July 24, 1915. 
LAND AND W; A T E R 
German Emperor could put at the outset of the 
war, with his allies, eight men against the Allies' 
five. That is why he made war, and that is why 
the Prussians were, at first, confident of winning. 
X. False. The French three years' service 
was only introduced after violent debate, most 
reluctantly, after and as a consequence of an 
enormous and unexpected increase in the German 
Army, openly a preparation for war. The strategic 
railways on the German side of the frontier, their 
absence on the Russian, was one of the chief causes 
of Prussian confidence, and remains the key to all 
that has happened on the Eastern Front. 
XI. Not as an army ready to take the field 
fully equipped. Prussia knew that Russia could 
immediately put forward less even than the 
German Empire, let alone the Germanic Alliance. 
Had it been otherwise Prussia would never have 
made war. 
XII. War had already resulted four days 
before the British Government tardily decided to 
come in. 
XIII. The motive of service in the enormous 
voluntary effort Britain has made during this year 
is so little connected with a wage that everyone 
reading these lines, like the writer of them, could 
name fifty cases of men who had impoverished 
themselves by volunteering, and would be hard 
put to it to find a dozen cases of men who were 
even slightly better off at the risk of wounds and 
death. 
XIV. The " half the world " consisted of 
troops numerically inferior to the troops Prussia 
could command with her Allies by sixty per 
cent. It was (again) the knowledge of this 
that caused Prussia to make war. .With 
similar odds against her Prussia would not 
have been heard of. Great Britain was 
the last of the three great Powers to enter the 
campaign, and the other two, Russia and France, 
received and did not send the peremptory chal- 
lenge. On July 31, 1914, this deliberate challenge 
produced a war which Prussia and her Allies 
had been preparing for three years. The mere 
material preparation corresponds with that 
period. 
All these replies are obvious truths and 
commonplaces, which are now a part of history. 
One only sets them down thus with wearisome 
reiteration in order that, against the extraordi- 
nary catalogue the Germans have drawn up for 
American consumption, a similar short catalogue 
of rebutting statements can be consulted. 
THE EMPIRE'S PLEDGE. 
"We shall never sheathe the 
sword which we have not lightly 
draw^n until Belgium recovers in 
full measure all, and more than all, 
she has sacrificed, until France is 
adequately secured against the 
menace of aggression, until the 
rights of the smaller nationalities of 
Europe are placed upon an un- 
assailable foundation, and until the 
military domination of Prussia is 
wholly and finally destroyed." 
— The Prime Minister of England, 
Nov., 1914. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
SOTB.— This article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibiUty for the correctness ol the statements. 
THE VALUE OF NAVAL SUPREMACY. 
WHEN in naval war one of the com- 
batants has established a command of 
the sea which the other cannot dis- 
pute, it is inevitable that the war 
must continue barren of engagements between 
first-class ships. Such fighting as takes place will 
arise chiefly from amphibious operations initiated 
by the stronger, or raids which the weaker Power 
may make upon trade or communications. 
After Trafalgar, except for the affair of the 
Aix Roads, the activities of the British Navy were 
confined to small operations on the coasts of 
Spain, Holland, and of the Baltic, and to single- 
ship actions, which were brought about either 
by chance or in repelling raids on our military 
communications or on our trade. History is 
repeating itself in these respects to-day. The 
Grand Fleet has been, in the fighting sense, idle 
since the beginning of the war, with the exception 
of Admiral Beatty's lightning dash to Heligo- 
land, and his unsuccessful chase of Admiral 
Hipper across the Dogger Bank. . The fighting 
has all been either amphibious, as at Tsing Tau, 
in the many attacks on the Turkish Empire, from 
the Persian Gulf to the .^gean, on the German 
colonies in Africa, and repeated attacks on the 
Dalmatian coast by the Italians — some very 
interesting details of which were published on 
Tuesday morning — or in repelling raids, as in the 
North Sea, at the Falkland Islands, in the Baltic, 
&c. 
Note, then, that, except in the Baltic, where 
the curious phenomenon exists that both sides 
have the choice of initiative, the stronger Power 
has established a freedom of communications, 
both for its military forces and for its trade, that 
the enemy is absolutely powerless to dispute, 
except by the agency of submarines. 
Rightly looked at, this condition of things 
has practically existed from the very commence- 
ment of the war, and the purely sea actions that 
have taken place have grown out of raids which 
the weaker has undertaken in the hope of achiev- 
ing his purpose while evading the fighting forces 
of the other. It is in the nature of things that 
in such circumstances it will only rarely happen 
that, if engaged at all, the weaker will be engaged 
willingly. But a Power unable to contest the 
general command of the sea may yet have a local 
superiority. 
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