July 31, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER, 
tbeir iadefatigable ofiicers. How luige and oiicrou? was this 
task when opposed by an eut«rpi'isiug aud unscrupulous 
euemy may be gauged by a glance at the map: its true nature 
can only be realised by those who were engaged in its per- 
formance. For nearly four months these men fought on under 
adverse conditions, never recking the extra risks they ran 
from wild beasts, were they at any time to fall wounded aud 
lie lost in the tall grass or thick patches of bush. And not 
only did they hold their own, but they were so successful in 
driving back, aud inflicting considerable los.ses on, superior 
forces of the euemy, that the majority of the German settlei-s, 
who had been forced into the ranks whether they would or no, 
had little wish to continue the struggle. Indeed, there were 
cases in which individuals came some distance to surrender, 
aud openly stated that it would only require a little added 
pressure on our part, and, perhaps, one good figitt, before 
the German authorities would be prepared to discuss terms. 
So much for tlw work of the Volunteers, which must 
always occupy a prominent place in any review, however 
slight, of the operations in British East Africa, not only on 
account of its excellence, not only on account of the magni- 
ficent sacrifices it entailed, but because no other troops have 
ever proved able to accomplish the same work with such 
marked success. That work did not come to an end with the 
arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force: it is still being 
carried on in the same spirit of detennination, but the 
Volunteers to-day form only a small section of the forces 
engaged in the subjection of German East Africa, and it is to 
ikese other forces and the part they have played in the cam- 
paign that we must turn our attention. 
The first Indian troops to arrive in the Prot«ctorate were 
a comparatively small body under Brigadier-General J. M. 
Stewart, C.B., A.D.C., who was in command of the recent 
Eucoessful expedition against Bukuba, when a strong enemy 
base on Lake Victoria was captured. These troops were 
Btationed at various points along the line between Mombasa 
and Nairobi, where General Stewart established his head- 
quarters, and activity in the country for some time after their 
arrival was directed more to the organising of ordnance and 
sapplies than diistinctly against the enemy. The main Indian 
Expeditionary Foro», that is " B " Force, which left Bombay 
at the same time as " A " Force left for Europe, sailed 
straight for the coast of G«rman Ea.st Africa and attempted 
to effect a landing at Tauga and capture the railhead there. 
The failure of this attempt has formed the subject of a short 
official announcement : no really detailed account of the 
acfeioa. bas ever been published, and I do not propose to give 
imcb an account here nor to discuss the question of why the 
attack was unsuccessful. The point I wish to make clear here 
is that the attack on Tauga was the fiist move in & definite 
offensive campaign which was to be carried out by the ludian 
Expeditionary Force against German East Africa. The 
failure of the attack on Tanga meant the breakdown, for the 
time being, of the origiiial scheme aud th«. Lnaugurat)r>a of 
fresh plans, while his victory appears to have encouraged the 
euemy to fresh tflorts and to the maiatenauoe, if uece.'=sary, 
of a long and arduous resistance. 
The force which has bccu transported to East Africa 
from India consists, mainly, of Imperial Service troops, who 
are commanded by native ofRcers, with one white Political 
Officer to each regiment. Added to these are a number of 
units from the Regular Indian Ar.-ny, chiefly Punjabis 
and Gurkhas. The European section of the force if com- 
posed of Loyal North Lancashires and Volunteer Corps from 
Bombay and Calcutta. 
After re-embarking at Tanga, the troops were lauded 
at Mombasa. Major-General Wapshare, who was appointed 
G.O.C., established his headquartere at Nairobi, and dis- 
positions of troops took place in the dillerent areas, which 
have already been specified, of the long strip of territory 
lying between the Uganda Railway and the German border. 
But, although a comparatively large number of troops were 
thus disposed, the natural advantage of the situation re- 
mained with the enemy, who was able profitably to employ 
tactics which, had we in turn adopted them, would in no 
way have furthered our ends. The first care of the British, 
naturally, w^as to safeguard the L^gauda Railway; the second, 
to develop a definite and successful offensive. The object of 
the euemy, on the other hand, was merely to cause injury to 
us; his furthest aim, apparently, being the destruction of 
some vital point on the Uganda Railway. Accordingly, if 
ever opportunity offered to effect a quick raid, inflict loss and 
retire, he was quick to seize it, aud some heavy engagements 
took place in consequence. Some of the severest fighting 
occurred at Jasin, which is some fifty miles distant from Mom- 
basa, and lies in the heart of a large sisal plantation in Ger- 
man territory, aud, therefore, was far better known to them 
than to us. Our object in occupying the post was to afford 
protection to the natives inside the British border, but there 
can be no doubt that to send our troops there at all was a 
tactical error, ^^jis conclusion had been arrived at, in fact, 
by the G.O.C. and the General OflScer responsible for the dis- 
])ositiou of the troops in this area, and it had been decided 
to withdraw the post. Unfortunately, the attack fell before 
this decision could be carried into effect, and, des))ite the 
remarkable gallantry displayed both by ludian and African 
troops, the position was surrounded and captured. 
(7*0 he continued.) 
COTTON AND EXPLOSIVES. 
By Lord Sydenham. 
THE handling of the question of cotton since the 
outbreak of war might fitly be described a.s a 
comedy of errors if the results had not been 
deeply tragic. From the first, misconceptions, 
which have needed nearly a year to dispel, 
prevailed in the counsels of Government, and the Press 
generally has been slow in grasping the simple facts. 
iWhen this vital question was hrst rai.sed, the Government 
was advised that discarded cotton garments would pro- 
vide a large supply of this indispensable commodity, 
and that, failing them, the expert German chemists were 
well able to turn to account valid sub.stitutes. The latter 
opinion was endorsed by the Marquis of Crewe in the 
House of Lords on July 15 in these words : " Knowing 
what we do of the extraordinary .skill and pertinacity of 
the German chemi-sts, it would, I think, be a bold thing 
to assume tiiat no substitute, even if less convenient, can 
be found in many cases." The prevailing misconcep- 
tions were heightened by the confusion of two distinct 
wquirements, " high explosives " and " propellants," 
and when an eminent chemi.st announced that cotton 
played no part in the production of the former, and a 
newspaper headed this announcement as " The Cotton 
Fraud," the bewilderment of the general public was 
complete. 
As a first step towards what Lord Haklane has 
called " clear thinking," it is necessary to point out 
that " high explosives " and " propellants " serve 
different purposes; that neither can be substituted for 
the other; and that their behaviour and mode of em- 
ployment are diverse. It so happens, however, that gun- 
cotton was adopted in the early days of higli explosives, 
which possibly contributed to the confusion of ideas. It 
was used in submarine mines, in torpedoes, and 
in shells, except shrapnel. " Lyddite," which is 
picric acid, then came into favour, and now tri- 
nitro-toluol, known as T-N-T, which the Germans 
were quick to utilise and we tardily accepted, is be- 
coming the principal high explosive. Neither of these 
two products contains cotton, and Professor Reid's state- 
ment was perfectly correct. Violence is the main recjuire- 
ment of a high explosive, and this is attained by 
detonating a substance which otherwise may be coirpara- 
tively inert and safe in handling. Mines, torpedoes, 
.shells, and now hand-grenades, depend for their elTect on 
this quality. A high explosive in the bore of a gun or 
rifle would wreck the weapon and might kill the men who 
used it. 
In a propcllant, other qualities are needed, of 
which the most important is uniformity of push 
without ri.sk of detonation. Gunpowder, after a 
lung unbroken reign, leading to many modifications 
as liie power of ordnance rapidly developed towards 
the end of last century, at length gave way to compounds 
17 
