July 17, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
perhaps, rather less now than they were two 
months ago. 
The importance of noting this is that whereas 
the Allies also failed in a certain strategic 
objective much the greater part of their action — 
all of it until the early summer or late spring — 
was undertaken against odds. The French failed 
badly in their strategic object of August, but they 
failed with the scales of numbers heavily against 
them. The Russians failed in their strategic 
objective last autumn when that objective was 
Silesia, but again they failed against a great 
superiority of numbers, which the enemy could then 
still command. The Russians again have failed 
in whatever was their strategic objective this 
winter — and that we must presume was the cap- 
ture and holding of the Carpathian Passes for an 
advance when the summer should come. They 
have, upon the contrary, been beaten back, as we 
know, to the confines of Galicia in one place and 
beyond that frontier in another. 
Still, taking it as a whole, the war, regarded 
impartially, is rather a series, so far, of failures 
in the grand strategy of the enemy than of corre- 
sponding strategy upon the side of the Allies. 
Every higher command on both sides, for instance, 
at this moment, sees quite clearly the position so 
often repeated in these columns, that the choice is 
between the enemy's obtaining a real decision 
within a comparatively brief delay and his ap- 
proaching exhaustion as compared with his foes. 
iTherefore his grand strategy in its simplest terms 
must be mainly directed to the attainment of such 
a decision and that of the Allies rather to post- 
poning it than to direct action at the moment 
upon their part. And this being so, it is fair to 
judge the general strategic results on both sides 
by the measure of success the enemy attains in his 
great main attempts to divide his enemy's forces, 
whether that attempt be made upon the East, like 
the one now in progress, or upon the West, where, 
m the opinion of many judges, he will make his 
next and perhaps his last effort. It is true to say 
that the importance to the enemy of obtaining his 
decision before the late autumn is very much 
greater than the importance to the Allies of 
obtaining a corresponding decision against his 
Eastern or his Western line by the same date, and 
It 13 upon this criterion that the whole position 
must be judged. 
One hears it sometimes proposed that the 
progressive diminution in man-power which the 
enemy must suffer as compared with his opponents 
IS compensated for by his mechanical advantages 
in the production and use of missiles, and particu- 
larly of heavy shelL 
Now, we have not the data upon which to 
judge this matter with the same accuracy that we 
can bring to the judgment of man-power. But it is 
again true to say that no proof has been afforded 
of the enemy's superior power of mechanical pro- 
duction. There is a great deal of vague taUc about 
tis marvellous organisation and the rest, but no 
one can give us figures which are in any way con- 
yincing, and the apparent facts of the campaign 
'do not bear out the thesis as a whole. 
It is obvious that he has accumulated enor- 
mously more heavy shell for work upon hia 
Eastern front than could the Russians under the 
strict blockade of last winter and with their lack 
of industrial opportunities. But, by all accounts, 
the delivery of shell from the Allied side in the 
West has been numerically superior to the 'delivcryj 
from the enemy's side on that same line. And the 
result is the more remarkable when we consider 
that much the greater part of the industrial plant 
of France is in territory stOl occupied by the 
enemy. It seems to be e(^ually true that the 
delivery of shell on the Itaban front is at a far 
greater rate from the guns of our Allies than from 
those of the Austrians. Further, the Allies are 
producing in very great quantities munitions of 
the largest kind — the production of which 
demands a wholly disproportionate amount of 
energy — for the fleets in action, and by way of 
reserves for those fleets, if further and more ex- 
tended action should be forced upon them. 
It may be true that the enemy, with his un- 
limited resources in iron and coal, his industrial 
districts as yet untouched, and holding those of his 
foes at Lille and at Lodz, not to mention the vast 
mass of Belgian plant, can produce more shell 
altogether than the whole body of the Allies. But 
if he can, he has not hitherto shown any proof of 
his power. 
Lastly, there is (if such phantasies be worth 
remarking) the frame of mind of those who seem 
to imagine that, with overwhelming mechanical 
supplies (which they gratuitously and without' 
proof ascribe to the enemy), the diminution of 
numbers of men, in no matter what ratio, is in- 
different. 
That mood is wildly wrong. Whenever great 
pressure is brought upon a line, no matter what 
the mechanical contrivances in the defence of it, 
you must, if you want to hold that line, bring for- 
ward very important forces. Witness the recenC 
pressure upon the German line north of Arras. 
Every conceivable mechanical device their science 
could afford the enemy (and except in the pro- 
vision of machine guns they had even here no 
advantages over the French) was at their disposal. 
They were none the less compelled to concentrate 
the equivalent of at least five army corps upon 
that narrow space during the end of May and the 
month of June, and of those five the equivalent of 
three are out of action now. 
H. BELLOC, 
(To be continued.) 
MR. HILAIRE BELLOG'S WAR LECTURES. 
Mr. BeHoc w£ll lecture on the course of the war at Queen's Hall 
on Tuesday, July 27, at a30. 
"Wc shall nevci" sheathe the 
sword which we have not lightly 
drawn until Belgium recovers in 
full measure all, and more than all, 
she has sacrificed, until France is 
adequately secured against the 
menace of aggression, until the 
rights of the smaller nationalities of 
Europe are placed upon an un-* 
assailable foundation, and until the 
military domination of Prussia is 
wholly and finally destroyed." 
— The Prime Minister of England, 
Noo.. 1914. 
