LAND AND WATER. 
July, 17, 1915. 
!n the hands of the Turks. But fairlv good 
evidence from that front seems to show that tne 
enemy is already feeling a pinch in the matter ot 
bis? shell. He has fired, for instance, amour- 
piSrcing shell at troops in the trenches, Y^'^^ii^^ 
would hardly do if his supply of shell, other than 
naval munitions, were still adequate. There is 
no report of any slackening in his fire — at least, 
none made public. But the quite undisguised 
political action of Austria and Germany against 
Iloumauia suggests that the question of supply^ 
for the Peninsula may soon become acute. 
A GENERAL SURVEY. 
{Continued.) 
THE last two points we have to notice 
among the enemy's guesses as to the 
probable turn modern warfare would 
take can be dealt with more briefly than 
those we have hitherto been reviewing, for m each 
the enemy was thoroughly in the right and the 
Allies, as a whole, in the wrong. 
These two points are the use of heavy artillery 
in the open field— with which may be incorporated 
the value of high explosive shell, not only against 
permanent fortifications, but for general opera- 
tions—and the value, especially upon the defen- 
sive of a very large provision of machine guns. 
As to the first of these points: Roughly 
epeaking, there were two schools before the out- 
break of war— the school which belittled the value 
of heav}' guns in the field, and of the use of high 
explosive shell for general purposes took their 
stand upon the experience of all modern warfare, 
including the recent lessons of South Africa and 
Manchuria. The proportion of losses produced by 
these methods did not seem to warrant the very 
great expense and lack of mobility they entailed. 
Now, it must here be conceded that though the 
enemy was right in his theory, and we were wrong, 
chance has also played very directly into the 
enemy's hands. 
After all, what is it that renders the use of 
hea^7 shell and of high explosives of such peculiar 
value at this moment ? It is that the war settled 
down months ago to trench warfare, which is 
essentially siege work. 
What makes that trench warfare possible? 
Nothing but the combination of two quite unfore- 
seen events, as much unforeseen to the enemy as 
to ourselves — namely, the failure of his use of 
mere numbers at the outset of the war and the 
immense forces available for the holding of a 
defensive line. 
With less forces engaged or with more 
countries entering the field, it would be perfectly 
impossible for trench warfare of this sort to 
have developed. It is no good holding an en- 
trenched line which can be turned. It is essential 
to the prolonged defence of an entrenched position 
.that its two flanks should be quite secure. 
The German southernflank m the West is secure 
because the Allies will not violate Swiss territory. 
In the north it reposes upon the sea. The Eastern 
front is too long to be held permanently as one 
ientrenched Line, nence its fluctuation; and if cer- 
tain of the Balkan States should enter upon our 
Bide complete mobility would certainly be restored 
to the Eastern front to our advantage, as it has 
already been recently partially restored to the 
faiemy s advantage. 
On the second point, the ample provision of 
machine guns and the training of many officers 
and men in their use, there is nothing to be said 
except that the enemy has proved entirely in the 
right. His guess was perfectly just and the 
opposition school was perfectly wrong. 
This is true not only of the use of the machine 
gun in the defence of an entrenched position, 
where it has amply and completely proved its 
value, but also to a lesser extent of the machine 
gun in almost every other operation in the field. 
It is, perhaps, if we survey the war as a whole, 
the only point in which the enemy's theories are 
open to no criticism at all, but have proved an 
exactly accurate forecast of the way in which 
modern war would develop. Just as the French 
theory of a most highly-perfected quick-firing 
field piece has proved upon their side the one 
unchallengea,ble preparation for modern war. 
Before completing this survey we should do 
well to note certain larger and vaguer points — 
but not less important — than these particular 
ones which have been chosen for comment. 
It is remarkable, for instance, that, regarded 
in its very widest aspect, the enemy's grand 
strategy has hitherto so consistently failed. No 
one can say that it has failed permanently until 
the history of the war can be written as a 
whole. No one can foresee the results of future 
movements. 
The only general proposition that can be 
laid dovm for the future is that which has 
continually been repeated in these pages— to wit, 
that by a mere numerical process the enemy's man- 
power must progressively diminish at a greater 
rate than that of the Allies, and that everything 
must therefore continue to depend upon his power 
to obtain a decision before numerical inferiority, 
leaves him unable to maintain his full strength 
upon the three fronts he now has to hold. 
Tnat his grand strategy has failed in its 
principal object so far is a very plain and simple 
matter of history. He set out to use his immense 
numerical superiority last year in piercing or en- 
veloping the Allied forces in France. He failed, 
was condemned to retreat upon prepared posi- 
tions, and was there pinned. He set out next to 
break forth from those positions and failed in the 
great battles of Flanders last November. He set 
out next to grasp the bridges of Warsaw in late 
December and January, first from the west, next' 
in February from the north, and failed in either 
project. Even his recent successful advance 
through Galicia, important as have been tho 
material and the political results obtained, has not' 
yet reached its strategic object. Its chances are. 
