I.AHD ASD JTATER. 
taoaps IB GOTizia np against the m o ant a i its and 
ad. tkem cM from all sapphr, aare sodi (<ptite in- 
t) as can reach tbm hj the ■oantaixi 
Sodi beti^ the pontk» as a whole <m this 
k fMHiit of we Itauaa front, we shall oext turn 
t« the most inuwrtant matter in conneetioB witft 
that fnmt, wsidi is^ as I have said, not the 
•draaee or retiramcnt of the Italian line, hot the 
eteetoithe IbUiaaiBtcrrention upon uMmbers. 
Let me recapitulate these eknents of the 
■nmerical sitaatioii, which render this point of 
socii importjuioe. 
The encmjr, as a whole, has lost sach nambers 
that kia reaenre in man-power may psobobh^ be 
Horded as not more than one-twelfth now of his 
)oUl original man-power, or anjrthing between a 
idCth and one-sixth of his remaining man-power. 
.Well, consider tliis reserve of man-power 
hefore the Italian operations began. It was there, 
leady to supply constant^ the gaps formed by the 
hta,rj fi^rtmg upon tne East^ front, and 
oocanoBsuly to send reinforcements to the ^est 
for particular operations. 
Italy intervenes. At once a portion of this 
reserre most be naed. According to the drawing- 
power of this " blister " appli^ on the Italian 
front is the reserve depleted. At its maximnm — 
sbonld it have to meet all the forces Italy can put 
into the field, and should it have to meet these 
forces with a similar number of men — the reserve 
would be exhausted altogether. 
Meanwhile, the " buster " draws the enemy's 
men down in a j>erpetual etream, which always 
flows in one direction, even while it is still a small 
stream, and from which no men can be spared to 
go back again to other places. 
f<» instanee, the Itabaa 
rnonHHCthancas 
, and if tjhis grew to he two kDndred 
, and became a little bta three hnndnd 
,AepnieesBisone(rfp«petnald^etkM 
witfcoat aaj chaaee of w aa w eiy; amd Aat nr tiiki 
icasn : that tlv eBcnj has decided (for Urn 
present, at any rate) to' treat the Italian front 
par% defena^^. Hei8,ataBy«o«eat,imtting 
there the very least nnmber of men and gni» 
required to hold on. Therefore, every access of 
leinforcemoits is aaneClHnc ^hich he sends as ths 
minimnm and heg^ndged aOowance for a theatre 
of opeTatians in whicft he is deliberately keeping 
down bis nanAers. He only sends them there 
because he mnst, and foecanse perpetual wantage 
leads him, week after week, right close up to the 
danger point, and compels him to drain in more 
men. 
This effect of the Italian operations upon the 
enemy's reserve of man-power works more power- 
fully than the mere numerical statonent might 
make it seem to work. It has, in other words, a 
more powerful effect by far than a mere redncti<m 
in the enemy's numbers. 
There is a treble action. 
First, there is the direct reduction in 
numbers. 
Secondly, there is the difficulty of keeping the 
units on other fronts at full strength. 
Thirdly, there is the confusion caused by the 
uncertainty as to how many men may be wanted 
for this Italian front in the future. 
Let me put the matter in a concrete way, and 
my point will be apparent. 
Supposing, in some smaller operation than 
this great war, a general had, say, one hundred 
