J^ ±\ 1\ i-J 
^»» XI. -1. J_i XV 
THE ATTITtJOB^QE^lOUMANlA:: 
By Dr. E. J. Di Ion. ^ 
(Concluded.) 
IT would, perhaps, be unfair to allege that the fluc- 
tuating attitude of the Roumanian Cabinet reveals 
among its chief motives deep-rooted personal 
egotism. It might be rash even to aflirm tliat 
individuals, shareholders, traders, bankers, 
speculators — whose all-absorbing interest lies in the 
distribution of German money and in the benefits 
of German credit — have furnisiied the keynote of 
a policy which poses as national and patriotic. 
But it is fair to say that the economic influence 
of the Teuton, which was very marked in Italy, 
is clearly discernible in Roumania as a regulative 
undercurrent of unchanging motive in the relations of 
that State towards the two groups of belligerents. It 
is no exaggeration to describe Roumania as a sort of 
Teuton colony. The economic atmosphere in which the 
country breathes and has its being is German. Capital, 
enterprise, credit are supplied by the Fatherland. In 
the Discount Bank in Berlin there is a cellar with the 
word " Rumanien " over the portal, and within there is 
nothing but heaps of Roumanian shares, obligations, 
and securities. The railways, whicli liave a convention 
with those of Prussia, are Roumanian only in name. 
But not content with these permanent fetters, the 
Germans have forged others of a stronger qualitv, such 
as temporary contracts, heavy " deals " in corn, and 
speculations by trusts. At tiie outbreak of the war, 
German agents were sent to Roumania to buy up the 
whole harvest of maize, which was not yet dried. The 
European market being closed, this was a godsend to 
the landowners. They at once formed a trust whose 
influence on the Government was almost irresistible. 
Prices rose rapidly. The Roumanian railway was 
unable to transport the vast quantities of corn to 
Austria-Hungary. The Government forbade tlie expor- 
tation not of the maize but of rolling stock. Germany 
and Austria, equal to the occasion, extracted enormous 
benefits to themselves from this piece of apparent ill- 
luck. Hundreds of goods trains came rolling into 
Roumania. The empty wagons were soon made the 
objects of lively speculation, and not only by private 
individuals. In Bucharest a " wagon exchange " was 
opened and concessions were sold at the rate of sixty 
pounds sterling a wagon. Now, the speculators who 
wield, great political influence could not approve 
military intervention, which would have hidden the sun 
that was enabling them thus lucratively to make hay. 
And now that Italy has declared war the Teutons are 
repeating the trick. They have already bought up all 
the corn that will be available in Roumania down to the 
end of August and have paid thirty per cent, of the 
price in gold. And the conveyance of the corn will be 
effected as was that of the maize, with all the collateral 
gains to be had through the " wagon exchange." 
iTIiese transactions bind the hands of those who have 
signed the contracts, and who form a most important 
element of what is known in Roumania as public opinion 
and sentiment. And several Press organs have chano-ed 
sides and espoused the cause of " neutrahty." (*i) " 
It is in congruity with this public opinion and senti- 
ment that M. Bratiano's policy appears to have been 
conducted from the outset. Last October the 
Premier (*2) discussed the subject of his country's 
attitude with the Government of the Tsar, and the up- 
shot of die negotiations has since been unoSicially 
narrated m two contradictory versions. That which was 
spread in Bucharest speaks of an agreement by which 
(»1) Roumania's neutrality has been relative, as the Russians 
know to their cost. ^^laus 
("2) Although Roumania has a Minister of Foreign Affairs he 
*oes not count m a Cabinet of which M. Bratiano is the chief. ' 
Roumania, in exchange for her neulralily, should be 
entitled to annex all territories of the Hapsburg 
Jlonarchy inhabited by Roumanians, provided that she 
took possession of them before the clo.se of the present 
war. Accordingly, from October until April 26, military 
preparations were pushed forward, but the Premier 
declined to di.scuss more fully the when and how of the 
performance of his part of the contract. On April 26 he 
reopened conversations with Russia with a view to defin- 
ing the territories inhabited by Roumanians. He began 
by putting forward a demand for the contentious dis- 
tricts of the Bukovina and the Banat in the dictatorial 
tone to which his colleagues and subalterns are used, 
but which M. vSazonoff would not have brooked even 
from the Kaiser's Ambassador at the time when 
Germany's relations with Russia were most friendly. 
The Russian Minister gave him a Roland for his Oliver 
in the shape of counter-proposals which nipped the pour- 
parlers in the bud. That was in the month of May. It 
was not until June 18 that they were resumed, and then 
the Russian Government showed its appreciation of the 
issues by its readiness to compromise. I have reason to 
believe that the only point on which it is and will remain 
inexorable is the cession of the Pancsova zone of the 
Banat, which would put Belgrade at the mercy of 
Roumania. 
The Russian version of the pourparlers is briefly 
this : The capture of Lemberg in September con- 
vinced the Roumanian Government that the hour of 
action was striking and that Russia's assent to the 
annexation of Tran.sylvania and Bukovina must be had 
in return for mililary intcrveniion. This assent was 
duly given in a telegram sent by Sazonoff on September 
19 and confirmed by another dispatch of the 22nd, in 
which he used the decisive words: " In the hour of 
liquidation the right to recompense will be recognised 
only for those who have taken part in the commor\ 
effort." These facts are well established, but M. 
Bratiano, finding that they did not dovetail with his 
methods, suppressed them. Not only did he conceal 
Sazonoff's proposals, but he assured the leaders of 
influential political circles that Transylvania and 
Bukovina had'been guaranteed to him by Russia as the 
guerdon of neutrality. In this way he had seemingly 
outdone the exploit of his predecessor, who had had to 
mobilise in order to obtain part of the Dobrudja. M. 
Bratiano would not pay even this price for the new king- 
dom. In January, however, the truth began to leak out, 
as truth will. The Roumanian journal Dimineala dis- 
closed the contents of Sazonoff's telegram which M. 
Bratiano had suppressed. But the Premier was equal 
to the occasion. His semi-official organs denied the 
existence of the telegram pointblank. 
To sum up : Roumania for the time being is M. 
John Bratiano. And this idol of the nation is embar- 
rassingly conscious that his shoulders are supporting 
the whole weight of the present Roumanian realm and 
also of the greater kingdom yet to come, and is resolved 
to fasliion the latter as far as possible without trouble or 
expense to the former or risk to his own great name. 
He has thus set the national problem on the lowest 
grounds conceivable, and it depends on him to keep it 
there. For, with the exception of the enlightened and 
courageous band of young Roumanian patriots led hy 
Take Jonescu and Filippescu, the only public opinion 
with w-hich he is concerned is that of the classes whose 
main interests keep them closely linked to Austria and 
Germany. So long, therefore, as the Allies continue 
to tackle the problem on the lines heretofore adopted 
they can confidently anticipate no change except by far- 
resonant military success. But is it indispensable that 
they should continue their efforts on these barren lines? 
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