LAND AND iffiAlEB, 
yuiy lY, lyii). 
[Wierpz Basin and tlie Basin of the San aJid 
^istX The eeneral level is ravined, but only 
Ktfc and wfth very shallov. valleys by h. 
Jtrfams that rise here and flow, some like the 
^>X towards the Vistula, twenty m^lesa^^^^^^^^^ 
others. Hke the Byzstryca. towards the .Wierpz 
The triangle of knd between the Upper 
iByzstrj'ca and its first tributary rivulet, thereiore 
must not be regarded ^^^^donunatlng height. It 
is but a portion of the plateau, like the rest, its 
•defensfv-r value consists only in the fact that upon 
both sides there is a short slope down to the water- 
level. .Why its height (from which its title is 
iaken) of 218 metres has been misprmted 118 in 
this country I do not know, but the error is 
'obvious, because there is not for miles around any 
epot within 50 or 60 feet of so low a contour as 
ai8 metres. Moreover, the summit of this slight 
elevation, which lies where I have put the cross 
eomewhat to the eastward side of the triangle, is 
clearly marked 218 metres on the best survey ot 
'the district. tt-h oio • 
This half-isolated position, then, Hiil 218, is 
'that upon which the Austrians have depended as 
^a nucleus for their whole defensive attitude since 
(Thursdav last. They have even counter-attacked 
if rem it' during the last few days, and have 
attempted, though unsuccessfully, to carry 
Byzstryca village. 
It will be seen from this general description 
of the Battle of Krasnik that what our Ally has 
succeeded in doing is to check one of the two 
columns opetating against the railway, to throw 
at back after the shock of its iirst attack over a 
belt averaging some two miles in width, but more 
than that has not been effected. The check saves 
for the moment the railway at Lublin. It is not 
a disaster for the enemy. Very far from it. It is 
a hold-up for the moment. It does not represent a 
retirement sufficient to affect in any way the posi- 
tion of Mackensen, who is facing towards Cholm 
from Zamosc along the eastern road. The two 
enemy forces are s'till roughly in line. _ If either 
can bring up munition by road in sufficient quan- 
tity, it will attempt a further offensive, and that 
further offensive may come first either again from 
the Austrians in front of Krasnik, or from the 
Germans in front of Zamosc, or from both 
together. 
Before discussing the opportunities the enemy 
now has, so far from liis railways, of bringing up 
munitions, and the disadvantage at which he 
staads compared with the Russians, who have a 
railway everywhere behind them now, parallel to, 
and no't twenly miles from, their front, let us see 
what has happened to the eastern column, under 
IMackensen, a force in about the same strength, 
8itd deployed upon only a slightly smaller front 
than that occupied by the Archduke. 
We have seen last week where iMucken- 
?cv.'s body was ciiecked. About h.alf-way between 
towards the iipper waters of the Wierpz, which 
] jre tii.n in a very tortuous and narrow stream 
t irough ;! uiarsby bottom, and on the east to the 
} 'iUi. tv^huiavy stream Wolica, which falls into 
1 :-.• Wierpz at'Krasnostaw. From the one stream 
1 ■■ ujft other the front of Mackensen's main body 
j <liti-.va up, starting from just south of the 
^ -i ;^ro of Tarzymaechy, which was carried by the 
Russians, and lost to the Germans ten days ago, m 
front of tho hamlet of Krasne, and so to the 
Wolica, upon the east; the whole of this front is 
rather more than seven miles in extent. 
It will be seen that the disposition of Macken- 
sen's troops, though on a somewhat more crowded 
front, is very similar to that of the Archduke s. 
Each General is exactly astraddle of the main 
causeway in his district, each has a depot and, 
presumably, an accumulating amount of stores 
and munitions there immediately in his rear, the 
one Krasnik, tho other Zamosc; each is facing 
towards and attempting to reach an important 
point upon the critical Russian railroad — the one 
Cholm, the other Lublin; each is rather more 
than one long day's march from that railroad. 
The whole question of whether either or both 
of these two enemy columns will be able to under- 
take a successful offensive in useful time depends 
upon the way in which they can use the poor road 
facilities of the district. 'Were our Ally as well 
munitioned as the enemy there could be no doubt 
of the result, for the Russians lie close to their 
railv-ay, by which they can concentrate troops cf 
munitions rapidly at any point of their line, 
which runs exactly parallel to that line, while the 
enemy's front is at distances varying from thirty 
to fifty miles from railhead. 
Further, the road facilities for bringing up 
heavy munitions, especially, and big guns are, aa 
we have seen, limited and bad. 
But the unknown factor is the proportion of 
munitionment, especially in big shell, upon either 
side, and until the event shaU have shown us how 
this stands, it is impossible to conjecture the 
future. We can only await the result. 
Meanwhile it is of some purpose to point out 
what the handicap is under which the enemy now 
suffers. To have only indifferent roads and few 
behind you, v/hile your opponent has a railway 
behind him, means that the rate at vvhich you can 
bring up munitions, and particularly heavy shell, 
will be greatly inferior to your opponent's. It may 
be an inferiority of four to one or even ten to one, 
and in the particular case of the enemy positions 
between the Bug and the Vistula to-day there is 
the further fact that lateral communications from 
one column to the other simply do not exist. 
Mackensen can only reinforce the Archduke, or 
the Archduke Mackensen, across open country by 
tracks of beaten earth, including the crossing of a 
narrow and shallow, but marshy, brook valley — 
that of the River W^ierpz. Munitions cannot be 
sent in aid any more than men, save very slowly, 
from the one force to the other. It is under this 
