LAND AND WATER, 
Jufy 24, 191S, 
for a 30,000-ton ship, carrying eight guns, two 
:15,000-ton ships carrying four guns each 1 JVould 
it be possible to give to the two smaller ships 
the same speed, the same armour protection — in 
so far as the experience of war may show armour 
protection to be important — and the same stability 
as gun platforms, that the single ship possessed 1 
Is it possible to fight two broadsides of four guns 
as efficiently as a single broadside of eight guns 
can be fought? It will be seen that to answer 
these questions a vast amount of expert know- 
ledge is required. Speed, for instance, is to some 
extent a function of length. Steadiness as a gun 
platform is to some extent a function of width. 
Fire concentration is easier as the number of 
guns in a gun battery increases. To give the 
same armour to two ships of approximately 
the same length clearly involves the carrying 
of a vast deal more; indeed, nearly double the 
amount. The total horse-power in the two ships, 
then, to get the same speed, would have to be 
vastly greater than in the single ship. Ships 
could not, then, be divided without raising the 
cost of every gun brought into action. The For- 
tnidables, for instance, carried four 12-inch guns 
into action at 18 knots, at a cost of £250,000 
per gun. The ten 13.5's in the Iron Duke can 
be taken into action at 22 knots at a cost 
of considerably less than £200,000 per gun. 
iThe economy is obvious. The Formidables were 
manned by, say, forty officers and eight hundred 
men. The Iron Duke requires only a slightly 
larger personnel. The upkeep of two ships in 
victuals, clothes, and pay would nearly double the 
upkeep of the single larger ship. Is the economy 
argument prohibitive ? 
It would seem as if, once the principle is 
established that a numerous and efficient 
destroyer patrol is generally an effective protec- 
tion against submarines, the cheaper alternative 
to subdividing the ship would be to increase its 
escort protection. It would cost a great deal less 
to build three fast destroyers and keep them 
manned than to build two ships to take the place 
of one, and to maintain them with double crews. 
'An increase of escort of anti-submarine craft has 
this, also, to commend it, that your added expense 
is giving you added naval force — for the fast 
craft that defends your capital ship may in a fleet 
action prove a valuable asset in attacking the 
enemy's main squadrons. But the problems in- 
volved are intricate and complicated, and it seems 
quite safe to say that, so far, no sufficient experi- 
ence has been gained for the direction of the right 
solution to be unmistakably indicated. 
If the submarine, on the whole, has been a 
failure against the capital ship, what are we to 
say of its performances against the unarmed 
merchantman ? Has it proved an efficient substi- 
tute for the commerce destroying cruisers and 
privateers of former ages ? We have five months' 
experience now of an absolutely ruthless war waged 
by the German under- water boats against the trad- 
ing craft coming into and passing out of British 
Eorts. In those five months less than 200 ships 
ave been attacked. Between forty and fifty 
times as many have entered and sailed without 
coming within fighting distance of a submarine 
at all. Of those attacked, a considerable propor- 
tion have either escaped being hit or, having been 
hit, have been brought wounded into port. None 
of these ships have enjoyed the protection which 
destroyers and fast craft give to battleships. Nonfl 
of them possessed any means whatever of self- 
protection, beyond, in a few cases, superior speed 
and resolute and skilful handling. The guns of 
the warships have, in many cases, actually^ 
saved the ship from attack, and in almost every 
case may be considered factors extremely dis- 
concerting to the submarine. Except for the' 
danger of being rammed, the submarine has 
nothing to fear from the merchantman. Is the 
record of a nominal percentage of ships coming 
into and leaving English ports one that shows 
the submarine to be an exceedingly formidable 
enemy of the trading ship ? 
THE SUBMARINE WAR. 
We publish to-day three diagrams, one com- 
pleting the submarine record for the month of 
July from the first to the nineteenth, which shows 
that in the last fortnight their successes in at- 
tacking ships show a distinct decrease. The 
Second shows the triangle — Fastnet, Ushant, and 
St. George's Channel — with the ships that have 
been attacked there in the current month. The 
third shows the same triangle with all the attacks 
that have taken place within it since the begin- 
ning of the war. 
i 
X 
y 
1 
X 
X 
X 
xy 
X 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1 
1.— SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPPING. 
July 1-19. Tlios« CT;>£<ied occurred in the triangle. 
There is one more feature of submarine 
war which seems to me eminently worthy of 
remark. I have before raised the question of 
the periodicity of the German attacks in our own 
waters. Is not the same periodicity very clearly 
marked in other fields ? In the last week or so we 
<0 _ 17 
€ 18 
16 
^^^^ 
15 
7 nr' 
13 
c 
y^r^ 
2 
1 
3 
1* n 
8 , " 
5 
4 
t 
2.— ATTACKS SINCE JULY U 
16 
