terms of hope. For the diplomacy of 
the Allied Powers, after having exhausted its ingenuity 
and resourcefulness in endeavours to accomplish the 
second feat, appears to be little nearer the wished-for 
solution to-day than it was eleven months ago. The 
problem, as conceived by the Allies, who, it seems to 
me, were bent on beginning with what could only be 
the fmal consummation, was the revival of the Balkan 
League. To those who have a clear vision of its in- 
herent difficulties, this enterprise, under present con- 
ditions, smacks of the squaring of the circle. Personally, 
I should have preferred to see it reduced to much simpler 
terms; to terms which miglit not, perhaps, so fully 
harmonise with the principle of nationality laid down by 
the Allies, but would, at any rate, render a workable 
arrangement relatively easy and absolutely efifective. 
That, however, is not the point with which we are now 
concerned. 
Of the three South-Eastern States, I^oumania is the 
one whose attitude the British mind seems least able 
to comprehend. That Greece, ruled by the Kaiser's 
brother-in-law and a band of Vertizelos's antagonists, 
should show signs of lapsing into its former anarchic 
condition, and pass into German tutelage on tlie wav 
nothing could be less astonishing. For Venizelos, 
during the few years of his recoi.structive administra- 
tion, had wrought a political miracle at the cost of the 
Tested mterests of a little army of place-hunters whose 
appetites grew witii enforced abstinence, and who were 
eager to bring back tlie old anarchy which alone could 
gratify them. And the King, whose conduct and 
motives demand a chapter for themselves in the tragic 
story of Hellenism, closed the memorable parenthesis, 
Bulgaria — ruled by an .Austrian Narcissus, administered 
by Russia's avowed enemies, and angered by the fatal 
blunders of her ruler, which she has been taught to lay 
to the charge of the Allied Powers — is naturally vindic- 
tive, mistrustful, and grasping. Beneath the patriotic 
demands for all Macedonia, Kavalla, and the Dobrudja 
lurks the ambitious design of expanding the destiny and 
fhe frontiers of the nation, and of building up that 
greater Bulgaria by means which involve the subjection 
and assimilation of other races and the creation of a 
Balkan Prussia. 
But Roumania appeared to stand on a different 
footing. Suddenly confronted with an unhoped-for 
opportunity of emancipating several millions of her 
downtrodden brethren in Austria and Hungary, she 
was first thrilled with the prospect and then shrank from 
realising it. Already last winter the Roumanian Mini- 
sters in the capitals of the Allied States announced that 
their Government had irrevocably taken its decision, and 
was awaiting only the fitting moment, which they 
xJefined now as that of the completion of their military 
preparations, now as the day on whicii Italy would 
descend into the arena. To Italy in particular the assur- 
ances volunteered by Roumania's most responsible 
representatives dispelled all doubts respecting not merely 
the nature of her resolve, but also the approximate date 
of its execution. And on the strength of these assur- 
ances Roumania received substantial help and further- 
ance in Paris and London, and has recently been suing 
for analogous services in Rome, where the Raumanian 
Minister had long been ostentatiously playing the part 
of an apostle of the Entente. 
Before we can satisfactorily account for this elusive 
behaviour, it behoves us to divest ourselves of certaia 
12* 
