July 17, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
double handicap that the enemy is acting. If he 
succeeds in spite of it, it will be because, slower as 
must be his rate of supply than that of the Eus- 
sians now in this particular field, yet his total 
supply may be so much greater as to make up for 
the difference of speed in delivery. 
A successful Russian offensive here would en- 
danger the communication between the two enemy 
armies, would compel the immediate retreat of the 
eastern one, f or Mackensen could not strike in flank 
with any force, being not only sufficiently held for 
the moment, but also having the obstacle of the 
iWierpz, such as it is, incommoding him upon his 
left. He would have to fall back should a Russian 
offensive of this sort develop in any strength. But 
as yet no such offensive has developed. All that 
has happened has been a decided set-back to the 
Austrian column, the holding up of the German 
column for ten days, and both parties presumably 
accumulating munitions for the next move. 
It is sometimes asked why, should the enemy 
fail to achieve even his secondary object — the 
cutting of this railvs^y line and the consequent 
evacuation of Warsaw — it must be regarded as a 
strategic defeat for him. It is suggested that, 
though the Austro-German advance nas failed to 
separate the Russian armies and has not hitherto 
succeeded even in reaching the railway in ques- 
tion, the enemy might decide to stand upon the 
defensive even in this region, as he has upon the 
[West, maintain his territorial gains, including 
nearly aU Galicia and more than haK of Russian 
Poland, and, so standing upon the defensive on 
the Eastern line, turn his energies again to the 
West. 
This suggestion seems to me erroneous. It is 
impossible to give to the Eastern line that immo- 
bility which has been given for months to the 
Western, and this on account of its very great 
length. In aU its sinuosities the line the enemy 
must defend — should he turn to the defensive — 
from the Baltic to the Roumanian border, is about 
1,000 miles. It is about double that which he is 
holding upon the West. With the aid of a great 
natural obstacle like the Vistula the thing could 
be done, and if he obtain Warsaw, then with the 
Vistula Line in his possession he might, though at 
a great expense of men, stand entirely upon the 
defensive upon the East. But without the posses- 
sion of the Vistula line it is difficult to see how he 
could do so. Hehas, by concentrating great numbers 
of men in one district — Galicia — drawn a corre- 
sponding number of men thither of the Russian 
armies. Perhaps two-thirds of the Eastern forces 
are now south of Ivangorod. The rest of the line 
is, therefore, for the moment, comparatively stable 
and at any rate quiescent. Let him once withdraw 
the pressure of these great numbers and it would 
seem inevitable that upon so very long a front the 
Russians, free to concentrate where they would, 
must restore at will mobility to the line in their 
own favour again. 
In other words, though the last reserves of 
men may be used for a last attempt upon the 
West, that attempt cannot be swelled by men 
released through the adoption of a deiensive 
attitude along the whole Eastern front. The 
enemy would seem to be compelled to maintain his 
offensive there until he obtains a decision, or at 
the very least the Vistula line, and, failing either 
of these successes, must continue exercising pres- 
sure upon his opponents continually if he is to 
prevent a return to that opponent. 
THE WESTERN AND ITALIAN 
FRONTS. 
On the Western front there is no develop- 
ment of importance in the course of the week. A 
strong German counter-offensive has been begun 
below the Lorette spux against 'Souchez. The 
enemy have carried the cemeteiy and claim, at the 
moment of writing, a further advance of 600 
yards ; which turns on later news to mean not 600 
yards gain forward, but an advance of a few feet 
on a front of 600 yards — a characteristic piece of 
malinformation. The fighting is proceeding, and 
there is yet no final result one way or the other. 
There have been rumours proceeding, presume 
ably from German sources, of continual concen- 
tration this side of the Rhine, and of the passage 
of heavy artillery. It is quite impossible for any- 
onCj save members of the Higher Command and 
their Intelligence Staffs, to weigh the value of 
these rumours. Exactly similar rumours in the 
past have, in about three times out of four, proved 
to be devices put forward by the enemy for hiding 
action elsewhere. But the remainder have been 
warnings of an offensive that did actually develop. 
On the Italian front we have no official news 
that advances our knowledge of the campaign 
appreciably in lie course of the week. But, un- 
officially, there has come through an interesting 
piece of news that is likely enough to be true, to 
the effect that the Austrian position north of Cor- 
tina, in the Dolomites, is becoming critical. The 
narrow gap, just before the highest point in the 
road between Cortina and the Pusterthal, has 
been under heavy bombardment for many days. 
Were its fortifications merely the old permanent 
fortifications they would long ago have been 
reduced, but the whole meaning of this prolonged 
siege work on the Austrian and Italian frontier 
is, of course, that the enemy, like ourselves, are 
using temporary field works in abundance, and 
supplementing with them, or more probably; 
supplanting by them, the old permanent works. 
For the narrow area of these and their known 
location render them, as the experience of last 
year proved, untenable against a modern siega 
train. 
Whether this unofficial piece of news is 
accurate or no the next week will enable us to 
determine. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
Of the three methods by which alone success 
in the Dardanelles could be hoped for — the advent 
of a much more powerful siege train, the aid of a 
new aUy in that territory, the interference with 
Turkish supply — the latter would seem to bo 
promising some result. The German Press has 
been allowed to talk openly of the shortage of 
munitions on the Turkish side, and it is clear that 
Roumania has now, for some little time past, for- 
bidden German and Austrian material to pass 
through her territory to the Turks. The enemj 
attitude on this matter is so open that it forms one 
of the very few political indications of strategic 
conditions apparent in the course of the war. 
What the effect of a continued Roumanian resis- 
tance to German and Austrian pressure would bo 
in the Dardanelles we cannot yet tell, because wo 
have not the elements for a calculation before us; 
we do not know the reserves of heavy ariununitioa 
