JTuly 24, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
crosses in that region, the nearest approach of 
which line to the Lublin-Cholm-Rowno railway 
(2) (2) was at Klrasnostaw, marked K upon Dia- 
gram II., and only ten miles from the railway. 
\\^e further know that the occupation of Krasnos- 
taw did not follow upon a deliberate Russian re- 
tirement, but was the immediate result of a strong 
Austro- German offensive which carried the 
town. 
As to the other front — the northern front — 
we know that the Russian armies are still well 
on the enemy side of the railway (1) (1), but here 
there is another element in the situation, which 
consists in the fortified line of the Narew. The 
exact trace of this fortified line is that shown 
upon Diagram II. by the letters N N. It supports 
several fortifications, which will be dealt with in 
more detail further on, and which command and 
protect the crossings of the river, the nature of 
which as an obstacle will also be dealt with fur- 
ther on. In this northern sector on that same 
day, Sunday, July 18, the Russians had retreated 
to the line of crosses there shown, and, according 
to the enemy reports, they were leaving but pro- 
tecting forces at the bridge-heads, while the main 
bodies were retiring behind the stream. 
It will be clearly apparent from so general a 
description that the issue long pending and the 
climax of the Austro-German plan has arrived. 
For if the line of the Narew be forced the railway 
behind it can hardly stand; while if that other 
railway (marked (2) (2) upon Diagram II.) to the 
south, from which the enemy are but now ten miles 
distant, be reached, his success will be equally 
certain. 
The answer to the first question, then, is clear 
enough. We see what the avenues of supply and 
concentration of troops holding the salient, and 
particularly its apex at Warsaw, are, and in what 
peril they now stand. 
The answer to the second question is less easy 
— or, rather, it is impossible. 
We have, roughly, a conception as to the men. 
We know that in men the Russian numbers pre- 
sent upon these two fronts are, if inferior, not 
greatly inferior to the enemy numbers. But as 
to the proportion of equipment for those men we 
know nothing except that their reserves are tar- 
dily equipped; as to the proportion of munition- 
ment, and particularly for the heavy oieces, by 
the action of which can the corresponcfing artil- 
lery of the enemy be kept in check, we know 
nothing save that our Ally is still grievously han- 
dicapped in the matter; but whether he has a 
quarter, or a third, or half of the fire power of his 
enemy in pieces from, say, 4 inches upwards, we 
have no evidence to guide us. 
From this general view of the position let us 
turn to the particular details of ground which 
will make the action and its result more com- 
prehensible to the reader. 
There are two operations : the first, upon the 
south against the Lublin-Cholm railroad, has 
been a regular action of great magnitude, with a 
result locally clear if not final ; the second has been 
no more than a general strategic operation, a 
Russian retreat coupled with a German advance, 
the one upon, the other towards, the River 
Narew. 
The first of these operations, then, I will call 
the " Battle of Krasnostaw " ; the second, the 
" Retreat on to the Xarew." 
THE BATTLE OF THE KRASNOSTAW. 
It will be remembered from our analysis of 
last week, and the preceding weeks, that the 
enemy advance against the Rowno-Ivangorod 
railway — that is, the southern of the two great 
avenues feeding Warsaw and its salient — was 
handicapped by the increasing distance it would 
draw the Austro- Germans from railhead as 
they proceeded through the railless district 
which separates this railway from the Galician 
frontier. 
It will further be remembered that upon the 
advantage such a railway running immediately, 
at their back gave the Russians depended the 
opportunity for resistance the Russians hero 
possessed in spite of their inferior munitionmenL 
Further, it will be remembered that the 
enemy, though possessed of imperfect roads in 
this district, depended mainly upon two great 
causeways, that passing through Zamosk towards 
Cholm, and that passing through Krasnik towards 
Lublin. The issue would depend upon the com- 
parative rates at which the enemy could bring 
up his superiority in men and munitions by road 
and the Russians could bring their insufficient 
supply from the neighbouring railway. 
The enemy was divided into two main armies, 
the one dependent upon the Krasnik-Lublin cause- 
way, the other upon the Zamosk- Cholm causeway. 
Each army was about a third of a million men 
in number. The first and the second both came into 
action in the first week of July, the main body of 
the one just to the north of Krasnik, the main body, 
of the other about ten miles north of Zamosk, in 
the angle between the brook Wolica and the uppei 
waters of the River Wierpz (here little more than 
a brook, though marshy). The first column, under 
the Archduke, was badly checked between July 5 
and July 11. It lost about 22,000 prisoners, 
counting wounded, and perhaps fifty thousand 
casualties all told, counting light casualties. It 
was beaten back from the line Wilkolaz-. 
Bychawa shown upon the left of Diagram IIL 
to a line about three miles at a maximum 
and one mile at a minimum to the south of 
its most advanced positions. It still hung on to 
the high ground immediately north of Krasnik, 
and particularly defended with success the height 
218, of which a somewhat detailed description waa 
given in these colunuis last week. 
Mackensen's column had in the same days 
been held up in the triangle between the upper 
waters of the Wierpz and their tributary there, 
the brook Wolica, and after its check in the 
triangle remained quiescent, presumably bringiag 
up heavy munition, until Friday, the 16th. 
Upon the Friday, the 16th, then, the general 
line of the enemy in this region may be repre- 
sented by the line of broken dashes carried across 
Diagram III., of which line the two great nuclei 
or massed bodies of men were in the oblongs 
marked respectively A A (under the Archduke) 
and B B (under Mackensen), with comparatively 
thin lines joining them and prolonging them on 
either side, to the Bug upon the east, to the Vis- 
tula upon the west, an extension in either case of 
about 20 miles, the whole front being one of 
rather more than 85 miles. 
From this position, established for nearly a 
week after the first check of the Archduke, the 
enemy advanced, I say, upon Friday, the 16th. 
