LAND AND WATER 
July 17, 1915. 
THE MACHINE GUN. 
By L. F. W. A. KENDALL. 
SINCE mention is not infrequently made of the cap- 
ture of machine guns from the enemy it ia necessary 
to sound a note of warning, lest more importance 
than is justified should be attributed to these minor 
successes. It must be remembered that to the Ger- 
mans the loss of one or several machine guns does not repre- 
sent what at the beginning of the war it would have meant 
tc us with our then vastly inferior total of these weapon?. 
It is believed that before war broke out the Germans had 
available a stock of 50,000 machine guns, apart from any 
that have since been turned out in their arsaoals. Their em- 
ployment of them has, in a certain sense, beea |wodigal and 
carried out with a disregard of loss wliidi is only compre- 
hensible when the large reserve of these weapons in their 
possession is borne in mind. 
To the Germans the machine gun represents merely a 
piece of machinery of immense killing and stopping power 
which has cost a certain sum of money, but is less vulnerable 
and less valuable in every way than the number of men and 
rifles of equivalent killing power. 
A Maxim perfectly understood and well handled by a 
well-trained team has the fire effect of a hundred and twenty 
men using rifles; on certain occasions and under certain circum- 
•tances its powers and possibilities are even greater than this. 
It was not until the Eusso-Japane'se War of 1904 that the 
Maxim achieved any great success. In this campaign in 
Manchuria the machine gun at last came into its own, and 
the experiences gained there formed the basis of the tactics 
tauffht in our t«xt books which are embodied in the state- 
ment that " The machine gun is a weapon of opportunity, 
eminently adapted for surprise situations, but not suitablo 
for a prolonged conflict." 
We are still in a stage of learning in connection with the 
Maxim gun. The present war has taught us much and will 
iteach us yet more, if only we are willing to learn. 
The work done by the machine gun in the Russo-Japanese 
campaign v/as as deadly in its effect as it was astoniiihing in 
its result. The conclusions formed ought to have been con- 
vincing. No country, however, realised more fully the great 
possibilities of this arm than did Germany. She immediately 
set to work to manufacture large numbers of the latest and 
light«st pattern of Maxim : trained her best men to form the 
ir.achine-gun t-earas : and this weapon which hitherto had 
been a despised subsidiary arm, became a highly trained and 
separate branch of her forces. 
Other countries are beginning now to recognise the claims 
of the macliino gun, and much could be written on this 
enbject. But, put briefly, the following are some of the 
ichief advantages and characteristics of the machine gun. 
Firstly, its Mobility. The gun weighing as it does 381b., 
and its tripod mounting 451b., it can be easily and quickK' 
taken wherever an infantry soldier can go. It can thus be 
used to support infantry closely. Also under certain condi- 
tions it can sometim.es take the place of artillery, though 
under no circumstances is it ever a match for artillery. It 
ia most important to realise this latter point: inability to 
do so was largely responsible for the failure of the machine 
gun used in the Franco-Prussian War by the French. 
This weapon SRems to have been cursed by its name. It 
is not a gun, and to look upon it as such is to seal its doom. 
If looked upon as an exceedingly quick firing and accurat-a 
automatic rifle, then, and then only, can it be properly 
handlrd and its best effects realised. 
The invisibility of the Maxim is another point in its 
favour. When in action it presents a front equal to that 
of two men with rifles. It is very easy to conceal the gun, 
the least fold in the ground being sufficient to hide it from 
view. If, however, it should be discovered in one position, 
there should be alternative positions previously found to which 
the gun can be m.oved without loss of time. 
An advantage of the machine gun is its invulneralilify. 
Infantry will never again fight in two ranks in civilised war- 
fare, and the closest formation possibly for a firing-line is 
one pace per man. A hundred and twenty men will, there- 
fore, 0CCU2W roughly a hundred yards, and the target pre- 
sented to the enemy is a hundred yards in breadth: wilTi. 
correct elevation shots striking anywhere within this hun- 
dred yards will be effective. The machine gun only occupies 
a front of one yard, or a hundredth part of the front occupied 
by infantry having the same fire effect. 
It is obvious that ten per cent, of casualties in the in- 
fantry firing-line reduces the fire effect by just that amount, 
while from thirty to forty per cent, would silence it 
altogether or render it ineffective. But provided a machine- 
gun team is well trained, and every member of it is inter- 
changeable, it can suffer from eighty to ninety per cent, of 
loss without its fire effect being in the least dimiuished. 
The all-round traverse is an important characteristic of 
this arm. The chief value of it lie.s in the facility with which 
the gun can be turned in any direction, without moving the 
tripod, and with the minimum of movemeut or exposure. 
This facility enables the machine gun to engage at once an 
enemy advancing from an unexpected direction without a 
moment's delay, and without increasing its vulnerability 
to enfilade fire. The all-round traverse indicates action on 
a flank or in a detached post as particularly suited to the 
machine gun. 
The fixed mottnting of the Maxim is another point to be 
noticed. From it it follows that the personal factor ia 
reduced. The reduction of the personal element combined 
with the fixed platform result in the close grouping of 
machine gun fire. The personal factor being largely elimi- 
nated renders it particularly valuable in the crisis of a fight. 
It has no nerves as men with rifles have, and provided one 
man can sit behind and press the thumbpiece, its fire effect 
will be as valuable and great as ever no matter how critical 
the situation may be. 
Rapid production and application of a large volume of 
accurate fire is a further point in favour of the riiachine gun. 
When the gun is loaded and laid fire can be opened instan- 
taneously at any moment, making the gun especially valu- 
able for outpost or night firing. 
Yet v/lth all these favourable characteristics and many 
advantages of the machine gun, it is commonly supposed that 
it more often than not fails to work owing to the gun jam- 
min''. Like every other piece of niacliinerj-, the Maxim haa 
delicate parts, the breaking of which will cause the gun to 
stop. There are, however, two kinds of stoppages — the 
avoidable ones and the unavoidable ones. With a well- 
trained team of intelligent men the former will never occur, 
and it would be a disgrace to the section if they did occur. 
The unavoidable, when they do occur, can be rectified in a 
few seconds, and the gun started again without the loss of 
opportunity or effect. 
And now comes a niost important point. The Maxim 
has, as we have seen, many advantages and great possibili- 
ties. Neither of these, however, will be realised unless tho 
men of a machine gun team are all good men and well 
trained. Company commanders should therefore see that 
the machine gun oflicer gets the very best men. The 
latest establishment for a maclilne gun section is 
one officer, two sergeants, one corporal, and twenty- 
four men, with a reserve sscticn of tho same number. 
It may seem hard on tho company commander to have to 
part with his best men ; yet without them the machine gun 
officer can never either realise the pcssibilitles or exhibit the 
power of the weapon under his charge. And when it comes 
to business tho company commander will have every reason 
to be grateful to the machine gun team, and will be amply 
repaid for having sent his best men to the section. 
In the crisis of a fight, wlion each side is struggling for 
that superiorUy of fire v.hlcli alone can make the assault pos- 
sible, the side that can first bring up a seciion of machine 
guns and from the four of them deliver 2,000 shots a minuta 
for, say, three minutes only will win tho day. 
This war of to-day is one to a certain extent of machine 
gnm. To get the best out of tlicm., their working and tacticil 
handling must be perfectly understood, and the best men of a 
regiment are essential for this, purpose. 
Printed b^ tie Victoria Housa PBixmia Co., Ltd., TuJor Street, WiiltcfiLais, Losiiiuu, E.( 
