LAND A i\ D .WATER 
July 24, 1915. 
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English Miles 
If we take its main elements it has a chord 
or neck between the two critical points A and B 
of 175 mites; while from that chord to the apex 
is no less than ninety miles. 
But the salient might be even more pro- 
nounced and yet be strat^ically sound under 
modern conditions. Indeed, there are but two 
questions to ask in order to decide whether the 
salient can be held at all, and the answer to 
neither of these questions is expressed in terms 
of the acuteness of the salient. 
The two questions are : 
(1) What opportunities have the defenders 
of maintaining their defensive upon either side 
of the neck of the salient through avenues of sup- 
ply there situated or where natural features aid 
their defence? 
(2) How far are the defenders, in numbers 
of men, equipment, and munitions, able to make 
use of these opportunities? 
In the case of the Warsaw salient we know 
the condition. There is ujwn the north and upon 
the south an avenue of supply for munitionment 
and for the concentration of men open for the 
defensive; one, the main railway from Warsaw 
to St. Petersburg, marked (1) (1) upon Diagram 
II. ; the other the main railway through Ivango- 
rod, Lublin and Cholm, Rowno, and so to Kieff, 
marked (2) (2). We know that so long as Russian 
armies can stand upon the enemy side of these 
two avenues of supply, the salient and the railway 
bridges of Warsaw which it guards can be held. 
We know that if either of them goes, then, sooner 
or later, the salient itself must go, and with it, at 
the best, the bridges of Warsaw, and, at the worst, 
the stores, troops, &c., which the whole salient 
contains. 
At the present moment — or, rather, upon last 
Sunday — the Russian armies in the South stood 
in front of (2) (2) upon a line represented by th© 
