July 31, 1915. 
LAND AND \V:ATER. 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NO) t. — This article has been submUted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
respoosibiliiy for the correctness oi the statements. 
In accordance wiih the requirements o( the Press Bureau, the positions o! troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only bfl 
rcjjardcd as approximate, and no dcGnite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE ITALIAN FRONT. 
"^HE mere movementii upon the Italian front 
— if so stationary a condition can be said 
to produce " movements '' — can easily be 
told, and is not the ciiief point for our 
consideration upon that front. It is not the 
advance or the checking of the Italian forces that 
is of chief importance to the Allies in this field. 
What counts for the Alliance as a whole is the 
effect of the Italian intervention upon the numbers 
of the enemy; with that I will deal in a moment. 
As to the movements, then, they are no more 
than, first, the securing (which is now apparently 
amply achieved) of those northern roads coming 
down from the Alps which threatened an enemy 
interference with the flank of the Italian advance 
upon Istria ; and, secondhj, the prosecution of that 
advance itself. 
It is the latter point, of course, which has 
been, so far, the chief business of the campaign. 
The position which the Austrians have chosen 
to fortify and make a centre of is the town of 
Gorizia, or Goerz, which lies a little removed from 
the left bank of the Isonzo at the foot of the moun- 
tain country through which the river has come by 
a deep gorge. Until Gorizia is taken the Italians 
cannot advance upon Trieste, as will be apparent 
from Sketch I., Trieste Ijeing. in this sketch, at 
T, and the line I — I representing the Isonzo river. 
It is clear that a large body of men and guns and 
munitions in existence within the circle of dots at 
G would be disastrous to an attack along the 
arrow towards T. They would come down upon 
its flank and cut its communications and destroy 
the force attacking along that arrow. 
It is essential, therefore, before advance in 
the direction of the arrow can be proceeded with 
that the force at G should be destroyed, or at the" 
very least cut off. That is why the attempt to cap- 
ture or mask Gorizia is for the moment the main 
Italian operation. 
How this operation stands at the end of two 
months of war may perhaps be best appreciated 
by a glance at Sketch II. The mountain country, 
(the foothills of the Julian Alps) comes down 
sharply on to the plain, the line of demarcation 
between the hill country and the flat being as clear 
as anything of the kind in North Italy. The 
Isonzo issues from a deep gorge which it has cut 
through the mountains and comes out on to the 
plain at a point where the line of demarcation 
between the mountains and the plain runs north- 
ward into a sort of pocket. Within that pocket is 
built the town of Goerz, or Gorizia, and beneath 
the projecting spur of high land immediately to 
the west is the spur of Podgora, beneath which 
the high road and the railway cross the Isonzo. 
The level plain stretches southward from 
Gorizia, traversed by the Isonzo for an extent of 
about four miles, beyond which there rises the low 
plateau called the Carso, to the southward of 
which, again, we find a narrow slip of flat country, 
along the sea coast upon which stands Trieste. 
The Italian effort so far has succeeded in 
holding all the Isonzo (both banks of the river) 
from two or three miles below Gorizia to its 
mouth; and the Italians have established them- 
selves firmly upon the tip of the Carso plateau. 
Their line runs as does the line of dashes upon 
Sketch II. (.see following page). It will be seen 
from the position in this line that Gorizia is not 
invested or even partially surrounded. 
The Austrians have here a double object — the 
one defensive, the other offensive. Their defensive 
object is the retention of the spur of Podgora, 
which protects the bridge-head and prevents an 
Italian attack from that side. For if the Italians 
held it, Gorizia below would be at their mercy. 
Their offensive object is to drive the Italians 
off the Carso plateau and to seize once more the 
line of the Isonzo intact as a line of defence for 
the whole district. They were very foolish ever 
to have allowed it to get into Italian hands. It 
should have been perfectly possible to have forti- 
fied so strong a line from the mountains to the sea. 
For it is a distance of but one day's march, and 
the river is, I believe, everywhere rapid — but I 
am speaking of ground wliich I have not myself 
visited. 
The Italian object, on the other hand, is 
everywhere offensive. They desire to seize the 
s{)ur of Podgora. because if this were in their 
hands they would conunand with their heavy, 
artillery the depots, barracks, &c., of Gorizia. 
And they also desire to press forward across the 
Carso plateau and down on to the plain to the 
north of it until they have pinned the Austrian 
[Copy,ighl in America by " The Nciv York American."} 
